6. In England, drunkenness has never been admitted in extenuation for any offences committed under its immediate influence. "A drunkard who is voluntarius demo," says Coke, "hath no privilege thereby: whatever ill or hurt he doth, his drunkenness doth aggravate it." Lawyers have occasionally shown a disposition to distinguish between the guilt of one who commits an offence un consciously, though in consequence of vicious indulgence, and that of another who is ac tuated by malice aforethought and acts de liberately and coolly. In Pennsylvania, as early as 1794, it was remarked by 'the courts on one occasion that, as drunkenness clouds the understanding and excites. passion, it may be evidence of passion only; and of want of malice and design. Add. Penn. 257. In 1819, Justice Holroyd decided that the fact of drunkenness might be taken into consider ation in determining the question whether the act was premeditated or done only with sudden heat and impulse. Rex v. Grundley, 1 Russell, Crimes, 8. This particular de cision, however, was, a few years afterwards, pronounced to be not correct law. 7 Carr. & P. 145. Again, it was held that drunken ness, by rendering the party more excitable under provocation, might be taken into con sideration in determining the sufficiency of the provocation. 7 Carr. & P. 817. More recently (1849), in Rex v. Monkhouse, 4 Cox, Cas. 55, it was declared that there might exist a state of drunkenness which takes away the power of forming any specific intention.
7. In this country, courts have gone still further in regarding drunkenness as incom patible with some of the elements of crime. It has been held, where murder was defined to be wilful, deliberate, malicious, and pre meditated killing, that the existence of these attributes is not compatible with drunkenness. 13 Ala. N. s. 413 ; 4 Humphr. Tenn. 136 ; 9 id. 570 ; 11 id. 154 ; 1 Spears, So. C. 384.
It has been already stated that strong drink sometimes, in consequence of injury of the head, or some peculiar constitutional susceptibility, produces a paroxysm of frenzy immediately, under the influence of which the person commits a criminal act. Cases of
this kind have been too seldom tried to make it quite certain how they would be regarded in law. It is probable, however, that the plea of insanity would be deprived of its validity by die fact that, sane or insane, the party was confessedly drunk. In a case where injury of the head had been followed by occasional paroxysms of insanity, in one . of which the prisoner killed his wife, it ap peared that he had just been drinking, and that intoxication had sometimes brought on the paroxysms, though they were not always preceded by drinking. The court ruled that if the mental disturbance were produced by intoxication it was not a valid defence;, and accordingly the prisoner was, convicted and executed. Trial of M'Donough, Ray, Med. Jur. 514. The principle is that if a person voluntarily deprives himself of reason, he can claim no exemption from the ordinary consequences of crime. 3 Paris & Fonbl. 39. Milder views have been advocated by writers of note, and they will sooner or later, no doubt, appear in judicial decisions. Mr. Alison, referring to the class of cases just mentioned, calls it inhuman to visit them with the extreme punishment otherwise suita ble. Prin. of Crim. Law of Scotland, 654. Dip somania would hardly be considered, in the present state of judicial opinion, a valid de fence in a capital case. In minor offences, especially if attended by extenuating circum stances, it might be more favorably regarded.
S. The law does recognize two kinds of inculpable drunkenness, viz.. that which is produced by the " unskilfulness of the phy sician," and that which is produced by the "contrivance of enemies." Russell, Crimes, 8. To these we should be disposed to add that above described, where the party drinks no more liquor than he has habitually used without being intoxicated, but which exerts an unusually potent effect on the brain, in consequence of certain pathological condi tions. See 5 Gray, Mass. 86; 11 Cush. Mass. 479 ; 1 Bennett & H. Lead. Crim. Cas. 113– 124.