Such is the celebrated Essay which has formed the basis of more than ouo school of modern philosophy, whose very opposite views may indeed find some support in the occasional variations and self contradictions of its author. For it must be admitted that it is deficient in that scientific rigour and unity of view which preclude all inconsistency of detail. Nevertheless, rightly to appreciate Locke's philosophical merits, all contradictory passages must be neglected, or interpreted by the general spirit of his system. Attaching out attention then to the common mould and whole bearing of the Essay, we must conclude that the authority of Locke is unduly claimed by the followers of Condillac and the ideologists of France, whose object it was to approximate as closely as possible the rational thought and sensuous perception, and to explain the former as simply a result of the latter. For although Locke took in hand the defence of the sensuous clement of knowledge, and, in opposition to Descartes and the idealists, endeavoured to show that in the attainment of science we set out from the sensible as the earlier and the better known, still ho was far from denying that the rational thought, which ii the per faction of human cognition, is really and truly distinct from th( motions of the mind or soul occasioned by sensation. Setting out with the assumption of the permanence of ideas in the mind, Lock( proceeds to illustrate the development of the particular into th( general ; and having then shown their difference from the unren creations of the fancy, proceeds to determine their degree of verity This description of the advance from the simple idea to universals anc to knowledge, evidently implies an independent and spontaneou activity of the mind, which nssents to the sensuous impressions, am confirms them by its conviction. Locke therefore is far from looking
upon human science and knowledge as the simple results of tin impressions produced by external objects on the senses. Noverthe lesa, there is another aspect of his theory which in some degree justi flee the use which has been made of his name, and under which hi appears to be proceeding in the direction of thought, of which th, ideoloFiste have attained to the height. Knowledge, as well as semen Lion, is looked upon as the joint result of the reciprocal action o outward objects and the mental faculties, wherein as much depend on the qualities of the external ns on those of the internal. Whil he admits that assent Is entirely subjective, he nevertheless grant that outward objects constrain It; and as a consequence of such view, he teaches that notwithstanding the idea produced in the min, by an outward object be a passive affection of the mind, it neverthe leas reveals to the mind its efficient tuse; and that to this manifesto Hon of outward objects by the senses there is invariably attached, a by a necessary consequence, the judgment that those objects exie really. It le therefore clear that, according to Locke, we receive senses not merely the object-matter of knowledge, but that lik( wiec the forms under which wo conceive of objects are furnished t the mind from the same source.
The works of Locke have been collected and frequently publisbe a 3 vols. foL, and a life of him was written in 1772; but the most omplete and best edition is that in 10 vols. 8vo, London, 1801 and 812. A Life of Locke was published in 1829 by the late Lord King, lineal descendant of hie sister.