An advocate must have been at least seventeen years of age, 1. 1, 3, D. 3, 1; he must not be blind or deaf, 1. 1, 3 et 5, D. 3, 1; he must be of good repute, not convicted of an infamous act, 1. 1, 8, D. 3, 1; he could not be advocate and judge in the same cause, 1. 6, pr. C. 2, 6; he could not even be a judge in a suit in which he had been engaged as advocate, 1. 17, D. 2, 1; 1. 14, C. 1, 51; nor after being appointed judge could he prac tise as advocate even in another court, 1. 14, pr. C. 1, 51; nor could he be a witness in the cause in which he was acting as advo cate, 1. ult. D. 22, 5; 22 Gliick, Pand. p. 161, et seg.
3. He was bound to bestow the utmost care and attention upon the cause, nihil stu dii reliquentes, quod sibi possibile est, 1. 14, 1, C. 3, 1. He was liable to his client for damages caused in any way by his fault. 5 Gluck, Pand. 110. If he had signed the con cepit, he was responsible that it contained no matter punishable or improper. Boehmer, Cons. et Peels. t. ii. p. 1, resp. cviii. no. 5. He must clearly and correctly explain the law to his clb-nts, and honestly warn them against transrression or neglect thereof. He must frankly/ inform them of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of their cause of action, and must be especially careful not to undertake a cause clearly unjust, or to let himself be used as an instrument of chicanery, malice, or other unlawful action, 1. 6, N 3, 4, C. 2, 6; 1. 13, 9; 1. 14, 1, C. 3, 1. In pleading, he must abstain from invectives against the judge, the opposite party or his advocate, 1. 6 1, C. 2, 6. Should it become necessary or advantageous to mention unpleasant truths, this must be done with the utmost forbear ance and in the most moderate language. 5 Gliick, Pand. 111. Conscientious honestrfor bade his betraying secrets confided to him by his client or making any imyroper use of them; he should observe inviolable secrecy in respect to them, ibid. ; be could not, there
fore, be compelled to testify in regard to such secrets, 1. ult. D. 22, 5.
If he violated the above duties, he was liable, in addition to compensation for the damage thereby caused, to fine, or imprison ment, or suspension, or entire removal from practice, or to still severer punishment, par ticularly where he had been guilty of a prce varicatio, or betrayal of his trust for the benefit of the opposite party. 5 Gliick, Pand. 111.
4. Compensation.—By the lex Cincia, A. U. C. 549, advocates were prohibited from receiving any reward for their services. In course of time this became obsolete. Clau dius allowed it, and fixed ten thousand ses terces as the maximum fee. Trajanpro hibited this fee, called honorarium, f'rom being paid before the termination of the ac tion. This, too, was disregarded, and pre payment had become lawful in the time of Justinian. 5 Gliick, Pand. 117. The fee was regulated by law unless the advocate had made a special agreement with his client, when the agreement fixed the amount. But a pactum de quota lib's, i.e. an agreement to pay a contingent fee, was prohibited, under penalty of the advocate's forfeiting his privi lege of practising, 1. 5, C. 2, 6. A palma rium, or conditional fee in addition to the lawful charge and depending upon his gain ing the cause, was also prohibited. 5 Gliick, Pand. 120 et seq. But an agreement to pay a palmarium might be enforced when it was not entered into till after the conclusion of the suit, 1. 1, 12, D. 50, 13. The compen sation of the advocate might also be in the way of an annual salary. 5 Gluck, Pand. 122.
Remedy.—The advocate had the right to retain papers and instruments of his client until payment of his fee, 1. 26, Dig. 3, 2. Should this fail, he could apply for redress to the court where the cause was tried by petition, a formal action being unnecessary. 5 GliIck, Pand. 122.