4. It was never the practice of the Eng lish parliament to grant a divorce for any other cause than adultery; and it was the general rule to grant it for simple adultery only when committed by the wife, and upon the application of the husband. To entitle the wife, other circumstances must ordinarily concur, simple adultery committed by the husband not being sufficient. Macqueen, Parl. Pract. 473 et seq. The recent English statute of 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, before referred to, prescribes substantially the same rule,—it being provided, 27, that the husband may apply to have his marriage dissolved "on the ground that his wife has, since the cele bration thereof, been guilty of adultery," and the wife, "on the ground that, since the celebration thereof, her husband has been guilty of incestuous bigamy, or of bigamy with adultery, or of rape, or of sodomy, or bestiality, or of adultery coupled with such cruelty as without adultery would have en titled her to a divorce a ntensa et thoro, or of adultery coupled with desertion, without reasonable excuse, for two years or up wards." In this country the question depends upon the statutes of the several states, the pro visions of which are far from uniform. In South Carolina, a divorce is not allowed for any cause; in New York, only for adultery ; but in most of the states it is allowed fbr several causes, e.g. adultery, cruelty, wilful desertion for a specified period, habitual drunkenness, etc. In some of the states, also, the matter is left, wholly or in part, to the discretion of the court. See Bishop, Marr. & Div. c. 26. For more specific in formation, recourse must be had to the statutes of the several states.
5. Some of the principal defences in suits for divorce are,— Connivance, or the corrupt consent of a party to the conduct in the other party whereof he afterwards com plains. This bars the right of divorce, be cause no injury was received ; for what a man has consented to he cannot say was an injury. Bishop, Marr. & Div. 332. Collusion. This is an agreement between husband and wife for one of them to commit, or appear to commit, a breach of matrimonial duty, for the purpose of enabling the other to obtain the legal remedy of divorce, as for a real injury. Where the act has not been done, collusion is a real or attempted fraud upon the court; where it has, it is also a species of connivance: in either case it is a bar to any claim for divorce. Bishop, Marr. & Div. 350. Condonation, or the conditional for giveness or remission by the husband or wife of a matrimonial offence which the other has committed. While the condition remains unbroken, condonation, on whatever motive it proceeded, is an absolute bar to the remedy for the particular injury condoned. Bishop, Marr. & Div. 354. For the nature of the condition, and other matters, see CONDONA TION. Recrimination. This is a defence arising from the complainant's being in like guilt with the one of whom he complains. It is incompetent for one of the parties to a marriage to come into court and complain of the other's violation of matrimonial duties, if the party complaining is guilty likewise. When the defendant sets up such violation in answer to the plaintiff's suit, this is called, in the matrimonial law, recrimination. Bishop, Marr. & Div. 389.
The foregoing defences, though available in all divorce causes, are more frequently applicable where a divorce is sought on the ground of adultery.
6. The consequences of divorce are such as flow from the sentence by operation of law, or flow from either the sentence or the proceeding by reason of their being directly ordered by the court and set down of record. Bishop, Marr. & Div. 548. In regard to the former, they are chiefly such as result imme diately and necessarily from the definition and nature of a divorce. Being a dissolu tion of the marriage relation, the parties have no longer any of the rights, nor are subject to any .of the duties, pertaining to that relation. They are henceforth single persons to all intents and purposes. It is true that the statutes of some of the states contain provisions disabling the guilty party from marrying again ; but these are in the nature of penal regulations, collateral to the divorce, and which leave the latter in full force. Bishop, Marr. & Div. N 655-659.
I. In regard to rights of property as be tween husband and wife, a sentence of di vorce leaves them as it finds them. Conse quently, all transfers of property which were actually executed, either in law or fact, con tinue undisturbed: for example, the personal estate of the wife, reduced to possession by the husband, remains his after the divorce the same as before. But it puts an end to all rights depending upon the marriage and not actually vested: as, dower in the wife, all rights of the husband in the real estate of the wife, and his right to reduce to posses sion her chosen in action. Bishop, Marr. & Div. 660 ; 27 Miss. 630, 637 ; 17 Mo. 87 ; 6 Ind. 229 ; 6 Watts & S. Penn. 85, 88 ; 4 Harr. Del. 440; 8 Conn. 541 ' • 10 id. 225 ; 2 Md. 429 ; 8 Mass. 99 ; 10 id.260 ; 1Q Paige, Ch. N.Y. 420, 424 ; 5 Blackf. Ind. 309 ; 5 Dan. Ky. 254 ; 6 Watts, Penn. 131. In re spect to dower, however, it should be observed that a contrary doctrine has been settled in New York, it being there held that imme diately upon the marriage being solemnized the wife s right to dower becomes perfect, provided only she survives her husband. 4 Barb. N. Y. 192 ; 4 N. Y. 95 ; 6 Du. N. Y. 102, 152, 153.
S. Of those consequences which result from the direction or order of the court, the most important are—,4/imony, or the allow ance which a husband, by order of court, pays to his wife, living separate from him, for her maintenance. The allowance may be for her use either during the pendency of a suit,—in which case it is called alimony pendente after its termination, called permanent alimony. Bishop, Marr. ,& Div. 549. As will be seen from the foregoing definition, alimony, especially permanent alimony, pertains rather to a separation from bed and board than to a divorce from the bond of matrimony. Indeed, it is generally allowed in the latter case only in pursuance of, statutory provisions. Bishop, Marr. & Div. 563. See ALIMONY, 2. It is provided by statute in several of our states that, in case of divorce, the court may order the husband to restore to the wife, when she is the inno cent party, and sometimes even when she is not, a part or the whole of the property which he received by the marriage. In some cases, also, the court is authorized to divide the property between the parties, this being a substitute for the allowance of alimony. For further particulars, recourse must be had to the statutes in question. See, also, Bishop, Marr. & Div. cc. 28-30.