The second proof of conspiracy drawn from this testimony to the referee is the statements of both Hatch and Moot that they had no contracts for compensation and that they knew they would receive nothing if they lost. For instance, when Moot was examined by the referee he was asked: Q. Did you have any contract or agreement as to how you should be compensated ? A. Not the slightest. I never had such a contract in my life, except that I should be liberally paid if I succeeded. If I did not succeed, the party being poor, my work would be without compensation. . . .
Q. Did you ever have any conversation with Matthews or with any officer of the company with reference to that ? A. No, sir. I feel very clear that I never had a conversation with a single member of this company about what we should receive for our services, except to this extent: Mr. Matthews once said, in referring to or commenting on these litigations, that they were like any other independent company, as I very well knew; that if the lawyers could not keep them alive with litigation, the Standard would beat them—we would not get anything.
Judge Hatch in his statement said: "Matthews and I or any one for his company never had any talk with respect to compensation for services at the time of their commencement or during their rendition. I knew, however, that the payment for services was largely contingent upon the success of the litigation, and the company was not able to pay much more than the actual expenses in the event they failed to succeed, and that we would get a very meagre compensation unless we succeeded in the actions. I think no conversation was ever had except Mr. Matthews stating that if we should succeed we should be well paid. I think he mentioned that once or twice." It is not an unusual thing for lawyers to take cases they believe just, knowing that their compensation depends on their winning. Many clients with just cases would be deprived of counsel if they had to insure a fixed compensation, for not in frequently all that a client has is involved in a suit. The prac tice is so common among reputable lawyers that it certainly cannot be regarded as a proof of a conspiracy, unless there is a reason to suppose that they have taken a case of whose merits they themselves are suspicious. There is absolutely no evidence that Matthews's counsel were not convinced from the first that they had a strong case. Quinby, the district-attorney who tried
the criminal case, certainly conducted it with a fire and a logic which nothing but conviction could have inspired. Moreover, it must be remembered that these attorneys never failed to con vince the juries before whom they appeared of the merits of their case. Four juries, two grand juries and two juries gave unanimous verdicts of conspiracy against the defendants in the course of the litigation. A case backed by evidence which would convince such diversified bodies of men could hardly be called a speculation. Their claims were large, but lawyers are not proverbial for the modesty of their charges, and in the cases of Hatch and Moot, the two making the largest claims, the labour had been very great and had extended over long periods, as one can see who will examine the testimony pub lished by the Derrick; and besides, exorbitant charges can hardly be construed as a proof of conspiracy.
This, then, in outline, is the history of the case on which are based all charges, so far as the writer knows, that the Standard Oil Company has deliberately destroyed property to get rid of rivals. The case is of importance not only as showing to what abuses the Standard policy of making it hard for a rival to do business will lead men like the Everests, but it shows to what lengths a hostile public will go in inter preting the acts of men whom it has come to believe are law less and relentless in pursuing their own ends. The public, particularly the oil public, has always been willing to believe the worst of the Standard Oil Company. It read into the Buffalo case deliberate arson, and charged not only the Ever ests, but the three co-directors, with the overt acts. They re fused to recognise that no evidence of the connection of Mr. Rogers, Mr. Archbold and Mr. McGregor with the overt acts was offered, but demanded that they be convicted on presumption, and when the judge refused to do this they cursed him as a traitor. To-day, in spite of the full airing this case has had in the courts and investigations, Judge Haight is still accused of selling himself to a corporation, and Mr. Rogers is accused daily in Montana of having burned a re finery in Buffalo. As a matter of fact, no refinery was burned in Buffalo, nor was it ever proved that Mr. Rogers knew any thing of the attempts the Everests made to destroy Matthews's business.