INFANT. One under the age of twenty one years. Cola, Litt. 171.
2. But he is reputed to he twenty-one years old, or of full age, the first instant of the last day of the twenty-first year next before the anniversary of hia birth; because, according to the civil computation of time, which differs from the natural computa tion, the last day having commenced, it is con sidered as ended. Savigny, Dr. Rom. 182; 6 Ind. 447. If, for example, a person were born at any hour of the first day of January, 1810 (even a few minutes before twelve o'clock of the night of that day), he would be of full age at the first instant of the thirty-first of December, 1830, although nearly forty-eight hours before he had actually attained the full age of twenty-one years according to years, days, hours, and minutes, because there is in this case no fraction of a day. 1 Sid. 162; 1 Kehl. 589; 1 Salk. 44; Raym. 84; 1 Sharswood, Blackst. Comm. 463, 464; 1 Lilly, Reg. 57; Comyna, Dig. Enfant (A); Savigny, Dr. Rom. 383, 384.
3. A curious case occurred in England, of a young lady who was born after the house-clock had struck, while the parish clock was striking, and before St. Paul's had begun to strike, twelve, en the night of the fourth and fifth of January, 1805; the question was whether she was born on the fourth or fifth of January. Mr. Coventry gives it as his opinion that she was born on the fourth, because the house-oloek does not regulate any thing but domestic affairs, that the parochial clock is much better evidence, and that a metropolitan clock ought to be received with "implicit acquiescence." Cov entry, Er. 182. It is conceived that this can only be primd facie ; because, if the fact were otherwise, and the parochiil and metropolitan clocks should both have been wrong, they would undoubtedly have had no effect in ascertaining the ago of the child.
, 4. The sex makes no difference at common law: a woman is, therefore, an infant until she has attained the age of twenty-one years. Coke, Litt. 171. It is otherwise, however, in some of the United States. 18 Ill. 209; 4 Ind. 464. Before arriving at full age, an in fant may do many acts. A male at fourteen is of discretion, and may consent to marry; and at that age he may disagree to and an nul a marriage he may before that time have contracted; he may then choose a guardian, and, if his discretion be proved, may, at common law, make a will of his personal es tate; he may act as executor at the age of seventeen years. A female at seven may be betrothed or given in marriage; at nine she is entitled to dower; at twelve she may consent or disagree to marriage ; and, at common law, at seventeen she may act as executrix. Con siderable changes of the common law have taken place in many of the states. In Penn sylvania, to act as an executor the party must be of full age.
5. In general, an infant is not bound by his contracts, unless to him necessa ries, Selwyn, Nisi P. 137 ; Contr. 31 ; Bacon, Abr. Infancy, etc. (13); 9 Viner, Abr. 391 ; 1 Comyns, Contr. 150, 151 ; 3 Rawle, Penn. 351; 8 Term, 335; 1 Kehl. 905, 913 ;
1 Sid. 129, 258 ; 1 Lev. 168 ; 1 South. N. J.
R7 • hut. RPP tl flroneh 998. l Pink. Mass. 492! 1 Nott & M'C. So. C. 197; or unless, by some legislative provision, he is empowered to enter into a contract ; as, with the consent of his parent or guardian to put himself apprentice, or enlist in the service of the United States. 4 Binn. 487; 5 id. 423; 30 Vt. 357.
6. Contracts made with him may be en forced or avoided by him on his ccming of age, 20 Ark. 600; 12 Ind. 76; 4 Sneed. Tenn. 118; 13 La. Ann. 407; 32 N. 11. 345; 24 Mo. 541; hut must he avoided within a rea sonable time. 15 Gratt. Va. 329 ; 29 465; 25 Barb. N. Y. 399. But to this general rule there may be an exception in case of contracts for necessaries ; because these are for his benefit. See NECESSARIES. 2 Head, Tenn. 33; 18 Ill. 63 ; 13 Md. 140; 32 N. H. 345 ; 11 Cush. Mass. 40 ; 14 B. Monr. Ky. 232. The privilege of avoiding a contract on account of infancy is strictly personal to the infant, and no one can take advantage of it but himself. 3 Green, N. J. 343; 2 Brev. NO. C. 438 ; 6 Jones, No. C. 494; 23 Tex. 252 ; 30 Barb. N. Y. 641 ; 31 Miss. 32. When the contract has been performed, and it is such as he would be compellable by law to per form, it will be good and bind him. Coke, Litt. 172 a. And all the acts of an infant which do not touch his interest, but take effect from an authority which he has been trusted to execute, are binding. 3 Burr. 1794; Fonblanque, Eq. b. 1, c. 2, 5, note c.
The contract cannot be avoided by an adult with whom the infant deals. 29 Barb. N. Y. 160 ; 12 Ind. 76 ; 32 id. 537 ; 5 Sneed, Tenn. 659.
7. The protection which the law gives an. infant is to operate as a shield to him, to protect him from improvident contracts, but not as a sword to do injury to others. An infant is, therefore, responsible for his torts,. as for slander, trespass, and the like, 29' Barb. N. Y. 218 ; 29 Vt. 465 ; but he cannot be made responsible in an action ex delicto, where the cause arose on a contract. 3 Rawle, Penn. 351; 6 Watts, Penn. 9 ; 15 Wend. N. Y. 233; 25 id. 399; 9 N. H. 441 ; 32 id.101; 10 Vt. 71 ; 5 Hill, So. C. 391. But see 6 Cranch, 226 ; 15 Mass. 359; 4 M'Cord, So. C. 387.
S. With regard to the responsibility of infants for crimes, the rule is that no infant within the age of seven years can be guilty of felony or be punished for any capital offence ; within that age an infant is, by presumption of law, doli incapax, and cannot be endowed with any discretion; and against this presumption no averment shall be re ceived. This legal incapacity, however, ceases when the infant attains the age of fourteen years, after which period his act becomes subject to the same rule of con struction as that of any other person. Between the ages of seven and fourteen years an infant is deemed prima fade to be doli incapax; but in this case the maxim applies, malitia snpplet cetatem: malice supplies the want of mature years. 1 Russell, Crimes, 3; 31 Ala. N. s. 323.