4. Classes of orders.—Orders issued by the execu tive must be clear and explicit if the expected results are to follow. Orders, it.will be found, are of two dis tinct classes—one designed to produce general efforts, the other directed to the performance of typical tasks. A military commander divides his orders into general orders and special orders ; a general manager in busi ness speaks of shop and office policies, and production orders and office instructions.
In order that we may make this distinction clear, we shall again revert to military history. Let us examine a general order issued by Napoleon to his chief of staff, and then trace its further developments into a series of special orders to the several commanders involved.
5. An example of general orders.—On October 12, 1806, having decided to strike the Prussians at Jena, Napoleon gave his general orders to Berthier. Re membering that his principles of war were concentra tion of forces and rapidity and secrecy of movement, we observe that these orders are the clear and con cise expression of the Emperor's purpose—about 150 words in all, yet embracing general orders for seven commanders: Give orders to Marshal Davout to leave his position for Naumberg, where he must arrive as quickly as possible, but always holding his troops ready to fight. He will be pre ceded by all his light cavalry, which will send out skirmishers as far as possible, as much for the purpose of obtaining news of the enemy as to make prisoners, stop baggage and get accu rate information.
General Sahuc's division of dragoons will be under his orders. It will proceed to Mittel-P011nitz where it will receive Marshal Davout's orders. Prince Murat and Marshal Bernadotte are also ordered to Naumberg, but are to follow on the Zeitz road.
Marshal Lennes proceeds from Neustadt to Jena, Marshal Angereu proceeds to Kahla, Marshal Ney will be at Mittel Pfillnitz. Headquarters will be at Gera, noon.
Give orders for sending off of the divisions of heavy cavalry and the divisions of dragoons which have remained in the rear, as well as the park of artillery, to Gera.
6. General orders converted into special orders.— Berthier, the chief of staff', having received Napo leon's general orders, proceeded to write to each of the commanders those instructions which pertained spe-* cifically to him. Taking as an example Berthier's
special order to Marshal Davout, we find that hardly a word is, added to the general orders—such was poleon's method in this one-man type of management.
A few hours later, Davout, having received his or ders, immediately assembled his troops and gave them their instructions regarding: 1, the route to be fol lowed; 2, the order of march (first, second, third di vision, etc.) ; 3, the formation of the troops (in a mass) .
7. Strength and weakness of these orders.—The success of Napoleon's method depended upon the se-, crecy and rapidity with which orders were carried out. On an average of two hours after the receipt of the army orders by the commander of a corps, the troops were in motion.
The weakness of the method is evidenced by an examination of the orders which be issued. These special orders, as Colonel Vachee in his "Napoleon at Work," says, Show by their tone the incorrectness of style, the numerous omissions, that they were written by secretaries after the dictation of Berthier, who had before him the Emperor's general order, which he occasionally completed by drawing upon information received verbally and perhaps set down in his green notebook.
A glance will show that this method lent itself to a multiplication of omissions and an increasing of errors. Vachee says further : These orders, altho verbose, contained little; the object of the march, the position of the army and, in the case of the corps in the front line, instructions to obtain information concerning the enemy. But as to what the general-in-chief himself knew about the enemy, as to the ensemble of the pro jected maneuver and the mission of each corps in that maneuver, there is no mention. . . . the commanders were marching in the dark and could with difficulty show initiative. There was no indication as to either zones covered while on the march or the routes to be followed by each of the army corps. The commanders of the corps chose the roads leading to destinations fixed for them and sent in the information to imperial headquarters.