It was long contended that the significancy attached to sounds was altogether conventional. Thus the author of ` Hermes' (314) says : " The meaning of language is derived from compact." No doubt this theory of arbitrary signs is in itself thoroughly intelligible. The signal-flags of a fleet, the oscillations of the needles in a telegraph office, owe their value entirely to a previous understanding ; but the explana tion is utterly without solidity for oral language, inasmuch as we cannot easily imagine a man possessed of sufficient authority to dictate such arbitrary laws, or able to make known his wishes. Add to this the consideration that the absence of all natural connection between the significant sound and tho thing signified, would render it the more difficult both to acquire and to retain a language so constituted. The theory then that would found language on the assumption of a com pact, may be left to share the fate of other similar theories, such as Rousseau's Contrat Social.' Ou the other hand it is now all but universally admitted that some portion of language at any rate, owes its origin to an imitation of the sounds that occur in nature. The moo-cow, the baa-lamb of the child, the cuckoo, the peewit, the whip-poor will, the tueo-tuco, are simple but irresistible examples of this law ; and we have the same principle presented in the dialogue over the Chinese banquet, when, as the tale goes, an English visitor endeavoured to extract from the native waiter a little information as to the dish he was eating by the inquiring words " quack quack, eh ?" and received the more intelligible than welcome answer of " bow-wow 1 " But if the imitation of actual sounds admittedly supplied one part of language, is it an overbold supposition that all language came from this source Not that it is to be expected that in each individual case we should succeed in tracing up the meaning of a word to its onomatopoetic progenitor, for words are incessantly modifying their meaning, and the principle of association by which this result is effccted,is ofteu difficult to follow. No better proof of this difficulty is to be found than iu the fact that the same word has occasionally obtained meanings diametrically opposed to each other. Thus the Latin noun species, lit. 'sight, is at one Lime employed to denote what a person seems to him self to see, and thus we have a class of meanings denoting what is utterly unreal, just as our language owes to the same stock its nouns specious and spectre. At other times it has meanings in keeping with the doctrine that " seeing is believing," and it is in this way that we have in use the terms specie, "solid bullion," as opposed to paper money, and spice, which at one time vied with gold itself in value.
So the learned Dean of Westminster points out that isepetientio has }.sone at deferent times the opposite meaning. of "impatience " (non eseleting) and “apathy" (non.feeling).
Lint to return to the pubjeet of the formation of words on the seiosipie of natural Imitation, it la importaut to notice that there are these who would draw a line, by which words so formed are separated from the large residue of language. Thus there was published a few years back, a raluable paper by Busch:nem:1,in the ' Transactions of the Berlin Academy,' In which he traces through the languages of the world the terms for the leading relations of family, as fatherland mother, and sso establishes a remarkable similarity of Jenne over the whole surface of our globe. Another Gentian writer in the' Transactions of the Philologieal Society' (1859, pp. 31-36), has done the same for the pronouns of the first and second person. It matters little for.the present purpoee that the two writers, here spoken of, refuse to see in this identity of results a proof of the historical unity of mankind, cou tending that it can only prove the ideal unity of human nature ; meaning it is supposed thereby, that different races of men may owe their possession of these words in common, not to tradition, but to the working of similarly constituted minds under similar circumstances. For our present inquiry it is enough that they fully admit the develop ment of these words on natural principles, as opposed to any arbitrary law of dictation.
But if the new which ascribes the origin of words to onoinatopccia be universally true,it will follow that the first development of language was the formation of active verbs, inasmuch as it is 'by action alone that noise can be produced. This proposition is in no way opposed to the commencing observations that the moo-coo and boiesicote owe their names to this principle; for the words moo and boor-wow denote first the act of lowing and barking, and then give a name for the beings that low and bark. Moreover, by the term active verbs are here meant not merely transitive verbs, as strike, but equally the intransitive, as walk, nes, to the exclusion of all verbs denoting a mere state, whether of body or mind. This doctrine, which assigns a sort of primogeniture to the verb, receives no little support from the Arabic, which expresses the grammatical idea of a verb by a word strictly denoting action. (De Sacy's ' Grammar,' § 245.) Similarly the Chinese (Endlicher's Crammer, g 219) denotes the same idea by sing-1s4, words," or t1E " words of motion ;" whereas for nouns the terms in use are ssi-sug, "dead words," or taing-tad, "quiescent words." Precisely in agreement with this, the terms twining of the Latin, and hen of the Greek, being limited to the verb, although etymologically they signify merely that which is spoken, imply thereby a marked supremacy for this part of speech. Is or is there much force in the argument of an
able writer in the Proceedings of the Philological Society' (3, p. 163), that in many languages the same word is used alike for a verb and an abstract substantive of kindred power ; as in Coptic, to signifies indif ferently "give" or "giving," so that with a pronominal affix there occurs ti-k," giving of me," and with the further addition of a noun we hare f,irime of we this, in the sense of I gA-e thin. When the writer in question gives to such a form as ti the title "nomen actionis," he really concedes all that is asked, for there cannot be found a better definition of a verb as here used.
