5. But in a proper case, as where there is fraud undiscovered till the statute has become a bar, or it the fault and wrong of the defendant that the plaintiff did not enforce his legal rights within the limited time, courts of equity will not hesitate to interfere in the interest of justice, and entertain suits long since barred at laW. 5 Johns. Ch. N . Y. 522 ; 4 How. 503 ; 2 Schoales & L. It. Ch. 630 ; 8 Vbs. Ch. 73 ; 2 Sim. Ch. 340. But here, again, courts of equity will proceed with great caution, 7 How. 819 ; and hold the compainant to allegation and prouf of his ignorance of the fraud and when and how it was discovered. .1 Curt. C. C. 390. Subject to these conditions, a claim forty years old for services WaS sustabied against a defendant who had obtained them by falsely represent big to the person Wh'o rendered them that'he was a slave. 12 Penn. St. 49.
6. And courts of admiralty are governed by substantially the same rules as Courts of equity. 3 Mas. C. C. 95 ; 2 Sumn. C. C. 212. And although the statute does not apply in terms to probate courts, there seems to he no reason whv the statute of limitations should not be applied ilecording to the principles of equity. 1 Bradt'. Surr. N.' Y. 1.
It is generally provided that personal actions shall be brought vvithin a certain speci fied , time—usually six years or less-7firom the time when the cause of action accrues, and not after ; and hereupon, whether the limitation be one or twenty years (the latter being the limit applicable to personal actions not otherwise specially limited), the question at once arises when the cause of action in each particular case accrues.
Cause of action accrues when. The rule that the cause of action accrues when and so soon as there is a right to apply to the court for relief by no roeans solves the difficulty. When does the right itself so to apply accrue? Upon this point the decisions are so numerous and so conflicting, or per haps, more accurately speaking, so controlled by particular circumstances, that no inflexible rule can be extracted therefrom. In general, it may be said that in actions of contract the cause of action accrues when there is a breach of the contract. 3 Barnew. & Ald. 288 ; 3 Johns. N. Y. 137.
S. When a note (except bank-notes, 2 Sneed, Tenn. 482) is payable on demand, the statute begins to run from its date, 2 Mees. & W. Exch. 467; 9 Pick. Mass. 488 ; and if there is no date, then from the delivery, 1 Harr. & G. Md. 439 ; and the rule is the same if the note is payable " at any time within six years," 39 Me. 492 ; or borrowed money is to be paid " when called on." 1 Harr. & G. Md. 439. If the note be payable in certain days after demand, sight, or notice, the statute begins to run from the deniand, sight, or notice, 13 Wend. N. Y. 267 ; 2 Taunt.
323 ; 4 Mas. C. C. 336 ; but the demand Itself should be made within the time limited for hringing the action on the note ; else a note limited to six years might be kept open in d,efinitely by a failure to make a demand. 10 Pick. Mass. 120. And when the note is on interest, this does not become barred by the statutes till the principal, or some dis tinct portion of it, becomes -barred. 2 Cush. Mass. 92 ; 1 Hall, N. Y. 314. If the note be entitled to grace, the statute runs from the last day of grace. 11 Me. 412.
9. Where money is paid by mistake, the statute begins to run from the time of pay ment, 9 Cow. N. Y. 674 ; also in case of usury, 6 Ga. 228, or where paid for another as surety. 6 Cow. N. Y. 225. If money is payable by instalments, the statute runs against each instalment as it becomes due. 20 Me. 400, unless it is agreed that upon de fault the whole shall become due. 3 Gale & D. Exch. 402.
Where a contract takes effect upon some condition or contingency, or the happening of some event, the statute runs from the performance of the condition, 5 Pick. Mass. 384, or the happening of the contingency or event, 3 Penn. St. 149, and not from the date of the contract. On an agreement to devise, the statute runs from the death of the promissor. 9 Penn. St. 260. When money is paid, and there is afterwards a failure of consideration, the statute runs from the failure. 14 Mae& 425.
10, Where continuous services are rendered, as by an attorney in the conduct, of ft suit, 1 Barnew. & Ad. 15, or by a mechanic in doing a job, 16 Ill. 341, the statute begins to ruu from'% le completion of the service. On a pro mise oz. indemnity, when the promissee payi money or is damnified, the statute begim to run. 12 Metc. Mass. 130. In cases of negligence, carelessness, unskilfulness, the like, the statute runs froin the time whei these happen respectively, and not from thE time when damages accrue therefrom, 4 Pet 172; and so, generally, in cases of tort wher the wrong is done or the right is invaded, 8 East, 4; 10 Wend. N. Y. 260 ; 24 Penn. St. 186. Thus, where an attorney negligently invests money in a poor security, the statuts runs from the investment, 2 Brod. & B. 73 ; so, where a party. neglected to remove goods from a warehouse, whereby the plaintiff was obliged to .pay damages, the statute runE from the neglect, and not from the payment of damages, 3 Johns. N. Y. 137 ; so, where the defendant agreed to go inth another state and callect some money, and on his return tc pay off a certain judgment, the statute was held to run from the return. 3 Ired. No. C. 48l.