"Much has been said in favour of the objects of the Stand ard Oil Trust and what it has accomplished. It may be true that it has improved the quality and cheapened the cost of petroleum and its products to the consumer. But such is not one of the usual or general results of a monopoly; and it is the policy of the law to regard, not what may, but what usu ally happens. Experience shows that it is not wise to trust human cupidity where it has the opportunity to aggrandise itself at the expense of others. The claim of having cheapened the price to the consumer is the usual pretext on which monopolies of this kind are defended." * From all this the court decided the Standard Oil Company deserved punishment. The charter was not taken away—the statute of limitations being advanced as a reason for this leni ency, although, as Mr. Watson and Mr. Warrington showed, the statute of limitations could hardly be pleaded in this case, when the state had been kept in ignorance by the concealment of the agreement. The company was allowed to live, but it was ousted from the privilege of entering into the trust agree ment, from the power of recognising the transfer of the stock, and from the power of permitting the trustees to control its affairs. It was also ordered to pay the costs of the action.
The judgment of the court was not rendered until March 2, 1892, almost two years after the filing of the petition. As soon as it was received Virgil P. Kline, the chief counsel of the Standard Oil Company of Ohio, went to New York for consultation with the trustees. Five days later he wrote to Judge Spear, the chief justice of the Ohio Supreme Court, saying: "Decisive steps will be taken at once not only to re lease the Standard Oil Company from any relations to the trust, but to terminate the entire trust." But there were "prac tical difficulties" in the task. The company pleaded for a "temporary recognition," and he asked an interview where he could explain the situation. This was granted, and on the 16th of March Mr. Kline explained to the judges in chain hers, to Mr. Watson, and to his successor in office, the situation of the company. The trustees had all but seven shares of its stock. Trust certificates had been issued for these ten years before. The Standard Oil Company did not know who held these certificates, and could only know through the trustees, therefore the trust certificates must be transferred back, the owners hunted up, and each one induced to make an exchange. A system must be devised for doing this. Anybody could see this would take time. The court was friendly in the matter, and Chief Justice Spear gave to Mr. Kline an informal note granting an extension. "The court is not disposed to change its order at this time," the chief justice wrote, "but, so long as those in control appear to be engaged, as now, in an honest effort to dissever the relations of the company with the trust, and liquidate and wind up the affairs of the trust, the court will not be disposed to interfere." Thus time was gained.
While Mr. Kline was securing time, the trustees were push ing a liquidation scheme. On March II the following notice was mailed to all holders of Standard Oil Trust certificates, and was published in a newspaper in each state where a Stand ard Oil Company had been organised: to terminate the trust agreement, in accordance with the terms of said agreement, and to take such further action as may be thereby rendered necessary.
The meeting was held as called. Mr. Rockefeller was in the chair, and Mr. Dodd, who had drawn the trust agreement, now presented the resolution which was to dissolve it. The re marks with which Mr. Dodd introduced his resolution denied every point which the courts had charged against the com bination: "Something over ten years ago," said Mr. Dodd, "a few individuals owning stocks in a number of corporations engaged in transporting and refining oil, entered into an agreement by which their stocks were placed in the hands of trustees, and certificates were issued by said trustees showing the amount of each owner's equitable interest in the stocks so held in trust. This was not done in order to vest the voting power in the hands of a few persons, because the persons chosen as trustees then held, and always have held, the voting power by virtue of their absolute ownership of a majority of the stocks. It was not done to reduce competition, because the companies whose stocks were placed in trust were not competing companies, and could not be so long as their stocks were owned by these few persons. It was not done to limit production or to increase prices, but, on the contrary, was done to increase production, cheapen cost of manufacture, and to lower prices, and it has been successful in that object far beyond the anticipations of those who originated the plan. It was called a trust, because it was a trust in the sense in which the word was then understood. It vested a fiduciary obligation in a few for the benefit of many, and the trustees thus created have faithfully observed the trust confided in them.
"Other persons, however, found this trust plan a convenient one, and it is alleged that it has been adopted for and adapted to purposes quite different from those which actuated the framers of this trust. Whether these allegations be true or false, it is true that a trust is now defined to be a combination to suppress competition and to reduce production, and to increase prices. Public opinion has not unwisely been aroused against combinations for such purposes, and legislation of more or less severity, and rather more or less peculiarity, has been directed against them in seventeen or eighteen states of the Union. All such arrangements are now miscalled trusts, and all trusts are popularly supposed to partake of the same nature. For this reason, if for no other, it should be seriously considered whether this trust should not be terminated. So long as it exists, misconception of its purposes will exist.