CONTINENTALS, or CONTINENTAL ARMY, the army of the United States during the Revolution. In May 1775, after the battle of Lexington, the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts requested the Continental Con gress to assume control of the forces which had gathered around Boston. Further outside pres sure led the latter Congress in June to vote for raising a ((Continental army* (the name ((Con tinental)) in all these cases expresses the hope, long entertained, that Canada would join the revolt), and for a loan of $2,000,000 to support it. On the 15th George Washington was ap pointed oommander-in-chief ; then four major generals were appointed, Artemas Ward, Charles Lee, Philip Schuyler and Israel Put nam; and an adjutant-general, Horatio Gates. Lee and Gates were bitterly opposed in Con gress, and were only confirmed by Washington's influence, as men of approved military capacity. It is curious that Congress was right and Wash ington wrong, and that Lee's treachery and Gates' incompetence and intrigue nearbr ruined the cause and Washington together. The bng adiers appointed were general officers in colon ial service, with two others; and the inferior colonial officers were confirmed in their rank and shortly given Continental commissions. For commissary-general was chosen Joseph Trumbull, son of the governor of Connecticut, Washington's right-hand man and adviser, who kept a great general store in Lebanon. There was a further reason for this. The food sur plus of the country came mainly from three great valleys,— the Connecticut, the Hudson and the Delaware; the last two were held by, or liable to raids from the British during most of the war, and the Connecticut Valley was the one rich farming country which the British could not molest. .Hence the first two commis sary-generals were both Connecticut merchants. Washington appointed his aide, Thotnas Mifflin of Pennsylvania, quartermaster-general; and Dr. Benjamin Church of Boston was made director of the army hospital. There was no paymaster general till late in 1776, when William Palfrey of Boston was appointed. On 12 June 1776 Congress voted to appoint a aBoard of War and Ordnance* of five members; in 1777 this was changed to a *Board of War,* to consist of three persons not members of Congress. This board has not left an enviable historical repu tation; but it lacIced neither ability nor patriot ism. In part its troubles were due to civilian misunderstanding of and contempt for military claims and feelings; in part to the insistence by the States on their share of army patronage, as now of civil patronage, which drove some of the best generals from the service and con tributed to Arnold's treason.
The army was constituted by talcing into colonial pay the militia regiments of the vari ous colonies, and enlisting others for a year. The number on the war office rolls during 1775 was 27,443, besides an estimate of 10,180 militia for a few months' service during 1776, 46,891 regulars, 16,700 militia as before. Had these
all been in the field and good troops, and well equipped, they would have been fairly sufficient, though not what could or should have been raised; but half or more were on paper, the material was poor, the equipment Insufficient and the whole system incompatible with effect iveness. The terrn of enlistment was too short for the soldiers to learn their business; the militia absolutely refused to submit to disci pline, and their insubordination affected the regulars. Washington during the campaigns of 1776 urged upon Congress a plan for a perma nent army; that body sent a conunittee to the camp at Harlem Heights, and drew up a scheme generally in accord with his views, which Con gress adopted. The aarmies* of different sec tions were to be consolidated into one body, of 88 battalions with 750 men each, to be raised in the States according to jpopulation and re sources; besides a Canadian regiment to be called aCongress' Own.) The largest numbers, 15 battalions each, were to come from Massa chusetts and Virginia. The men were to be enlisted for the war, with a bounty of 100 acres of land each at the end; officers, higher amounts; colonels, 500; and $20 bounty for each recruit. The States were to enlist their quotas, arm and equip them; and to appoint the officers from colonel down though Congress was to commission them. But the plan worked slowly and poorly. Enlistments for the war were so few that a three years' term was sub stituted; to stimulate even these, Massachusetts began and other States continued the policy of greatly increasing the bounties, and towns and counties bid still higher; but this rather made the process slower, men waiting to see how high the bids would go. Washington was shortly invested with dictatorial powers to re move any officers under brigadier, and fill the vacancies at his discretion; and allowed to raise 16 extra battalions. This somewhat strength ened his scanty lines, and enabled him in a slight degree to rectify the mischief done by the State patronage, give commissions to good officers, and keep others from retiring. But even so, and despite incessant drafts from the militia, the total number of soldiers enrolled in 1777 was but 34,820 regulars and 10,100 militia; in 1778, 32,899 and 4,353; in 1779, 27,699 and 5,135; in 1780, when the Carolinas and Georgia were in British hands, and none of their troops were on the roll, 21,015 and 5,811; in 1781, when Cornwallis surrendered, 13,292 and 7,298. It would seem that if the British could have held out a little longer, or sent one more army to America, the Continental army would have melted into nothing without the country taking pains to keep it up.