RHETORIC (i5nropitch)is a Greek word of similar import to the Latin oratory ; but a rhetorician is a teacher of or writer on oratory, and an orator is one who practises the art ; Demosthenes was an orator, Aria. totle was a rhetorician, and Cicero was both.
English writers, in treating of rhetoric, appear generally to consider it the same as oratory, and perhaps it is difficult to make a distinc tion between them. Cicero's Orator,' De Oratore,' and De Claris Oratoribus ' are always called rhetorical works. Quinetilian (` Inst.,' ii. 14) speaks of persons who translated the Greek word " rhetorice" into Latin by " oratoria" and " oratrix ;" but he objects to the nee of both these words, and adopts the Greek word, which, he says, Cicero himself employed to designate certain books (probably the two books `De Inventions') which he had written on this art. An account of Quinctilian's work on the same subject will be found under QtINcTI. tuaeus, in Moo. Div. In the article ORATORY it is stated that the treatise of Aristotle on rhetoric is the oldest extant treatise on this art, and one of the most valuable books preserved from ancient times. The present article seems to furnish a suitable occasion for giving a short account of Ariatotle's work.
Aristotle begins by saying that rhetoric is the counterpart (Gel irrpogan) of logic, and be defines it to he the faculty (Steeper) of perceiving on any given subject what is best adapted to persuade. Ho divides rhetoric into three parts Persumion ('forts, or rather atomic), Language or Expression (sults), and Arrangement (vita). Ilis work consists of three books, of which the first and second treat of persua Mon, and the third treats of expression and arrangement.
After premising some general remarks on rhetoric, he treats of per maiden as derived from enthymemos (?vOeutszara). Having stated that there are three kinds of persuasion, the deliberative (autigou irrik6v), the demonstrative (Jet8sieriedv), and the judicial (Sieavoole), and that, In reference to each of these, persuasion is both special (idtai) and general (vowel), c. 3, he diecteseas the subject of special persuasion
in each kind : touching the deliberative he inquires whether it be use ful, c. 4 to 8; touching the demonstrative, whether it be honourable, c. 9; touching the judicial, whether it be just, c. 10 to 15. He con cludes the first book by stating and explaining the modes of producing persuasion without the art of rhetoric, c. 16.
In the second book he proceeds to say that, in reference to certain questions, special persuasion must be considered as depending on the character of the speaker, c. 1 • and on the passions of the hearers, c. 2 to 13 ; as also on the character of the hearers, such as their passions, their moral habits, their different ages and conditions in life, c. 17 to 19. lie closes the discussion of special persuasion by viewing it in connection with questions common to the three kinds of persua sion, such as possibility, fact, futurity, and magnitude, c. 19. He then to persuasion considered generally and indefinitely, of which he mentions two kinds, example (sapaicypsc) and enthvmeme (sselintuz), adding poSsie (avefaie) as included in enthymeme. e. 20 to 26.
lie commences the third book with the second part of rhetoric, namely, expression. He states what is necessary to constitute expres sion, c. 2 to 4 ; and describes its various forms, c. 5 to 9. Ha treats of elegance ( Ta atrrela), c. 10, 11; and represents the different kinds of expression, c. 12.
lie then comes to the third part of rhetoric, which is arrangement. This, he nays, consists necessarily of two parts, the proposition of any subject, and its confirmation ; but there may be four parts, introduc tion (rpoolpsor), proposition ( spriest:sr), confirmation (Thera), and peroration (tirDsorn). lie concludes the work by discussing these four parts of arrangement : Introduction, c. 14, 15; proposition, c. 16 ; con firmation, c. 17 ; peroration, c. 19 Aristotle's ' Rhetoric' is not only the best treatise upon this subject, but a model of profound thinking and reasoning for the investigation of various other subjects.