SOCIAL CONTRACT, or ORIGINAL CONTRACT. Locke thus expounds his doctrine of the social contract (` Essay on Civil Govern ment,' c. 8, Of the Beginning of Political Societies): he says that "men being by nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of his estate and subjected to the political power of another without his own consent" By can he does not mean to say that it may not happen that one man shall be subjected to the political power of another, but that he cannot properly or justly be subjected without his consent ; which appears from what follows :—" Whosoever therefore out of a state of nature unite into a community must be understood to give up all the power necessary to the ends for which they unite in society, to the majority of the community, unless they expressly agreed in any number greater than the majority. And this is done by barely agreeing to unite into one political society, wIlich is all the compact that is or needs be between the individuals that" enter into or make up a commonwealth. And thus that which begins and actually constitutes any political society, is nothing but the consent of any number of free men capable of a majority to unite and incorpo rate into such a society. And this is that, and that only, which did or could give beginning to any lawful government in the world." This doctrine is open to obvious objection. The conclusion as to the origin of government" by implication contains the notion that some governments are not lawful, whereas all men must and do admit that all governments which can maintain themselves are govern ments, and the term lawful is not applicable to that power which can declare what is lawful. The two objections which Locke mentions as being made to the theory are, 1.—" That there are no instances to be found in story of a company of men independent and equal one amongst another, that met together, and in this way began and set up a government" 2. That " it is impossible of right that men should do so, because all men being born under government, they are to submit to that, and are not at liberty to begin a new one Locke replies to both objections with considerable ingenuity, lint there are few political writers at present who will be inclined to consider his answer conclusive.
Hume, in his Essay on the Original Contract,' admits that " the people, if we trace government to its first origin in the woods and deserts, are the source of all power and jurisdiction, and voluntarily, for the sake of peace and order, abandoned their native liberty, and received laws from their equal and companion. The conditions upon which they were willing to submit were either expressed or were so clear and obvious that it might well be esteemed superfluous to express them. If this, then, be meant by the original contract, it cannot be denied that all government is at first founded on a contract, and that the most ancient rude combinations of mankind were formed entirely by that principle." And yet he adds, " in vain are we sent to seek for this charter of our liberties—it preceded the use of writing and all the other civilised arts of life." Consequently we cannot trace "government to its first origin," and therefore we cannot tell bow government originated. But we do know, as flume shows, that all governments of which we can trace the origin have been founded in some other way than by an original contract among all the members who aro included in them. Hume further says, "that if the agree
ment by which savage men first associated and conjoined their force be meant (by the term Original Contract), this is acknowledged to be real ; but being so ancient, and being obliterated by a thousand changes of government and princes, it cannot now be supposed to retain any authority. If we would say anything to the purpose, we must assert that every particular government which is lawful, and which imposes any duty of allegiance on the subject, was at first founded on cement and a voluntary compact" This is the real question. Those who found what they very incorrectly term " lawful government " on an original contract, must show us the con tract. So far Hume's objection is good, and whether there was an original contract or not is immaterial. The question is, what was the origin of any particular government / Those who maintain that any particular government originated iu a contract of all the persons who, at the time of the formation of the government, wero included in it, cannot prove their case. Those who deny the original contract can show that many particular governments have originated " without any pretence of a fair consent or voluntary subjection of the people." But an original contract, such as Hume admits, is as far removed from the possibility of proof as the origin of any particular govern ment by virtue of a contract ; nor have we any record of savage men associating to forum a government. If one set of savage men did this, others would do it, and there must have been many original contracts, which contracts are the remote origin of all particular governments ; but inasmuch as that origin of any particular government, which we do know, was not made by contract, and did not recognise the original contract, such government is unlawful, as those who contend for the theory of an original contract would affirm, or ought to affirm, if they would be consistent. Thus the practical consequences of the doctrine of an original contract, if we rigorously follow them out, are almost as mischievous as the doctrine that every particular government was founded on an original contract. It is true that the theory of an original contract of savage people being the foundation of government is a mere leu-mless absurdity, when at the same time we deny that any particular government has so originated, provided we admit that such particular govennuent is not to be resisted simply because it is not founded on contract. Those who maintain that all existing govern ments rest on no other foundation than a contract, affirm that all men are still born equal—that they owe no allegiance to a power or govern- went, unless they are bound by a promise—that they give up their natural liberty for some advantage—that the sovereign promises them these advantages, and if he fails in the execution, lie has broken the articles of engagement, and has freed his subjects from all obligations to allegiance. " Such, according to these philosophers, is the founda tion of authority in every government; and such is the right of resistance possessed by the subject " (Hume). This is a good exposi tion of the consequences that follow from the theory of every govern ment being founded on contract.