These trustees then "know everything" about the oil busi ness and they have used their information. Nobody ever used information more profitably. What was learned was applied, and affected the whole great structure, for by a marvellous genius in organisation Mr. Rockefeller had devised a machine with a head whose thinking was felt from the seat of power in New York City to the humblest pipe-line patrol on Oil Creek. This head controlled each one of the scattered plants with absolute precision. Take the refineries ; they were indi vidual plants, having a manager and a board of directors like any outside plant, but these plants were not free agents. Ac cording to J. J. Vandergrift's testimony in 1879, the Imperial Refinery, of which he was president, had no control of its oil after it was made. The Standard Oil Company of Cleveland took charge of it at Oil City, and arranged for transportation and for marketing. The managers of the Central Association, into which the allied refiners went in 1875 under Mr. Rocke feller's presidency, had "irrevocable authority to make all purchases of crude oil and sales of refined oil," as well as to "negotiate for all railroad and pipe-line freights and trans portation expenses" for each of the refineries. Each plant, of course, was limited as to the amount of oil it could make. Thus, in 1876, when the Cleveland firm of Scofield, Shurmer and Teagle went into a running arrangement with Mr. Rocke feller on condition that he get for them the same rebates he enjoyed, it was agreed that the firm should manufacture only 85,000 barrels a year, though they had a capacity of i8o,000 barrels.
One of Mr. Rockefeller's greatest achievements has been to bring men who had built up their own factories and man aged them to suit themselves to work harmoniously under such limitations. As this history has shown, the first attempt to harness the refiners failed because they would not obey the rules. No doubt the chief reason why they finally consented to them was that only by so doing could they get transporta tion rates equally advantageous to those of the Standard Oil Company; but, having consented and finding it profitable, they were kept in line by an ingenious system of competition which must have done much to satisfy their need of indi vidual effort and their pride in independent work. In the investigation of 1879, when the producers were trying to find out the real nature of the Standard alliance, they were much puzzled by the sworn testimony of certain Standard men that the factories they controlled were competing, and competing hard, with the Standard Oil Company of Cleveland. How could this be? Being bitter in heart and reckless in tongue, the oil men denounced the statements as perjury, but they were the literal truth. Each refinery in the alliance was required to make to Mr. Rockefeller each month a detailed statement of its operations. These statements were compared and the results made known. If the Acme at Titusville had refined cheaper that month than any other member of the alliance, the fact was made known. If this cheapness continued to show,
the others were sent to study the Acme methods. Whenever an improvement showed, that improvement received credit, and the others were sent to find the secret. The keenest rivalry resulted—every factory was on its mettle.
This supervision took account of the least detail. There is a story often told in the Oil Regions to illustrate the minute ness of the supervision. In commenting as usual on the monthly statements," as they are called, Mr. Rockefeller called the attention of a certain refiner to a discrepancy in his reports. It referred to bungs—articles worth about as much in a refinery as pins are in a household. "Last month," the comment ran, "you reported on hand 1,119 bungs. Ten thou sand were sent you at the beginning of this month. You have used 9,527 this month. You report 1 ,01 2 on hand. What has become of the other five hundred and eighty?" The writer has it on high authority that the current version of this story is not true, but it reflects very well the impression the Oil Re gions have of the thoroughness of Mr. Rockefeller's super vision. The Oil Regions, which were notoriously extravagant in their business methods, resented this care and called it mean ness, but the Oil Regions were wrong and Mr. Rockefeller was right. Take care of the bungs and the barrels will take care of themselves, is as good a policy in a refinery as the old saw it paraphrases is in financiering.
There were other features of this revolutionary management which caused deep resentment in the oil world. Chief among them was the dismantling or abandoning of plants which the Standard had "acquired," and which it claimed were so badly placed or so equipped that it did not pay to run them. There was reason enough in many cases for dissatisfaction with the process of acquisition, but having acquired the refineries, the Standard showed its wisdom in abandoning many of them. Take Pittsburg, for instance. When Mr. Lockhart began to absorb his neighbours, in 1874, there were some twenty-five plants in and around the town. They were of varying capacity, from little ten-barrel stills of antiquated design and out-of the-way location, to complete plants like the Citizens', which Mr. Tack described in Chapter V. But how could Mr. Lockhart manage these as they stood to good advantage? It might pay the owner of the little refinery to run it, for he was his own stillman, his own pipe-fitter, his own foreman, and did not expect large returns ; but it would have been absurd for Mr. Lockhart to try to run it. He simply carted away any available machinery, sold what he could for junk, and left the debris. Now, one of the most melancholy sights on earth is an abandoned oil refinery; and it was the desolation of the picture, combined, as it always was in the Oil Regions, with the history of the former owners, that caused much of the out cry. It was a thing that the oil men could not get over, largely because it was a sight always before their eyes.