John Richard Green, in his 'History of the English People,' after commenting on the vagueness of some of the provisions of the Great Charter says: "But all vagueness ceases when the Charter passes on to deal with the rights of Englishmen at large, their right to justice, to security of person and property, and to good government.• He also writes: (A memorable article that lies at the base of our whole judicial system ran, 'No freeman shall be seized, or imprisoned or dispossessed, or outlawed, or in any way brought to ruin; we will not go against any man or send against him, save by legal judgment of his peers, or by the law of the ° Another section of the Great Charter reads as follows : "To no man will we sell or deny, or delay, right or justice.° In summing up the beneficial effects of the Great Charter, Mr. Green writes: "The great reforms of the past are now formally recog nized; judges of assize were to hold their cir cuits four times in the year, and the king's court was no longer to follow the king on his wanderings over the realm, but to sit in a fixed place') During the reign of Edward I judicial re forms of great importance were brought about. The King's. Court was divided into three dis tinct tribunals: (1) The Court of Exchequer, which took cognizance of all cases in which the royal revenues were concerned. (2) The Court of Common Pleas, for the trial of suits be tween private persons. (3) The Court of King's Bench, which had jurisdiction in all matters that affected the sovereign as well as in pleas to the Crown, or criminal cases that were expressly reserved for his decision. Each of these courts was provided with a distinct staff of judges.
Another judicial reform of even greater im portance was the establishment, in the reign of Edward I, of an equitable jurisdiction, side by side with that of the common law. By this measure was brought into existence the equity side of the court, and by it the courts were enabled to give more adequate relief in many cases of injustice. The king, in whom, as above stated, the judicial power vested, dele gated his judicial authority to the several courts of law by means of a No case could be instituted in a court of law except by the purchase of the proper writ. The common law courts acquired jurisdiction in each par ticular case by virtue of the writ, which could only be issued in cases already pro vided for and found in the registry of writs, or by the statute of Westminster II. By a narrow construction of the statute of Westminster II, the writs issued by the clerks failed to give proper redress, and often, because of technicali ties, no redress at all. Perhaps it was not always intended that they should give complete remedy because that meant simply a residuum of judicial power remaining with the king, not as yet delegated to any of the courts. Hence, applications for relief were allowed to be made to the king, or what amounted to the same thing, to his chancellor. The litigant would go
to the chancellor and say, "The Courts tell me that the writ issued by your clerk does not suit my case. Your clerk says he has no other writ to sell me. Writ or no writ, I appeal to you for justice." This was in substance the peti tion addressed to the chancellor, who, besides being.the keeper of the king's seal and his sec retary, was also known as the keeper of the king's conscience, and in constant attendance upon his person. Ways and means were devised for granting relief in cases where the common law writs had failed. In this way grew up a form of relief and a system that has evolved during the centuries into what is now known as the equity jurisprudence. After the estab lishment of parliamentary government, the courts took their law from the legislative enact ment, and their jurisdiction was constantly widened and increased by the many legislative acts that were adopted from time to time.
The judges of all the courts were appointed by the king and could be removed by him at will, until during the reign of William III (1701), it was enacted that the commissions of the judges should be qui:fait se bene gesserint instead of durante bene placito, as formerly, and they could be removed only by an address to both Houses of Parliament. The chancellor, who presided over the equity jurisdiction, be came subject to removal by the king at pleasure, his office being by political tenure.
It will accordingly be seen that it was not until the tenure of judicial office was made in dependent of the king and the separation of the judiciary from the executive was made effec tual, that the independence and power of the courts of law and equity were firmly estab lished; and it was not until these reforms were brought about that the courts were organ ized and firmly established under the system which prevailed for two centuries prior thereto and so continued until modified by the Judica ture Act of 1873.
Prior to the Judicature Act of 1873, the superior courts of England consisted of the common-law courts; namely, the Court of King's Bench (called Queen's Bench in the reign of a queen), the Court of Common Pleas and the Court of Exchequer. These three courts were of about the same importance and rank, although the Court of King's Bench was looked upon as having a pre-eminence, because the chief justice thereof was styled the Lord Chief Justice of England. In addition to these common-law courts, there was, on the equity side, the High Court of Chancery. Other courts were the Admiralty, Probate and Divorce Courts, and the London Court of Bankruptcy. There was also a court known as the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and the Court for the Consideration of Crown Cases Reserved. The House of Lords exercised the highest ap pellate jurisdiction.