DOUBT. The uncertainty which exists in relation to a fact, a proposition, or other thing ; an equipoise of the mind arising from an equality of contrary reasons. Ayliffe, Pand. 121.
2. The most embarrassing position of a judge is that of being in doubt; and it is frequently the lot of tho wisest and most enlightened' to be in this condition : those who have little or no experience usually find no difficulty in deciding the most pro blematical questions.
3. Some rules, not always infallible, have been adopted in doubtful cases, in order to arrive at the truth. 1. In civil cases, the doubt ought to ope rate against him who, having it in his power to prove facts to remove the doubt, has neglected to do so. In cases of fraud, when there is a doubt, the presumption of innocence (q. v.) ought to re move it. 2. In criminal cases, whenever a rea sonable doubt exists as to the guilt of the accused, that doubt ought to operate in his favor. In such cases, particularly when the liberty, honor, or life of an individual is at stake, the evidence to convict ought to be clear and devoid of all reasonable donbt.
4. The term reasonable doubt is often need, but not easily defined. It is not mere possible doubt; be cause every thing relating to human affairs and de pending on moral evidence is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and considera tion of all the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors in such a condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge. The burden of proof is upon
the prosecutor. All the presumptions of law inde pendent of evidence are in favor of innocence; and every person is presumed to he innocent until be is proved guilty. If upon such proof there is reasonable doubt remaining, the accused is entitled to the benefit of it by an acquittal. For it is not sufficient to establish a probability, though a strong one arising from the doctrine of chances, that the fact charged is more likely to be true than the con trary; but the evidence must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty,—a certainty that convinces and directs the under standing and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. This is proof beyond reasonable doubt; because if the law, which mostly depends upon considera tions of a moral nature, should go further than this and require absolute certainty, it would exclude circumstantial evidence altogether. Per C. J., in 5 Cush. Mass. 320; 1 Gray, Mass. 534. See Best, Pres. 195; Wilson, Cir. Ev. 26 ; 33 Howell, St. Tr. 506; Burnett, Cr. Law of Scotl. 522; 1 Greenleaf, Ev. 1; D'Aguesseau, Gluvres, xiii. 242.