5. That insanity, in some of its forms, annuls all criminal responsibility, and, in the same or other forms, disqualifies its subject from the performance of certain civil acts, is a well-established doctrine of the common law. In the application of this principle there has prevailed, for many years, the utmost di versity of opinion. The law as expounded by IIale, Pleas of the Crown, 30, was received without question until the beginning of the present century. In the trial of lladfield, Mr. Erskine contended that the true test of such insanity as annulled rdhponsibility for crime was delusion ; and accordingly the pri soner was acquitted with the approbation of the court. Subsequently, in Bellingham's case, 5 Carr. & P. 168, the court declared that the prisoner was responsible if he knew right from wrong, or knew that murder was a crime against the laws of God and nature.
Similar language was used in Reg. vs. Mg ginson, 1 Carr. & K. 129 ; Reg. vs. Stokes, 3 Carr. & K. 185. This test has sometimes been modified so as to make the knowledge of right and wrong refer solely to the act in question. Rex vs. Offord, 5 Carr. & P. 168 ; 9 id. 525 ; Reg. vs. Vaughan, 1 Cox, Crim. Cas. 80; Reg. vs. Barton, 3 Cox, Crim. Cas. 275; Reg. vs. Pate, Lond. Times, July 12, 1850; State vs. Spencer, I Zabr. N. J. 196; People vs. Freeman, 4 Den. N. Y. 29. Th.s was formally pronounced to be the law of the land by the English judges, in their reply to the questions propounded by the house of lords on occasion of the McNaughton 10 Clark & F. Iron. L. 200. A disposition to multiply the tests, so as to recognize essential facts in the nature of insanity, has been oc casionally manifested in this country. In Com. vs. Rogers, 7 Mete. Mass. 500, the jury were directed to consider, in addition to the above test, whether the prisoner, in commit ting the homicide, acted from an irresistible and uncontrollable impulse; and this case has been much relied on in American courts. Ray, Med. Jur. 58. Occasionally the court has thought it sufficient for the jury to con sider whether the prisoner was sane or in sane,—of sound memory and discretion, or otherwise. State vs. Wilson ; State vs. Cory; State vs. Prescott ; Ray, Med. Jur. 55.
6. To this remarkable diversity of views may be attributed, in some measure, no doubt, the actual diversity of results. To any one who has followed with some atten tion the course of criminal justice in trials where insanity has been pleaded in defence, it is obvious that, if some have been properly convicted, ,others have just as improperly been acquitted. It must be admitted, how ever, that the verdict in such cases is often determined less by the instructions of the court than by the views and feelings ef the jury and the testimony of experts.
Side by side with this doctrine of the crimi nal law which makes the insane responsible for their criminal acts is another equally well authorized, viz.: that a kind and degree of insanity which would not excuse a person for a criminal act may render him legally incompetent to the management of himself or his affairs. Bellingham's case, Collinson, 657. This implies that the mind of an in sane person acts more clearly and delibe rately, and with a sounder view of its rela tions to others, when about to commit a great crime than when buying or selling a piece of property. It is scarcely necessary to add that no ground for this distinction can be found in our knowledge of mental disease. On the contrary, we know that the same per son who destroys his neighbor, under the de-. lusion that he has been disturbing his peace or defaming his' character, may, at the very time, dispose of his property with as correct an estimate of its value and as clear an in sight into the consequences of the act as he ever had. If a person is incompetent to manage property, it is because he has lost some portion of his mental power ; and ths fact cannot be justly ignored in deciding upon his responsibility for criminal acts. Insanity once admitted, it is within the reach of no mortal comprehension to know exactly how far it may have affected the quality of his acts: To say that, possibly, it may have had no effect at all, is not enough: it should be proved by the party who affirms it.
7. More dearly reflecting the light of sci ence, the French penal code says there can be no crime nor offence if the accused were in a state of madness at the time of the act. Art. 64. The same provision was intro duced into Livingston's Code and into the Re vised Statutes of New York, vol. 2, 697. The law of Arkansas provides that a lunatic or insane person without lucid intervals shall not be found guilty of any crime or misde meanor with he may be charged. Rev. Stat. 236. In New York, however, in spite of this clear and positive provision of law, the courts have always acted upon the doc trines of the common law, and instructed the jnry respecting the tests of that kind of in sanity which annuls criminal responsibility. Freeman in Error vs. The People, 10 Bost. Law Rep. 12. In this case, the court (C. J. Beardsley) declared that the insanity men tioned in the statute means only insanity in reference to the criminal act, and therefore its qualities must be defined.