IIERBART, JOHANN FRIEDRICH, a distinguished German philosopher, was born in 1776, at Oldenburg, where his father at the time held an office connected with the adminietratiou of justice. Receiving his religious instruction from a man well acquainted with the philosophical systems of Leibnitz and Kant, Herbal; at the ago of about twelve, was led to speculate upon such subjects as God, freedom, and immortality. Iu his eighteenth year he went to the University of Jena, where be studied under Fichte, and formed an intimate acquaintance with him, and he entertaiued the highest opinion of his master until Schelling'e work, • Votti Ich,' fell into his hands, which was admired by Fichte, while Herbert opposed its tendency with the greatest zeal. This caused a breach between Fichte and Herbert, who gladly accepted a place of private tutor which was offered to him at Bern in Switzerland. lie had already conceived the idea of a system of psychology based upon mathematics, and the more clearly Fichte explained his views upon psychology in his 'Sitten lehre ' (Leipzig and Jena, 1793), the more Herbert became convinced that the speculations of Fichte must be abandoned if any permanent basis was to be gained for his science. About the same time ho devoted himself with great zeal to the study of the history of ancient philosophy, which led him to form an intimate acquaintance with the systems of Plato and the Eleatics. However he continued his own researches which ho had commenced under Fichte, and from 1802 to 1805 he delivered philosophical lectures in the University of Gottin gen, where he developed his peculiar method of thinking, which wee subsequently much extended, but remained essentially the same as it had been from the beginning. His tendency was pre-eminently prac tical, and it was partly owing to this circumstance, and partly to his personal acquaintance with Pestalozzl, that his first works treated ou education. In 1809 he was appointed professor of philosophy at Konigsberg, and was at the same time entrusted with the superin tendence of the higher educational establishments in the eastern parts of Prussia, in the orgauisatiou of which he did great service. In 1833 lie was invited to the chair of philosophy in the University of Giittiogen, where his lectures attracted great attention on account of the clearness and precision with which ho explained his views. He remained at Gottingen until his death, on the 14th of August 1341.
Herbert is the founder of a particular system of philosophy, which is interesting on accent of his peculiar method rather than his origi nality of thought, for in reality his system is of a syucretic kind, and Fichte's iufluence upon it cannot bo mistaken. Although Herbert occasionally professes to be a follower of Kant, still be is of opinion that Kant'a ' Criticism of Pure Reason' is almost without any objec. tivo value, and that its method must be entirely abaudoncd if meta physics are to be founded on a secure and permanent basis. Herbert's realistic tendency further reminds us of the manacles of Leibnitz. Philosophy, according to Herbert, has not, like ordinary ecieuces, any particular set of subjects which are its province, but it consists iu the manner and method in which any subject whatsoever is treated. The subjects themselves are supposed to be known, and are called by him • notions' (Begriffe), ao that philosophy ie the methodical treatment and working out of those • notions.' The different methods of treat• runt constitute the main departments of philosophy. The first of them is logic, which considers the nature and clearness of notions and their combinations. But the contemplation of the world and of our selves brings before us notions which cause a discord in our thoughts. This circumstance renders it necessary for us to modify or change those notions according to the particular nature of each. By the pro cess of modification or change something new is added, which Herbart calls the supplement or complement (Erganzung). Now the second main department of philosophy is metaphysics, which Herbert defines to be the science of the supplementary notions. The method of dis covering the supplementary notions which are necessary in order to render given facts which contain contradictory notiona, intelligible, is, according to him, the method of relations, and it is by this method alone that the other notions of the world and of onreelves can be properly defined. Hence arisea what he calls practical metaphysics, which is subdivided into psychology, the philosophy of nature, and natural theology. A third class of notions, lastly, add something to
our conceptions, which produces either pleasure or displeasure, and the science of these notions is mathetics, which, when applied to given things, forms a series of theories of art, which may be termed prac tical sciences. They arc founded upon certain model notions, such as the ideas of perfection, benevolence, malevolence, justice, compensa tion, equity, and the like. In his metaphysics Herbart points out three problems containing contradictions, viz. things with several attributes, change, and our own subjectivity (das Ich). In order to solve these contradictions, and to make the external and internal world agree and harmonise so as to become conceivable, ho assumea that the quality of everything exiating (des Seienden) is absolutely simple. Things therefore which exist have no attributes referring to apace and time, but they stand in relation to a something, which is the essence of things. Wherever this essence consists of a plurality of attributes, there most also be a pinrality of things or beings, and these many simple things or beings are the principles of all things in nature, and the latter, consequently, are nothing but aggregates of simple things. They exist by themselves in apace so far as it is con ceived by our intellect, but not in physical apace, which contains only bodies. We do not know the real aimple essence of things, but we may acquire a certain amount of knowledge concerning internal and external relations. When they accidentally meet in space they dis turb one another, but at the same time strive to preserve themselves; and in this manner they manifest themselves as powers, although they neither are powers nor have powers. By means of these prin ciples Herbert endeavours to reform the whole system of psychology which he found established by his predecessors ; for, according to him, the soul too is a simple being, and as such it is and remains unknown to us ; and it is neither a subject for speculation nor for experimental psychology. It never and nowhere has any plurality of attribntes, nor has it any power or faculty of receiving or producing anything; and the various faculties usually mentioned by psychologists, such as imagination, reason, &c., which sometimes aro at war and sometimes in concord with each other, are, according to Ilcrbart, mere fictions of philosophers. In like manner he denies that it possesses certain forme of thought or laws regulating our desires and actions. The soul as a simple being, and in its accidental association with others, is like tho latter subject to distnrbance and exerts itself for its own pre servation. The latter point is the principal question in Herbert's psychology, and he endeavours to deduce and calculate the whole life of the soul, with the aid of mathematics, from those mutual disturb ances, checks, and from its reactions against them. Hence he is obliged to deny man's moral or transcendental freedom, although he allows him a certain free character. He maintains the immortality of the soul, because the simple principles of all things aro eternal; but he denies the possibility of acquiring any knowledge whatever of the deity.
These theories, which betray a tendency to subtleties and over refinement, are explained more fully in his works, of which the principal are contained in the following list 'Pestalozzi's Idea eines A. B. C. der Anschanung, nntersucht and wissenschaftlich ent vrickelt,' Gottingen, 1802, 8vo. 2,'Allgemeine Paedsgogik,' Gottingen, 1806, 8vo. 3, Allgemeine Practische Philosophic,' Otittingen, 180$; 8vo. 4, 'Hanptpunkte der Metaphysik; Gottingen, 1808, 8vo. 5, Einleitung in die Philosophie,' 1813, an Improved edition appeared in 1816. 6, ' Kleines Lehrbuch zur Psychologie,' GOttingen, 1815, 8vo. 7, 'Ueber meinen Streit mit der Modephilosophie dieser Zeit,' Konigsberg, 1814. His great psychological work, however, is 8, 'Psychologie ale Wissenschaft, neu gegriindet auf Erfahrung, Meta physik, and Blathematlls,' Koisigsberg, 2 vols. 8vo, 1824-25. 9, All gemeine Metaphysik, nebst den Anfangen der Philosophischen Naturlehro,' Konigsberg, 1823-29, 2 vols. 8vo. 10, Kurze Encyclo psedie der Philosophie, ass practischen Geaichtapunkten ontworfen,' Kbnigsberg, 1831, 8vo. His smaller essays appeared in three volumes, Leipzig, 1842-43, 8vo ; the first volume contains a good Life of Herbert.
(Newer Nekrolog der Deutschen ; Brockhaus,