A punishment ought further to be, as far as the necessary defects of police and judicial procedure will permit, certain ; and also, as far as the differences of human natures and circumstances will permit, If a punishment be painful, and the pain be of the proper amount, and if it be likewise tolerably equal and certain, it will be a good punishment.
The qualities just enumerated are those which it is most important that a punishment should possess. But it is sometimes thought desirable that a punishment should possess other qualities than those which we have enumerated.
1. Since the time when it has been generally understood that punishment ought not to be inflicted on a vindictive principle, the deterring principle of punishment (which necessarily involves an in fliction of pain) has been sometimes overlooked, and it has been thought that the end of punishment is the reformation of the person punished. This view of the nature of punishment is erroneous in excluding the exemplary character of punishment, and thus limiting its effects to the persons who have committed the offence, instead of comprehending the much larger number of persons who may commit it. The reformation of convicts who are coffering their punishment is an object which ought to enter into a good penal system ; but it is of subordinate importance as compared with the effect of the punieh ment in deterring unconvicted persona from committing similar offences.
2. It is likewise sometimes thought that punishment is inflicted for the purpose of getting rid of offenders, or of rendering them physically incapable of repeating their offence. Death has often been inflicted for this purpose ; and bodily disablements of different sorts have been inflicted for the same end ; transportation has likewise been often recommended on the ground of its getting rid of convicts. This view of punishment errs in the same manner as that just examined ; inas much as it is confined to the persons who have actually committed offences. If all offenders were removed to a place of reward, they would be got rid of, but not punished. The principle of getting rid of the offender, or his confinement, for the purpose of protecting society against tho known dangerous tendencies of a person, is properly appli cable in the case of m tdmen.
A detailed account of the punishments which have been used in different nations may be found in different works on antiquities and law books. See, for the Greeks, Wachsmuth's ' Greek Antiquities,' vol. ii.; Hermann's Creek Antiquities,' § 139;' for the Romans, Haubold's Lincamenta,' § 147; for the ancient Germans and for Europe generally in the middle Grimm's Deutsche Rechtsalter thinner; b. v., ch. 3; for modern France, Le Code P6nal; !iv. 1 ; and for England, Blackstone's Commentaries; vol, iv.
The Secondary Punishments inflicted in this country are noticed under CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS and PENAL SERVITUDE.
An idle question is sometimes raised as to the right of a government to inflict death as a punishment for crimes, or, as it is also stated, as to the lawfulness of capital punishment. That a government has the i power of inflicting capital punishment connot be doubted ; and in order to determine whether that power is rightfully exercised, it is necessary to consider whether its infliction is, on the whole, beneficial to the community. The following considerations may serve to deter mine this question respecting any given class of crimes. Death is unquestionably the most formidable of all punishments ; the common sense of mankind, and the experience of all ages and countries, bear evidence to the truth of this remark. Moreover, capital punishment effectually gets rid of the convict. On the other hand, capital punish ment, from its severity and consequent formidableness, is likely to become unpopular ; and henCe, from the unwillingness of judges and juries to convict for capital offences, and of governments to carry capital sentences into effect, uncertain. Whenever the infliction of capital punishments becomes uncertain, their efficacy ceases, and they ought to be mitigated. An uncertain punishment is not feared, and consequently- the pain caused by its actual infliction is wasted. Capital punishments ought therefore to be pronounced only for crimes which could not be effectually prevented by a secondary pUnishment, and for which they are actually inflicted with as much constancy as the necessary defects of judicial procedure will allow.