The question, what does human happiness consist of ? remains to be answered. And here too we can only generally indicate the mode of answering the question, rather than provide in detail the answer itself. Man is so framed as to -be susceptible of certain pleasures and certain pains. These pleasures and pains are of two different kinds. physical and intellectual in the last division being included the pleasures and pains of sympathy, and also those derived from the feelings of moral approbation and disapprobation. These pleasures and pains differ of course among themselves, both in kind and degree. Now generally the greater the number of pleasurce gratified, and the greater tho number of pains avoided, the more is man's happiness consulted ; and when there is a necessity of choice between pleasures and pains of different kinds, this happiness is consulted more, in proportion as the pleasures and pains respectively gratified and avoided are more enduring and extensive in effect. The full enumeration and explanation of all the pleasures and pains of which man is by nature susceptible belongs to psychology, or mental science. Morale, availing itself of the results of this science, proceeds to determine, by a coin parieen, in each case, of known pleasures and pains, in respect of number and value, the different duties of man.
Much confusion has been made between mental and moral science-, first by treating the moral feelings (as they are easel), or the feelings of moral approbation and disapprobation, as the immediate object of mom! science ; and secondly, by supposing these feelings, under such MAWS as conscience and moral sense, to be the only and allisufficient criterion of morality or duty. The consideration of these feelings, as of all other feeling, belongs to mental science. SO far as they con tribute to increase the number of human pleasures and pains, their consideration is a necessary preliminary to the treatment of moral science. So far, on the other hand, as the proper direction of these feeling is concerned (which belongs to the act of education), it is clear that the enumeration and explanation of duties ehould precede. Those writers who, merging altogether moral in mental science, derive all duties from what they call an independent moral faculty, which, by way of making the thing clearer, they name conscience, or moral sense, or right rms.?), commit the error of mistaking the effect for the cause. So far as the judgments of this conscience, or moral sense, or right reason, are good and proper judgments, so far must they be founded upon the results of moral science, treated, as we propose to treat it, in reference to the principle of conducivenom to the happiness of man kind. And it will invariably be found that whatever of good exists in
any moral system professing to he founded on something else is really (though its authors imagine otherwise) derived from this science. But where direct and conscious reference is not made to this science, there is no 'longer any security for the proper direction of the moral feelings. As Dr. Paley happily expresses it, "a system of morality, built upon instincts, will only find out reasons and excuses for opinions and practices already established—will seldom correct or reform either." Thins much in the way of preliminary disquisition. We now proceed to enumerate man's several duties.
It is of course mit of the question to give a complete enumeration of single separate duties, or (in other words) to state in detail all that a man ought or ought not to do under all possible varieties of circum stances. This can hardly be expected, or at any rate is seldom pro fessed, and never accomplished, in treatises expressly devoted to the subject. The most at all events that can be done here is to name, with the addition of some brief general explanation, the chief general classes of duties. The adaptation of these general duties to particular cases'is often obvious. In some cases, which will be specially noticed, the carrying out into minute detail of general rules of duty opens new and Large departments of inquiry, which may be considered either as con stituting separate sciences, or as belonging to other sciences rather than to morals.
In thus taking refuge in a general classification of duties, we shall have to furnish the reader with a list of dispositions which it is the duty of man respectively to cultivate and not to cultivate. A dispo sition is a tendency in a man to act (under which word is comprehended thinking, feeling, speakirg, and doing) generally in a certain way. The names for the different dispositions thus come to embrace general classes of actions. For instance, the disposition called benevolence leads to innumerable actions which, under innumerably different circum stances, it is man's duty to perform ; and the name therefore stands as a general name for all these actions. To name singly and separately all these actions would perhaps not be practicable, and is certainly not desirable. Certain sub-classes of them may be named, in explaining the beneficial tendency of the general disposition, or (in other words) the reasons why it is man's duty to cultivate this disposition. This Last explanation will necessarily comprehend a general view of the advant ges of the different actions which the disposition tends to produce.