' CONTRACT '(Lat. contractus, from con, with, and traho, to draw. Contractus ultro utroque obligatio est pain Grceci avva"laayta vocant. Fr. 'contra* An agreement between two or more parties to de or not to do a particular thing. Taney, C. J., 11 Pet. 420, 572. An agreement in which a party undertakes to do or not to do a particular thing. Marshall, C. J., 4 Wheat. 197. An agreement between two or more parties for the doing or not doing of some specified thing. 1 Parsons, Contr. 5.
2. It has been variously defined, as follows. A compact between two or more parties. 6 Crane)), 87, 136. An agreement or covenant between two or more persons, in which each party binds himself to do or forbear some act, and each acquires a right to what the other promises. Eneye. Amer.; Web stsr. A contract or agreement is where a promise is made on one side and assented to on the other; or where two or more persons enter into an engage ment with each other by a promise on either side. 2 Stephen, Comm. 108, 109.
An agreement upon sufficient consideration to do or not to do a particular thing. 2 Blackstone, Comm. 446; 2 Kent, Comm. 449.
A covenant or agreement between two parties with a lawful consideration or cause. West, Sym bol. lib. 1, 0 10; Cowel; Blouot.
A deliberate engagement between competent par ties upon a legal consideration to do or to abstain from doing some act. Story, Contr. 0 1.
A mutual promise upon lawful consideration or eause which binds the parties to a performance. The writing which contains the agreement of parties with the terms and conditions, and which serves as a proof of the obligation. The last is a distinct signification. 2 Hill, N. Y. 551.
3. We have not included consideration in our definition of contract, because it does not scorn to be essential to a contract, although it may be necessary to its enforcement. See CONSIDERA TION. Mr. Stephen, whose definition of contract is given above, thus criticizes the definition of Blackstone, which has been adopted by Chancellor Kent and other high authorities. First, that the
word agreement itself requires definition as much as contract. Second, that the existence of a con sideration, though essential to the validity of a patrol contract, forms properly no part of the idea. Third, that the definition takes no sufficient notice of the mutuality which properly distinguishes a contract from a promise. 2 Stephen, Comm. 109.
4. The use of the word agreement (aggregatio mention) seems to have the authority of the best writers in ancient and modern times (see above) as a part of the definition of contract. It is pro bably a translation of the civil-law conventio (con and renio), a coming together, to which (being derived from ad and grape) it seems nearly equiva lent. We do not think the objection that it is a synonyme (or nearly so) a valid one. Some word of the kind is necessary as a basis of the definition. No two synonymes convey precisely the same idea. "Most of them have minute dis t•nctions," says Reid. If two are entirely equiva lent, it will soon be determined by accident which shall remain in use and which become obsolete. To one who has no knowledge of a language, it is impossible to define any abstract idea. But to one who understands a language, SD abstraction is de fined by a synonyme properly qualified. By point ing out distinctions and the mutual relations between synonymes, the object of definition is an swered. Hence we do net think Blackstone's de finition open to the first olajeotion.
5. As to the idea of consideration, Mr. Stephen seems correct and to have the authority of acme of the first legal minds of modern times. Con sideration, however, may be necessary to enforce a ()entrant, though not essential to the idea. Even in that class of contracts (by.specialty) in which no consideration is in fact required, one is always presumed by law,—tbe form of the instrument being held to import a consideration. 2 Kent, Comm. 450, note.