22 Pick. Mass. 495. Proceedings to recover damages for injuries to land by overflowing survive in North Carolina, 7 Ired. No. C. 20; and Virginia, 11 Gratt. Va. 1. Aliter in South Carolina, 10 Rich. So. C. 92 ; and Maryland, 1 Harr. & M'H. Md. 224. Ejectment in the U. S. district court does not abate by death of plaintiff. 22 Vt. 659. But in Illinois the statute law allows an action to executors only for an injury to the personalty, or per sonal wrongs, leaving injuries to realty as at common law. 18 Ill. 403.
10. Injuries to the person. In cases of in. juries to the person, whether by assault, bat tery, false imprisonment, slander, negligence, or otherwise, if either the party who received or he who committed the injury die, the maxim applies rigidly, and no action at com mon law can he supported either by or against the executors or other personal re Dresentatives. 3 Blackstone, Comm. 302 ; 2 Maule & S. 408. Case for the seduction of a man's daughter, 9 Ga. 69 ; case for libel, 5 Cush. Mass. 544 ; and for malicious prosecu tion, 5 Cush. Mass. 543, are instances of this. But in one respect this rule has been mate rially modified in England by the stat. 9 & 10 Viet. c. 93, known as Lord Campbell's Act, and in this country by enactments of similar purport in many of the states. These pro vide for the case where a wrongful act, neg lect, or default has caused the death of the injured person, and the act is of such a na ture that the injured person, had he lived, would have had an action against the wrong doer. In such cases the wrong-doer is ren dered liable, in general, not to the executors or administrators of the deceased, hut to his near relations, husband, wife, parent, or child. In the construction given to these acts, the courts have held that the measure of damages is in general the pecuniary value of the life of the person killed to the person bringing suit, and that vindictive or exem plary damages by reason of gross negligence on the part of the wrong-doer are not allow able. Sedgwidk, Damages.
11. Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and some other states, have statutes founded on Lord Camp bell's Act. In Massachusetts, under the sta tute, an action may be brought against a city or town for damages to the person of de ceased occasioned by a defect in a highway.
7 Gray, Mass. 544. But where the death, caused by a railway collision, was install taneous, no action can be maintained under the statute of that state; for the statute sup poses the party deceased to have been once entitled to an action for the injury, and either to have commenced the action and subse quently died, or, being entitled to bring it, to have died before exercising the right. 9 Cush. Mass. 108. But the accruing of the right of action does not depend upon intel ligence, consciousness, or mental capacity of any kind on the part of the person injured. 9 Cush. Mass. 478. For the law in New York, see 16 Barb. N. Y. 54 ; 15 N. Y. 432 ; in Mis souri, 18 Mo. 162 ; in Connecticut, 24 Conn. 575 ; in Maine, 45 Me. 209.
12. Actions against the executors or ad ministrators of the wrong-doer. The common law principle was that if an injury was done either to the person or property of another, for which damages only could be recovered in satisfaction, the action died with the person by whom the wrong was committed. 1 Sound. 216 a, note (1) ; 1 Harr. & M'H. Md. 224. And where the cause of action is founded upon any malfeasance or misfeasance, is a tort, or arises ex delicto, such as trespass for taking goods, &c., trover, false imprisonment, assault and battery, slander, deceit, diverting a watercourse, ob structing lights, and many other cases of the like kind, where the declaration imputes a tort done either to the person or the property of another, and the plea must be not guilty, the rule of the common law is actio perso nalis moritur cum persona; and if the person by whom the injury was committed dies, no action of that kind can be brought against his executor or administrator. But now in England the stat. 3 & 4 W. IV. c. 42, 2 authorizes an action of trespass, or trespass on the case, for an injury committed by deceased in respect to property real or per sonal of another. And similar provisions are in force in most of the states of this country. Thus, in Alabama, by statute, trover may be maintained against an executor for a conversion by his testator. 11 Ala. N. s. 859. So in New Jersey, 1 Harr. N. J. 54 ; Georgia, 17 Ga. 495 ; and North Carolina, 10 Ired. No. C. 169.