The project formed by Marshal Soult, in 1813, in opposition to that of Lord Wellington, affords also a good illustration of the nature of strategical operations. The French general decided to advance towards I'ampeluna in the hope of being able to succour that place, and after wards to unite his army with that of Suchet in Aragon : he expected also to command the road along the Spanish frontier, by which he might have got to the rear of the allies in a fertile country, where his army could have found subsistence. (Napier, vol. vi.) This project failing, and the battles of thePyrenees having forced the French army to act on the defensive, Marshal Soult took measures for protracting the war to the utmost.
In the defence of an extensive territory, since it is generally impos sible to cover the whole, the principles of strategy indicate that the army should be kept in force on a few of the most important positions. By securing these, the designs of the enemy may be more effectually frustrated than if it were attempted to occupy every post in the coun try ; for the different divisions of the army being in the latter case weak and ill supported, they aro liable to be cut off in detail, whereas the difficulty of dislodging a large body of troops from one strongly intrenehed position may deter the enemy from attempting it-: at the game time the occupation of that position by the defending army may paralyse his movements by rendering it dangerous for him to leave in his rear a force which might prevent him from drawing supplies from his magazines. The evils attending the dissemination of troops over a
guest extent of country are strongly exemplified in the surprise of the Austrians by Marshal Turenne. The French general caused the several corps of his army to be drawn together towards Befort in such a manner as not to excite notice ; and from thence suddenly penetrating into Alsace, in the midst of the enemy's quarters, he defeated tho troops before they had time to unite.