Adjournment is solely in the power of each house respectively. It has not been uncommon indeed for the king's pleasure to be signified, by message or proclamation, that both houses should adjourn. Either of them however may decline complying with what can be considered as no more than a request. Business has frequently been transacted after the king's desire has been made known, and the question for adjournment put in the ordinary manner.
Dissolution.—The king may also put an end to the existence of parliament by a dissolution. He is not however entirely free to define the duration of a parliament, for after seven years it ceases to exist under the statute of Oeorge I., commonly known as the Septennial Act. Before the Triennial Act, 6 Wm. & Mary, there was no limit to the continuance of parliament, except the will of the king. Parlia ment is dissolved by proclamation, after having been prorogued to a certain day. This practice, according to Hatsell, " which has now been uniform for above a century, has probably arisen from those motives that are suggested by Charles I., in his speech in 1628, ' that it should be a general maxim with kings themselves only to execute pleasing things, and to avoid appearing personally in matters that may seem harsh and disagreeable:" In addition to these several powers of calling a parliament, appoint ing its meeting, directing the commencement of its proceedings, deter. mining them for an indefinite time by prorogation, and finally of dissolving it altogether, the crown has the creation of one entire branch of the legislature ; together with other parliamentary powers, which will hereafter be noticed in treating of the functions of the two houses.
The judicial functions of the lords and their right to pass bills affecting the peerage which the commons may not amend, are the only properties peculiar to them, apart from their personal rights and privileges.
Taxation.—The chief powers vested in the House of Commons are those of imposing taxes and voting money for the public service. Bills for these purposes can only originate in that house, and the Lords may not make any alterations in them, except for the correction of clerical errors. On the opening of parliament, the king directs estimates to be laid before the house, but the amount may be varied by the commons at pleasure. Grants distinct from those proposed in the estimates cannot be made without the king's recommendation being signified. The commons will not allow the right of the lords to insert in a bill any pecuniary penalties or to alter the amount or application of any penalty imposed by themselves; but the rigid asser tion of this rule was found to be attended with much inconvenience, and a standing order was made in 1831, directing the Speaker in each case to report whether the object of the lords appears to be "to impose, vary, or take away auy pecuniary charge or burthen on the subject," or " only to relate to the punishment of offences, and the bowie shall determine whether it may be expedient in such particular case to insist upon the exercise of their privilege." On May 21, 1860, the bill for the repeal of the paper duty was thrown out by the House of Lords, after having been passed by the commons. This excited much attention, as it was contended that the power of refusing to repeal a tax was in fact equal to that of imposing one. It was, however, generally agreed that the lords had the power of refusing to pass any bill of which they disapproved. On July 5, the House of Commons, on the motion of Lord Palmerston, unanimously resolved, " 1. That the right of granting aids and supplies to the crown is in the commons alone, as an essential part of their constitution; and the limitation of all such grants, as to the matter, manner, measure, and time, is only in them. 2. That although the lords have exercised
the power of rejecting hills of several descriptions relating to taxatiou, by negativing the whole, yet the exercise of that power by them has not been frequent, and is justly regarded by this house with peculiar jealousy, as affecting the rights of the commons to grant the supplies and to provide the ways and means for the service of the year. 3. That to guard for the future against an undue exercise of that power by the Lords, and to secure to the commons their rightful control over tax ation and supply, this house has in its own hands the power so to impose and remit taxes, and to frame bills of supply, that the right of the commons as to the matter, manner, measure, and time, may be maintained inviolate." Right of determining Elections.—Another important power peculiar to the commons is that of determining all matters touching the election of their own members, and involving therein the rights of the electors. Upon the latter portion of this right a memorable contest arose between the Lords and Commons in 1704. Ashby, a burgess of Aylesbury, brought an action at common law against the returning officers of that town for having refused to permit him to give his vote at an election. A verdict was obtained by him, but a judgment was given against him in the Queen's Bench, which was reversed by the House of Lords upon a writ of error. The commons declared that " the determination of the right of election of members to serve in parliament is the proper business of the House of Commons, which they would always be very jealous of, and this jurisdiction of theirs is uncontested ; that they exercise a great power in that matter, for they oblige the officer to alter his return according to their judgment ; and that they cannot judge of the right of election without determining the right of the electors, and if electors were at liberty to prosecute suits touching their right of giving voices in other courts, there might be different voices in other courts, which would make confusion, and he dishonourable to the House of Commons ; and therefore such an action was a breach of privilege." In addition to the ordinary exercise of their jurisdiction as regarded the right of elections, the commons relied upon an Act of the 7 Will. III., c. 7, by which it had been declared, that " the last determination of the House of Commons con cerning the right of elections is to be pursued." On the other hand, it was objected that " there is a great difference betweeu the right of the electors and the right of the elected : the one is a temporary right to a place in parliament pro Mc rice ; the other is a freehold or fran chise. Who has a right to sit in the House of Commons, may be properly cognizable there ; but who has a right to choose, is a matter originally established, even before there is a parliament. A man has a right to his freehold by the common law, and the law having annexed his right of voting to his freehold, it is of the nature of his freehold, and must depend upon it. The same law that gives him his right must defend it for him, and any other power that will pretend to take away his right of voting, may as well pretend to take away the freehold upon which it depends." These extracts from the Report of a Lords' Committee, 27th March, 1704, upon the conferences and other pro ceedings in the case of Ashby and White, give an epitome of the main arguments upon which each party in the contest relied. The whole of this Report, together with another of the 13th March, may be read with great interest.