67. Organization. The United States are divided into districts, in each of which is a court called a district court, which is to con sist of one judge, who is to reside in the dis trict for which he is appointed, and to hold annually four sessions. Act of September 24, 1789. By subsequent acts of congress, the number of annual sessions in particular districts is sometimes more and sometimes less; and they are to be held at various places in the district.
6S. As the number of states increased into which no supreme judge went, and the old states became so large that one district judge could not transact the business, it was found necessary to increase the number of judges, to clothe these district courts with circuit court powers, and to allow appeals and writs of error from them to the supreme court.
Thus, from time to time acts were passed, with this view, relative to the district courts of Western Tennessee, Northern and Middle Alabama, Northern and Southern Florida, Northern Georgia, Texas, Iowa, Wisconsin, Western Arkansas, and California ; and by the act of March 3, 1837, cited 34, many of the district courts were made circuit courts, whereby the same rights of appeal and writ of error were conferred. There are in the United States (in 1860) thirty-three district judges who hold courts; in ten of the states, an addi tional judge who holds courts; in three states, two districts in which the same judge holds courts; and in Tennessee, three districts in which the same judge holds courts. The system has become, therefore, somewhat com plicated. For the powers and duties of all these district courts, the books which have already been mentioned may be referred to.
69. Jurisdiction. Their jurisdiction is either civil or criminal. Their civil jurisdic tion includes admiralty and maritime causes, and is either ordinary or extraordinary. The ordinary jurisdiction is granted by the act of September 24, 1789, sect. 9. It is there en acted that the district court shall have exclu sive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. This jurisdiction is exclusive. Bee, Adm. 19; 3 Dall. 16 ; Paine, C. C. 111 ; 4 Mas. C. C. 139.
This ordinary jurisdiction is exercised in 70. Prize suits. The act of September 24, 1789, sect. 9, vests in the district courts as full jurisdiction of all prize causes as is possessed by the admiralty of England; and this juris diction is an ordinary inherent branch of the powers of the court of admiralty, whether considered as prize courts or instance courts. 3 Dail. 16; Paine, C. C. 111.
71. The act of congress marks out not only the general jurisdiction of the district courts, but also that of the several courts in relation to each other, in cases of seizure on the waters of the United States, navigable, etc. When the seizure is made within the waters of one district, the court of that district has exclusive jurisdiction though the offence may have been committed out of the district.
When the seizure is made on the high seas, the jurisdiction is in the court of the district where the property may be brought. 9 Wheat. 402; 6 Cranch, 281; 1 Mas. C. C. 360; 'Paine, C. C. 40.
72. When the seizure has been made with in the waters of a foreign nation, the district court has jurisdiction when the property has been brought into the district and a prosecu tion has been instituted there. 9 Wheat. 402; 9 Cranch, 102.
The district court has jurisdiction of seiz ures, and of the question who is entitled to their proceeds, as informers or otherwise, and the principal jurisdiction is exclusive. The question as to who is the informer is also exclusive. 4 Mas. C. C. 139.
73. Cases of salvage. Under the consti tution and laws of the United States, this court has exclusive original cognizance in cases of salvage; • and, as a consequence, it has the power to determine to whom the resi due of the property belongs after deducting the salvage. 3 Dall. 183.
74. Actions arising out of torts and inju ries. The district court has jurisdiction over all torts and injuries committed on the high seas, and in ports or harbors within the ebb and flow of the tide. See 1 Wheat. 304; 2 Gall. C. C. 389; 1 Mas. C. C. 96i 3 id. 242; 4 id. 380; 18 Johns. N. Y. 257.
75. In the very leading case of Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. 441, two grounds were taken to sustain the position that the court had not jurisdiction, as the collision took place within the ebb and flow of the tide, and so infra corpus comitatus First, "That the grant in the constitution of all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction was limited to what were cases of admiralty and maritime juris diction in England when our revolutionary war began, or when the constitution was adopted; and that a collision between ships within the ebb and flow of the tide, infra corpus comitatus, was not one of them. Se cond, That the limitation of ad miralty jurisdiction, and decisive test sgainst it, in England and in the United States, ex cept in the cases allowed in England, was the competency of a court of common law to give a remedy in a given case in a trial by ury." And as auxiliary to this ground it was urged that the clause in the ninth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. at Large, 77, saving to suitors in all cases the right of a common-law remedy where the common law is competent to give it, took away such cases from the admiralty jurisdiction of the courts of the United States. The court held, confining their opinion to cases of collision, that the objections were not valid. Mr. Jus tice Wayne asserts that the grant of admi ralty and maritime jurisdiction to the federal judiciary by the constitution of the United States was not limited to the restricted juris L diction which had prevailed in England since the restraining statutes of 13 & 15 Rich. II. and 2 Hen. IV.