3. The changes in congressional functions and relations, from the intent Of the framers of the Constitution, come under three heads: (1) The position of Congress as a whole re garding the executive; (2) the position of the two houses regarding each other; (3) the posi tion of the whole body regarding legislation.
(1) The Constitution attempted a total sepa ration and absolute equality between the execu tive and legislative branches, the latter deciding on measures of public welfare and the former carrying them out. How far this would be de- sirable if perfectly accomplished-- altogether forbidding one branch of the government to think and the other to act—might be ques tioned, but will not be argued here. At any rate, it was never remotely realized except when both were in deadly need of the same thing, or one was content to forego thinking. The ideal example of its best is probably the Lincoln ad ministration, a strong executive and a strong Congress with the same essential purposes; of its worst, the Johnson administration, where the thoughts of the one and the acts of the other were at irreconcilable variance, and what the one most wished done was what the other was most set on not doing. More usually, one side or the other has been master. The extreme instance of executive mastery was the Jackson administration, where a resolute and aggressive leader, with a not too reflective popular ma jority behind him, got such legislation as he wished; of congressional mastery, each reader may prefer to choose his own instance. But there can be no question that the balance in clines more and more decisively to the con, .gressional side. Of late years the results of attempted executive independence have been more picturesque than successful. The Senate, which has the confirmation of treaties and ap pointments, cannot be prevented from signify ing in some form what treaties and appoint ments it will confirm; and the body which can grant or refuse money for public purposes can decide what those purposes shall be.
(2) The change of power between the Houses is not so dramatically obvious, but it is quite as notorious and is easily explicable. The Senate has some superiorities: its long terms both attract superior men on an average and enable them to acquire parliamentary Icnowledge and public weight; its committees are still its servants rather than its masters—preparing legislation for it to discuss, rather than merely killing most of it, and leaving the rest to run in an undiscussed huddle through the open sluice at the last; and it has time and rules that permit some genuine argument, for its own and the public's enlightenment. But these very terms render seats so valuable and desirable that members are more loath to peril them than House seats; and the Senate, which was ex pected to have more independence than the House from the length of terms, has actually of late years had less backbone and less willing ness to run counter to popular currents within its own party than the House. Moreover, the license of debate has too often been a mere license of wanton obstruction, bringing forward no new facts or illuminating discussion, but only exhibiting the spectacle of the will of 100,000,000 people nullified by one or two of its servants. This does not contradict, but only supplements, the other evil. On the other hand, the unity and dispatch of public business made possible in the House by the nominal autocracy and real leadership of the Speaker, aided by the committees and the previous question, have made it seem more and more the body where something is accomplished and the will of the people carried into execution.
(3) The drift of our form of government, and the coming position of Congress and its organs within it, are to some extent matters of prophecy rather than fact; and political philoso phers have been busy with them. But some things are certain, and though commonplace, must be recited. Chief of them are the control of the Speaker and the committees over legisla tion. That the Speaker is a totally different
officer from the English Speaker is obvious. He puts motions, decides question of rule and order, and represses disorder, it is true; but instead of being a sworn judge he is a recog nized party chief, with functions which approxi mate the English premier much more closely than the other. By his appointment of the com mittees he determines the line which legislation shall take, and in a broad way the bills which shall or shall not be considered; and by his daily power of recognizing members who wish the floor, in whicit he is held to none but party re sponsibility, he still further molds the total im pression which the measures shall make on the public. But he is no autocrat; his very in fluence can only be exercised by appointing the chief party leaders to the committees, and once there, it is they and not he who hold the deci sive power; he and they together, in fact, form something like the shaping committee which is what ,the .Etnelish Cabinet, headed by the premier, has fully become. The Cabinet offi cers, moreover, are fast becoming advisers of the committees rather than of the President. These approximations to the English position have caused many to think that the transforma tion will be fully carried out, and the parlia mentary system established in fact if not in form in the future; the speaker having the full power of the premier, and the President be coming a dignified nullity like the sovereign of England. But there are still some vital differ ences, and it is not easy to foresee the process by which they will be overcome. It is true that the admission of Cabinet officers to the floor of either House, to expound their views and needs and explain doubtful questions, is within a sim ple permissive vote of that House at any time. and can perfectly well be made a standing rule; and that the consequent necessity of their being skilful speakers and capable expositors would profoundly modify the character of men chosen for that position. But the committee do not want information on the floor of the House of Representatives at least: they have no time to attend to it there, and the rules would mostly shut it off before anything material had been communicated. They want it in their commit tee rooms, and that needs no change in the men and would involve none before the public. The officers cannot become primarily public speakers and secondarily executive officers un less the House gives up its time to debate; and the whole tendency is the other way, ricir is it evident where the new time would be found or taken. The place where the change would have to take place is in the Senate, if at all; but the power of legislation more and more drifts away from the Senate except as concur rent; and the new debaters, if they arrive, will seemingly be more in the position of those in the House of Lords than of Commons, which would be immaterial. Still greater is the ob stacle of fixed terms. The English members of the Commons remain no longer when the people vote that they do not want them, and it is consequently the great party object to ob tain such a vote and to put the other party in a position where they must be disgraced if they do not ask the people to give one pro or con. But the American member must serve out his term, and he can do so if his party has lost all public favor: the tremendous sweep of 1874 did not shorten any Republican member's term for a day, nor imperil any piece of Republican legis lation, for which they had an entire session after they were voted down, and as many spe cial ones as the President had chosen to call; and similarly with reverses of the other side. This alone prevents debate from taking up time in the House; it is mainly a sham battle, the real one having been fought in committee. Still further, the English committee called the Cabi net is all of one party, represents it, goes down with it; and the bills it puts forward are the party's bills.