HUTCHESON, FRANCIS, the reviver of speculative philosophy in Scotland, was born in Ireland, August 8th, 1694. His father was minister to a Presbyterian congregation. After completing his studies at Glasgow, Hutcheson officiated for some time in a (limner capacity in the north of Ireland. In 1720 he first became known to the literary world by the publication of his 'Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, &c., with an Attempt to introduce a Mathe matical Calculation in Subjects of Morality,' and acquired by it the friendship of Archbishop King, author of the treatises on the Origin of Evil' and 'Predestination,' &c. His essay 'On the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections' appeared in 1723, and in the following year he was appointed professor of moral philosophy in the University of Glasgow, where he was admitted to the degree of Doctor of Laws. He published, as manuals for his class, 'Synopsis Metaphysical Ontologiam et Pnaumatologiam complectene, and ' Phi losophize Morelia institutio compendiaria Ethices et Jurisprudentim Naturalia Principia cumplectens.' His great work, in 2 vols. 4to, entitled 'System of Moral Philosophy,' did not appear until after his death, which took place at Glasgow in 1747. It was published by his son, Dr. F. Hutcheson, with a life of the author, by Dr. Leechmau.
In his metaphysical system Ilutcheson rejected the theory of iouato ideas and principles, but insisted upon the admission of certain uni versal propositions, or, as ho terms them, metaphysical axioms, which are eelf-evident and immutable. These axioms are primary and original, and do not derive their authority from any simpler and antecedent principle. Consequently it is idle to seek a criterion of truth, for this Ls none other than reason itself, or, in the words of Hutcheson, " menti coogenita intelligendi vie." Of his ontological axioms two are Import ant :—Everything exists really; and no quality, affection, or action is real, except in so far as it exists in some object or thing. From the latter proposition it follows that all abstract affirmative propositions are hypothetical, that is, they invariably suppose the existence of some object without which they cannot be true.
Truth is divided into logical, moral, and metaphysicaL Logical truth is the agreement of a proposition with the object it relates to ; moral truth Is the harmony of the outward act with the inward senti ments; lastly, metaphysical truth is that nature of a thing wherein it is known to God as that which actually it ie, or it is its absolute reality. Perfect truth Is in the infinite alone. The truth of finite things is imperfect, inasmuch as they are limited. It is however from the finite that the mind rises to the idea of absolute truth, and so forms to itself a belief that an absolute and perfect nature exists, which in regard to duration and space is infinite and eternal The soul, as the thinking essence, is spiritual and incorporeaL Of its nature we have, it is true, but little knowledge; nevertheless its specific difference from body is at once attested by the consciousness. It is simple and active; body is composite and passive. From the spiritual nature however of the soul Hutcheson does not derive its immortality, but makes this to rest upon the goodness and wisdom of Cod.
In his moral philosophy Hutcheson adopted the views of Lord Shaftesbury. Accordingly his first endeavour is to show that man desires the happiness of others not less than his own, and that bene volence can no more be explained by selfishness than selfishness by benevolence. In proof of this he examines successively the several solutions of benevolence, and shows of all that they are contrary to facts. He then concludes that man desires the good of his fellows in consequence of having within him an original inclination which aspires to secure the good of others as its final cause. Benevolence therefore is primary and irreducible. There are then two classes of human affections; the one impels man to his own happiness, the other to the well-being of his fellows. But alongside of these two there exists a third, incapable of being reduced to either of them ; the end it has in view is moral good, of which the idea is primary, simple, and irreducible.