Not a little support for the doctrine now maintained exists in the fact that the moment the idea of feeling is to be represented, the older forms of language exhibit an antipathy to the simple personal verb. Thus the Latin language abounds in such forms, as pact me ejus, lades, &c.; as also in reflective verbs, such as reminiseor, adirierer, terror, wiener. Other languages exhibit a similar peculiarity : as the Greek, in Eel, Aropas, trirreftai; the German, in es ;grout mich, "I repent ; " ra friert mid., " I am chilled ;" es alma mit, " my mind forebodes ; " es ekell " I loath ; " ra traumt vier," I dream ; ' while In our own tongue we have :Ain methinks; and the older language had sseeresss, it likes me. Thus we have in Shakspere the phrases : "An 't like your grace" (' Measure for Measure,' v. I); Ilia countenance likes me not" (' King Lear," L 1); "I'll do it, but it dislikes me "(' Othello,' il. 3). Similarly, our verbs fear, remember, and repent, to take them as specimens, had the active sense before they were employed eis verbs denoting a state of mind ; or it would be more accurate to say, before they were used as reflective.. Than, still to quote from our great poet : "Tush, twill, fear boys with bugs " (' Taming of the Shrew,' L 2); " ller wit+, I fear me, are not firm " (' Measure for Measure,' v. I); " How I may be censured, something fears me to think of " (' King bear,' ill 5). Again : "Thou but retnember'st me of mine own conception " (' King Lear,' i. 4); " And now I am remembered, scorned at ma " (' As You Like it,' iil. 5). So, also : " I do repent mo that I put it to you " (' Othello; um. 3); " I can again thy former light restore, should I repent me." And In the Bible : " It repented the Lord that Ho had made roan" (Oen., vi. 6). Another proof that the verb of action belongs to the earliest state of language is found in the brevity of form which characterises this class of words. Thus the Latin so-called third conjugation consists chiefly of verbs which denote the simplest seta; and the special character of this conjugation Is brevity, the roots consisting largely of a vowel flanked by single consonants; and if the other conjugations poetess a few monosyllabic verbs, those also *Wl out from among their neighbours, as having a similar form of meaning. But, of course, in speaking of such verbs, we discard from view those suffixes which denote the persons, and further reject those modifications, whether of a lengthened vowel or doubled consonant, which are commonly employed solely for the purpose of denoting an imperfect, or rather continued. character of action, by compelling the voice to dwell longer on the sound. Thus, to take our examples from the Latin, we have the verbs, (Isle, "lead ;" die, "say," or rather " show ; " far," do ;" cad," fall ;" mr, " sow," or rather " put ;" rd, "pull ; " let go ; " da, "give," or rather " put ;" i," ; " on, " s5w." The other conjugations have their chief employment In denoting either a state or a succession of acts, as ama, fried, ride, alge, darnel, audi, rule, metro : or, to mark the contrast better, we may point to such pairs of words as ice, " throw ;" lace, " lie ;" acd (aid-ire), "take a seat ;" rode, " be seated, sit ; " cap, " take ;" babe, "have ; " ten- (tend-ere)," stretch ;" tent," hold tightly, grasp." The one main argument which may be opposed to the views here put forward is the doctrine, favoured by many grammarians, that all sentences ought to be reduced to the logical form, conaisting of a sub ject, predicate, and copula. That this view of language is all-important for the syllogism, and consequently for argument, is admitted. It is not admitted that the first object in the formation of language was argument. An earlier and more important object was to enunciate facts and to give commands. In truth, the process by which a logician forces (for it is often sheer force) every sentence into his favourite form, so as to exhibit the so-called substantive verb, is alto gether artificial ; and not a little harm has been done to grammar by regarding language solely from the logician's point of view. Thus we find Do Sacy, in his ' Grammaire Arabe ' (tome L, § 246), expressing himself thus :— Le soul eerie, qu'on puisse regarder comme absolument ndcessaire h ]'expression des jugemens de notro esprit, c'est eclui qu'on nouns() rerbe sobstantif ou abatrait tel quo ease in Latin, Ben en Francois. Celui lb soul ne renferme precigment„que ce qui constitue csscutiellement la valour du verbe, 1'id6e de ]'existence du sujet avec relation Is un attribut.