A more immediate source of evil is the freedom of the human will, which however exists for the sake of a greater good, namely, the possible meritoriousness of mau and his consequent adaptation to a state of felicity to be attained by his spontaneous acts. This freedom of man is intermediate between a stringent necessity and-a lawless caprice. That man is free who, of several courses which in certain circumstances are physically possible, ohooses that which appears the most desirable. This choice however cannot be without a motive or sufficient reason, which however is of such a nature as to incline only, and not to compel Every event in the universe takes place according to necessity; but the necessity of human actions is of a peculiar kind; It is simply moral, and is not destructive of its contrary, and consists merely in the choice of the best. Even the Divine omniscience is not destructive of human liberty. God unquestionably knows all future events, and among these consequently the acts of all individuals in all time who act and sin freely. This prescience however does not make the contingency of human actions a necessity.
Such was the philosophical system by which Leibnitz sought to correct the erroneous opinione of his age, which had been drawn from the theory and established on the authority of Descartes. The broad and marked distinction which the latter had drawu between matter and mind had led to an inexplicable difficulty as to the reciprocal action of the body and soul, to get rid of which Spinosa had advanced his theory of substance, and denied or got rid of the difference. Leibnitz attempted to solve this difficulty by resolving all things into spirit, and assuming nothing but mental powers or forces. Neverthe less he has only presented the dualism of the Cartesian theory under another form ; and the equal difficulty of explaining the community of action between the conscious and unconscious forces, so as to account for the reciprocal influence of body and mind, forced him to have recourse to the gratuitous assumption of the pre-established harmony. As to the charge of fatalism, which Dugald Stewart has objected to, his objection seems to have arisen from that antagonism of error which takes refuge from a blind necessity in irrational chance.
The theory of optimism has been the subject of the satire of Voltaire, but it is not more misrepresented in 'Candide' than in the Essay on Man.' Pope and Leibnitz agree in the position that of all possible systems infinite wisdom must form the best; but by the coherency of all, the former understood the co-existence of all grades of perfection, from nothing up to Deity ; the latter, that mutual dependence of all in the world by which each single entity is a reason of all others. By the fullness of creation Leibnitz denied the existence of any gap in the causal order of co-existent things; Pope asserted by it the unbroken series of all degrees of perfection. The Divine permission of evil, Pope referred to the indisposition of the Deity to disturb general by occasional laws. There is consequently evil in the world which tho Deity might have got rid of, if he were willing in certain cases to interrupt h14 general providence. Consequently he admits evil in the world which does not contribute to tho perfection of the whole.
Leibnitz however denies that God could remove the existing evil from the world without prejodice to its goodness. lie moreover does not admit of the opposition of general and particular providence, but makes the general law of the universe to be nothing else than the totality of all special laws. (On this subject consult 31endelsehre ph. Schriften p. 538.) Leibnitz has been spoken of principally as a but it should be remembered that his mathematical fame is as high among mathematicians as his metaphysical reputation is among metaphy sicians, and perhaps higher.
Of the works of Leibnitz several editions and collections have appeared. The two principal are the following:—'G. W. Lelbnitil, Opp. omnia nuns] primum coll. stud.; Dutens, Geneves, 6 vols. ; and ' (Euvres Phil., Let. et Franc., de fen 31. Leibnitz, pub. par M. Rasta; Amstelod., 4to, 1765. The `Commerciuns Philosophic= et b1athematieum; 2 vole. 4to, containing the correspondence of Leib nits with John Bernoulli, was published at Lausanne and Geneva in 1745.