In the second place, the analysis presents the rights of property, which is divided into personal property or chattels, viz., that which is movable, and real property, or that which is immovable, viz., lands, including nearly all degrees of interest therein, as well as such chattels as by a peculiar connection with land may be deemed to have lost their character as legally movable: these rights of property are viewed in respect to the origin of title, tho transmission of title, and the protection of the enjoyment thereof.
In the third place, the analysis presents a view of private wrongs, or those injuries to persons for whinh the law provides a redress for the aggrieved party ; and wider this head may he considered the tribunals through which the protection of rights or the redress of wrongs may he obtained, and the various modes of procedure to those ends.
4. Lastly, the analysis presents a view of pub lic wrongs, or crimes and misdemeanors, in which may be considered the theory of crime and punish ment, the persons capable of committing crimes, the several degrees of guilt of principals and accesso ries, the various crimes of which the law takes cog nizance,—as, those against religion, those against the state and its government, and those against persons and property,—witb the punishment which the law affixes to each, and also the tribunals and procedure by whieh crimes threatened may he pre vented and crimes committed may be punished. Blaokstone, Comm.
5. In a strioter sense, but still in tbe abstract, law denotes the aggregate of those rules and prin ciples of conduct whioh the governing power in a, community recognizes as the rules and principles which it will enforce or sanction, and according to which it will regulate, limit, or protect the conduct of menibers of the oommunity.
It is the aggregate of legal rules and principles, as distinguished from any particular rule or prin ciple. No one statute, nor all statutes, constitutei the law of the state; for the maxims of the oourts and the regulations of municipal bodies, as well as, to some extent, the universal principles of ethios, go to make up the body of the law. It inoludes prin ciples, which rest in the oommon sense of justice and right, as well as positive rules or regulations, which rest in ordinanoe. It is tho aggregate of the rules or principles only which the governing power in the community recognizes, beoause that power, whether it be deemed as residing in a mon arch, an aristoeracy, or in the common people at large, is the suurce of the authority and the sanc tion of those rules and principles. It is the aggre gate of those rules and principles which are recog nized as the law by that power, rather than those which are actually enforced in all eases : for a sta tute is none tho less a law because the commuoity forbear to enforce it, so lung aa it is officially re cognized hy them as that which, in theory et least, should be enforced; nor does a departure from the law by the governing power in itself abrogate the law. It comprises nut only those rules and prin
ciples which are te be enforced, but also those which are simply permissive; for a very large part even of modern statute-law—which is commonly defined as a rule commundIng or prohibiting—in reality neither commands nor prohibits, except in the most distant and indirect sense, but simply authorizes, permits, or sanctions; and this is much more generally true of those principles of the law which rest in oustom and the adjudications of the courts. It is only thorte which relate to the mem bers of the community in question; fur laws, as such, have no extra-territorial operation.
6. The idea of law has commonly been analyzed as composed of three ekments: Rest, a command of the lawgiver, which command must prescribe not a single act merely, but a series or class of acts; second, on obligation insposed thereby on the citizen; third, a sanction threatened in the event of disobedience. Thus, municipal law is defined as "a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in the state, commanding what is right and prohibiting. what is wrong." I Blackstone, Comm. 44. The latter clause of this definition has been much criticized. Mr. Chitty modifies it to "com manding what shall be done or what shall not be done" (id. note); and Mr. Stephen omits it, de fining law as "a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a, state." 1 Stephen, Comm. 25. It is also defined as a rule of conduct con tained in the commaod of a sovereign addressed to the subject. (Encyc. Brit.) These definitione, though more apt in reference to statutes and edicts than to the law in general, seem, evils referenoe to the former sort of law, to look rather at the usual form than the invariable essence of the thing. The principle of law, that a promise without a consideration is void, neither commands men to provide a consideration for every promise nor for bids them to promise without consideration, for this is lawful; nor does it forbid them to fulfil such promises. It simply amounts to this, that if men choose to break such promises, society will inter fere to enforce them. And even many statutes have no form of a command or prohibition; and, moreover, some that are such in form are not in reality. An enactment that no action shall be brought on a simple contract after the lapse of six years from the time the cause of action accrued cannot aptly be said to command men to bring ac tions within six years, nor eveu, in fact, to forbid them to bring such actions after that time; for it is still lawful to sue on an outlawed demand, and, if the defendant do not object, the plaintiff may succeed. It may be deemed a command in so far as it is a direction to the courts to dismiss such aotions; but as a rule of civil conduct it amounts simply to this, that when an obligation has become stale to a certain degree, society will sanction the debtor in repudiating it.