3. Therefore, though the existence of n con sideration seems as essential to a sealed instru ment as to any other, it is generally conclu sively presumed from the nature of the con tract, 11 Serg. & R. Penn. 107 ; but it seems that in some of the states by usage, and in others by statute. the want or failure of a consideration may be a good defence against an action on a sealed instrument or contract. 1 Bay, So. C. 275 ; 2 id. 11; 1 Dall. Penn. 17 ; 5 Binn. Penn: 232; 11 Wend. N. Y. 106; 1 Blackf. Ind. 173 •, 3 J. J. Marsh. Ky. 473; 1 Bibb, Ky. 500 ; 13 Ired. No. C. 235; 8 Rich. So. C. 437.
Negotiable instruments also, as bills of ex change and promissory notes, by statute 3 & 4 Anne (adopted as common law or by re-enact ment in the United States), carry with them evidence of consideration. 4 Black stone, Comm. 445. Vide BILLS OF EXC#ANGE, etc.
4. The consideration, if not expressed (when it is prima facie evidence of considers, tion), in all pare] contracts (oral or written), must be proved. This may be done by evi dence altunde. 2 Ala. 51; 16 id. 72 ; 21 Wend. N. Y. 628 ; 9 Cow. N. Y. 778 ; 3 N. Y. 335 ; 7 Conn. 57, 291 ; 13 id. 170 ; 16 Me. 394, 458 ; 4 Munf. Va. 95 ; Cooke, Tenn. 499 ; 4 Pick. Mass. 71 ; 26 Me. 397 ; 1 La. Ann. 192 ; 21 Vt. 292 ; 4 Mo. 33.
A contract upon a good consideration is considered merely voluntary, but is good both in law and equity as against the grantor himself when they are once executed, Fon blanque Eq. b. 1, ch. 5, 2 ; Chitty, Contr. 28 but void against creditors and subsequent bond fide purchasers for value. Stat 27 Eliz.
c. 4; Cowp. 705; 9 East, 59 ; 7 Term, 475 ; 10 Barnew. & C. 606.
5. A moral or equitable consideration is not sufficient to support an express or im plied promise.
They are only sufficient as between the parties in conveyances by deed, and in trans fers, not by deed, accompanied by possession.
9 Yerg. Tenn. 418. These purely moral obli gations are wisely left by the law to the con science and good faith of the individual. Mr. Baron Parke says, " A mere moral con sideration is nothing." 9 Mees. & W. Exch. 501; 8 Mo. 698.
It is often said that a moral obligation is sufficient consideration; but it a rule, that such moral obligation must have once been valuable and enforceable at law, but has ceased to be so by the operation of the statute of limitations, or by the intervention of bank ruptcy (e. g.). The claim, in this case, remains equally strong on the conscienceof the debtor.
The rule amounts only to a permission to waive certain positive rules of law as to remedy. 2 Blackstone, Comm. 445 ; Cowp. 290; 3 Bos. & P. 249, n.; 2 East, 506 ; 3 Taunt. 312 ; 5 id. 36 ; Yelv. 41'b, n.; 8 Mass.
127 ; 3 Pick. Mass. 207 ' • 19 id. 429 ; 6 Cush. Mass. 238 ; 20 Ohio, 332; 5 id. 58 ; 24 Wend. N. Y. 97 ; 24 Me. 561 ; 2 Bail. So. C. 420 ; 13 Johns. N. Y. 259 ; 19 id. 147 ; 14 id. 178– 378 ; 1 Cow. N. Y. 249 ; 7 Conn. 57 ; 1 Vt. 420 ; 5 id.] 73 ; 3 Penn. 172 ; 5 Binn. Penn. 33 ; 12 Berg. & R. Penn. 177 ; 17 id. 126 ; 14 Ark. 267 ; 1 Wisc. 131 ; 21 N. H. 129 ; 4 Md. 476. If the moral duty were once a legal one which could have been made available in defence, it is equally withiu the rule. 5 Barb. N. Y. 556 ; 2 Sandf. N. Y. 311 ; 25 Wend. N. Y. 389 ; 10 B. Monr. Ky. 382; 8 Tex. 397.
6. A valuable consideration only is good as against subsequent purchasers and attach ing creditors ; and these are always sufficient if rendered at the request, express or implied, of the promisor. Dy.172, n.; 1 Rolle, Abr.11, pl. 1 Ld. Raym. 312 ; 1 Wms. Saund. 264, n. (1) ; 3 Bingh. N. c. 710 ; 6 Ad. & E. 718 ; 3 Carr. & P.36 ; 6 Mees. & W. Exch. 485 ; 2 Stark. 201 ; 2 Strange, 933; 3 Q. B. 234 : Croke Eliz. 442; F. Moore, 643; 5 Johns. No. C. 273 ; 2 id. 442; 1 M'Cord, So. C. 22, and cases passim.
Among valuable considerations may be mentioned these : In general, the waiver of any legal or equitable right at the request of another is sufficient consideration for a promise. 3 Pick. Mass. 452 ; 4 id. 97 ; 13 id. 284; 2 N. H. 97; Wright, Ohio, 660; 20 Wend. N. Y. 184 ; 14 Johns: N. Y. 466; 9 Cow. N. Y. 266; 4 Ired. Eq. No. C. 207 ; 4 Harr. Del. 311 ; 1 Salk. 171 ; 12 Mod. 455; 4 Barnew. & C. 8; 5 Pet. 114 ; 2 Perr. & D. 477; 2 Nev. & P. 114; 7 Ad. & E. 108.
2'. Forbearance for a certain or reasonable time to institute a suit upon a valid or doubtful claim, but not upon one utterly unfounded. This is a benefit to one party, the promisor, an injury to the other, the promisee. 1 Rolle, Abr. 24, pl. 33 ; Comyns, Dig. Action on the Case upon Assumpsit (B 1); 3 Chitty, Corn. Law, 66 ; 1 Bingh. N. c. 444 ; 8 Md. 55; 4 Me. 387 ; 4 Johns. IN. Y. 237 ; 1 Cush. Mass. 168; 9 Penn. St. 147. 3 Watts & S. Penn. 420 ; 20 Wend. N. Y. 201 ; 13 III. 140; Wright, Ohio, 434; 5 Humphr. Tenn. 19; 6 Leigh, Va. 85 ; 1 Dougl. Mich. 188 ; 20 Ala. N. s. 309 ; 6 Ind. 528 ; 4 Dev. & B. No. C. 209 ; 21 Eng. L. & Eq. 199 ; 6 T. B. Monr. Ky. 91; 2 Rand. Va. 442; 5 Watts, Penn. 259; 15 Ga. 321; 5 Gray, Mass. 553 ; 3 Md. 346; 25 Barb. N: Y. 175; 9 Yerg. Tenn. 436 ; 35 Caines, N. Y. 329 ; 15 Me. 138; 5 Barnew. & Ad. 117 ; 6 Munf. Va. 406 ; 11 Vt. 483; 4 Hawks, No. C. 178 ; 6 Conn. 81 ; 1 Bulstr. 41; 2 Binn. Penn. 506; 4 Wash. C. C. 148; 1 Penn. 385; 5 Rawle, Penn. 69; 23 Vt. 235; 3 Watts, Penn. 213.