The history of philosophy from its earliest origin to its latest development forms so perfect and compact a whole, that no single part can be separately considered without losing something of its value and significancy. This difficulty is greatly increased in the case of a philosophy which gives itself out not only as the completion of its immediate forerunner, but as the sum and result of all anterior systems. Accordingly our general view of the Hegelian system will be unintel ligible unless preceded by a rapid sketch of the states of philosophy out of which it grew. The transcendental Idealism of Kant formed the transition from the empiricism of the I8th century, and effected, as it were, a compromise between the ancient realism and the scepticism of Hume. To the system of Kant succeeded the pure and absolute idealism of Fichte, destined to be displaced in it turn by Schelling's system of absolute identity and intellectual intuition, which was itself to be further modified and developed by the dialectical momentum of Hegel. Essentially the systems of Ilegel end Schelling are both founded on the same principle, namely, the absolute ideality of thought and being; for there is evidently but little difference between the doctrine of Schelling, which supposed that the human mind con tains within it the fullness of reality and truth, the consciousness of which it may attain to simply by contemplating Its own nature, and that of Hegel, according to whom the concrete notion, or the reason, comprises within itself all verity, cud that in order to arrive at the science thereof it is only necessary to employ logical thought, or diRlectie. The difference is purely a difference of method. For the cold and narrow abstractions, the rigorous formalism, of Fichte, Sshelling bad substituted a sort of poetical enthusiasm, and banishing from philosophy the ecientifie form it had received from Wolff had introduced into it the rapturous mysticism of the intellectual Intuition. Hegel however, insisting that the scientific system is the only form under which truth can exist, re-established the rights and utility of method by his doctrine of the dialectical momentum, or development esf the ides. Indeed with Hegel the method of philosophy is philosophy itself. This he defines to be the knowledge of the evolution of the concrete. The concrete is the idea, which, as a unity, Is diversely determined, and has in itself the principle of its activity. The origiu of the activity, the action itself, and the result, are one, and constitute the concrete. Its movement Is the development by which that which exists merely potentially is realised. The concrete in itself, or virtually, must become actual ; it is simple, yet different. This inhereut contradiction of the concrete is the spring of its development. Hence arise differences, which however ultimately vanish into unity. There is both movement, and repose in the movement. The difference scarcely becomes apparent before it disappears, whereupon there issues from it a full and concrete unity. Of this he gives the following illustration :—the flower, notwithstanding its many qualities, is one ; no single quality that belongs to it is wanting in the smallest of its leaves, and every portion of the leaf possesses the sense properties as the entire leaf. He then observes, that although this union of qualities in sensible objects is readily admitted, it is denied in immaterial objects, and held to be irreconcilable. Thus it is said that man possesses liberty ; but that freedom and necessity are mutually opposed ; that the one excluding the other, they can never be united so a, to become concrete. But according to Hegel, the mind is in reality concrete, and its qualities are liberty and necessity. It is by necessity that man is free, and it is only in necessity that ho experiences liberty. The objects of nature are, it is true, subject exclusively to necessity ; but liberty without necessity is an arbitrary abstraction, a purely formal liberty.
This concrete idea develops itself in obedience to certain laws which it determines of itself. Among these Hegel distinguishes three species of thought, or three productions of thought in general. I, the thought,
which ho calla formal, as considered independent of its subject-matter, or, in the Hegelian terminology, of all its contents ; 2, the notion, which is thought more closely determined ; and, 3, the idea, or thought in its totality and fully determined. The truth, determined in itself, experiences a want of development. The idea, concrete and self developing, is an organical system, a totality comprising iu itself vast treasures of degrees and momenta, or germs of further development. Now philosophy is nothing else than the knowledge of this develop ment, and, in eo far as it is methodical and self-conscious thought, it is the development itself. With the progress of this evolution, philo sophy advances towards perfection. The more the idea develops itself the more precise and limited does it become, the wider its expansion and the deeper its intensity. All the partial results it gives rise to, as well as their systematisation, proceed from the one identical idea. Particular systems are but so many diversified forms of the same life ; they have no reality but in this unity, and their differences and their specific determivations taken collectively are but the expression of tiro forms contained in the idea. The idea is at once the centre and the circumference—the source of light, which in all its expansions does not pass out of itself; it is both the system of necessity and its own necessity, and yet nevertheless liberty.
In the history of philosophy we have, under the form of accidental succession, the actual development of philosophy itself. In the dif ferent systems which the history records there is one and the same philosophy at different degrees of its development, and the different principles which have been employed to support these systems aro but branches of a single unity and of one whole. The philosophy therefore which is the last in time is the result of all preceding systems, and consequently must comprise the principles of all, and therefore it is the most perfectly developed, the richest, and the most ' concrete.' The more concrete the idea becomes, the more widely extended is the domain of science. It reconciles the apparent inconsistencies of appearance and reason, and a true philosophy removes the contradiction in which the ancient philosophy was involved with the natural and historical development of the human mind. Starting from and nourished by experience, the thought rises to the idea of the general and the absolute, and, being allowed its free course, passes beyond the moment of doubt and difficulty, to repro duce all that it has conceived in a rational order, and to impress upon It the stamp of a logical necessity. For all verity is virtually con tained in thought, from which, being made fruitful by experience, it is the duty of philosophy to draw it, and to deduce the actual con sciousness. Accordiugly it is the high pretension of the Hegelisu philosophy to reconcile philosophy with reflection, and positive reli gion with the state and with every political and religious establish ment. It is, he observes, an evil prejudice to suppose that true philosophy is opposed to the sober results of experience, and to the rational enactments of actual laws.
Ilegel divides philosophy into three parts :—I, Logic, or the science of the idea in and by itself, or in the abstract element of pure thought ; 2, Philosophy of nature, or the science of the idea out of itself—or in nature, or as nature ; 3, Philosophy of mind, or the science of the idea in its return into itself. Into the details of this division it would ho idle to enter, as it would only lead to a dry and barren nomenclature. Each part is agaiu divided into three parts; for this holy number determines throughout the divisions and subdivisions of the system. In this respect, as well as for his obscurity and neologism, Hegel well deserves the reproach of Wolffianism, which hie master Schelling has urged against him, Schelling indeed disavowed him as his disciple, which honour however Hegel still loved to claim with a satisfaction mingled with regret.