BUTLER, Joseph, English philosopher and theologian : b. Wantage, Berkshire, England, 1692; d. 1752. Although reared a Presbyterian, he became a member of the Episcopal Church, and entered Oriel College, Oxford, in 1714. After receiving his degree he took orders and was appointed preacher at the Rolls Chapel, where he preached the famous "Sermons on Human Nature" which have given him a lead ing place among moral philosophers. These (of which the first three are of fundamental importance) were published in 1726. Ten years later (1736) appeared his famous (Anal ogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature.' He gained the friendship of Queen Caroline who at her death left a request that he should re ceive promotion in the Church. In 1738 he was appointed bishop of Bristol, and in 1750 was promoted to the bishopric of Durham.
Butler's "Sermons on Human Nature" have given him a foremost place among ethical writers, and have had an important place in the instruction at the English universities. His ethical teachings are directed at what might be called the "naturalistic" view which was formu lated with great clearness by Hobbes in the previous century and which still seemed suffi ciently dangerous in the 18th century to require repeated refutation. The doctrines of Hobbes as against which the more "orthodox" writers directed their attacks were: (1) That moral distinctions are not "natural," founded in the nature of things, but conventional, resting upon the authority of a state founded by social contract ; and (2) that human nature is essen tially egoistic. These positions had been con troverted by Cudworth, Samuel Clarke and others who sought to show that moral relations belong to the very nature of things. Butler chose a more concrete method of inquiry. There are two ways, he says, in which moral questions can be treated. "One begins from inquiring into the abstract nature of things the other from a matter of fact, • namely, what the particular nature of man is, its several parts, their economy or constitution; from whence it pro ceeds to determine what course of life it is which is correspondent to this whole nature." It was this psychological method which Butler adopted. Human nature, he maintains, is to be regarded as a whole or system, which is made up of parts, but which cannot rightly be under stood until we consider "the relations and respects which these parts have to each other." In addition to particular affections and in stincts, Butler finds that there is in man a natural instinct which makes for his own pres ervation and happiness, and also a natural principle of benevolence whose object is the good of others. These are the two general principles which he names self-love and be nevolence. Against Hobbes, he argues that the latter is just as fundamental and natural as the former. The constitution of our nature proves therefore that we are made for society. But, on the other hand, Butler will not deny the legiti macy of self-love, or identify, as had been done, the content of morality with benevolence. The self-love which is approved, however, is not a particular affection, but a general principle of regard for one's own happiness and interests. It is "cool" or "rational" self-love which is justified. This principle may, however, become perverted into selfishness or egoism by being allowed to operate without due reference to the elements of human nature. It then loses its authority and ceases to be a general principle. Men constantly sacrifice their most evident interest to fancy, inquisitiveness, love, hatred or any vagrant inclination, and thus violate their nature no less in regard to their individual than to their social end. Self-love has accord ingly a regulative control over the particular passions and inclinations: it possesses higher authority, and this authority is something quite distinct from the question as to which in any given case happens to be stronger. There are some passages in which it might seem that Butler intends to identify morality with what he calls "rational self-love," and to subordinate benevolence as a particular affection to it. Yet it is evident from the whole context of his ethical system that he rather intends to show that self-love and benevolence are co-ordinate, but not contradictory principles, both superior to what he calls the "particular affections," and both in turn harmonized and systematized in human nature by the supreme principle of con science. "There is a natural principle of be nevolence in man, which is in some degree to society what self-love is to the individual.° By insisting as he does upon the presence in human nature of these two principles, and their necessary harmony, Butler avoids the extremes of making one or other of these principles supreme in conduct, as well as the necessity of denying or explaining away the other. He
transcends the fundamental conflict between • interested" and "disinterested* conduct, in which his predecessors and many of those who came after him found themselves involved; and he goes far in suggesting the conception of the complementary character and essential unity of these principles in the idea of a "social self.* But Butler's ethical system receives its com pletion in the idea of conscience as the supreme authoritative principle to which both self-love and benevolence are subordinate. He defines conscience as that "principle of reflection in men by which they distinguish between, approve and disapprove their own actions." Moreover, "conscience not only offers itself to show us the way we should walk in, but it also carries its own authority with it, that it is our natural guide.* The conclusion is that from the very make or constitution of man he is in the strictest sense a law unto himself. "Had con science strength, as it has right; had it power, as it has manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the world." Two objections have been brought against Butler's view of conscience by modern writers. In the first place, it is urged that it involves a falling back upon mere intui tion, upon a principle that can give no account of itself or of its mode of operation. There are doubtless some passages in his writings which, taken by themselves, might seem to jus tify this interpretation. But it is necessary to remember that for Butler conscience is reason or reflection, that is, that it is the action of the whole moral constitution of man, and that in following its requirements we are acting in the light of the whole. The second criticism is that for him conscience seems to pronounce in fallible judgments, taking no account of cir cumstances, and not providing for the growth or development of ethical judgment. It is doubtless true that Butler was concerned to defend the "absolute" authority of conscience as a principle of human nature. Yet it is not for him any mechanically acting faculty : the due proportion between self-love and benevo lence is different in different cases, and °can be judged only from our condition and nature in this world.° Conscience itself develops with use and practice, becoming more and more ade quate to deal with the changing conditions of life, and giving rise to virtuous habits and fixed modes of character. Morality for him is no set of fixed axiomatic truths, infallibly per ceived once for all; but it is what the moral reason perceives in particular situations to be correspondent to man's nature and constitution when this is seen in its true perspective.
Butler's 'Analogy) is the most famous and most carefully reasoned defense of revealed religion which appeared in England during the 18th century. It was directed against deism (ci.v.) and sought to meet the attacks which this school of writers brought against the tra ditional view of theology. Butler undertakes to show that the course of nature suggests not only the conclusions, which the deists admitted, of the existence of God and the duty of wor shipping Hin; but also, when looked at more closely, natural occurrences and laws seem to furnish evidence for the doctrines of revealed religion which the deists *discarded and denied as immoral. Butler's candor in pointing out what might be called imperfections and injus tice in nature, which the deists were inclined to neglect, has led to the remark that his treat ment tends to raise doubts rather, than to settle them, and that his conclusions might be read by a sceptical mind in a different way. However this may be, one can say that Butler's (An alogy' together with Hume's 'Dialogues on Natural Religion) served to undermine, long before the appearance of Kant's systematic criticism, the rationalistic conclusions of °natu ral religion.° It should be noted that Butler did not profess to furnish a demonstration for the doctrines of revealed religion, but only to show their probability by pointing out their analogy with the course of nature. For man, as he says, in all such matters, °probability is the very guide of life.° Bibliography.— There are of Butler's works; the most recent being that of Gladstone in two volumes, 2d ed., 1898. Mr. Gladstone also published a volume entitled 'Subsidiary Studies on Butler.' Consult also Collins, W. L., 'Butler) (Blackwood's P hilos Classics'); Stephen, Leslie, 'English Thought in the 18th Century' (Vol. I) ; Sidgwick, H., 'History of Ethics); Lefevre, A., articles in the Philosophical Review, Vols..VIII and IX.