PRESUMPTION. An inference affirm ative or disaffirmative of the tru0 or false bood of any proposition or fact drawn by a process of probable reasoning in the absence of actual certainty of its truth or falsehood, or until such certainty can be ascertained. Best, Presump. 4.
An inference affirmative or disaffirmative of the existence of a disputed fact, drawn by , a judicial tribunal, by a process of probable reasoning, from some one or more matters of fact, either admitted in the cause or other wise satisfactorily established. Best, Pre aump. 12.
Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law makes so peremptorily that it will not allow them to be overturned by any contrary proof, however strong. Best, Pre sump. 20. They are called, also, absolute and &rebuttable presumptions.
Disputable presumptions are inferences of law which hold good until they are inva lidated by proof or a stronger presumption. Best, Presump. 29 ; 2 Harr. & M'H. Md. 77 ; 4 Johns. Ch. N. Y. 287.
Presumptions of fact are inferences as to the existence of some fact drawn from the existence of some other fact; inferences which common sense draws from circumstances usually occurring in such cases. 1 Phil lipps, Ev. 4th Am. ed. 599 ; 3 Barnew. & Ad. 890 ; 3 Hawks, No. C. 122 ; 1 Wash. C.
C. 372.
Preswnzptions of law are rules which, in certain cases, either forbid or dispense with any ulterior inquiry. 1 Greenleaf, Ev. 14. Inferences or positions established, for the most part, by the common, but occasionally by the statute, law, which are obligatory alike on judges and juries. Best, Presump. 17. They are either conclusive or disputable.
The distinctions between presumptions of law and presumptions of fact are—firat, that in regard to presumptions of law a certain inference muet be made whenever the facts appear which furnish the basis of the inference; while in case of other presumptions a discretion more or less extensive is vested in the tribunal as to drawing the infer ence. See 9 Barnew. C. 643. Second, in case
of presumptions of law, the court may draw the inference whenever the requisite facts are de veloped in pleading, Stephen, Plead. 4th ed. 382; while all other presumptions can be made only by the intervention of a jury. Presumptions of law are reduced to fixed rules, and form a part of the system of jurisprudence to which they belong; presumptions of fact are derived wholly and di rectly from the circumstances of the particular case, by means of the common 'experience of man kind. See 2 Starkie, Ev. 684; 6 Am. Law Mag. 370; 35 Penn. St. 440.
2. In giving effect to presumptions of fact, it is said that the presumption stands until proof is given of the contrary. 1 Crompt.
M. & R. Exch. 895 ; 2 Harr. & M'Il. Md. 77 ; 2 Dall. Penn. 22; 4 John13. Ch. N. Y. 287.
See BURDEN OF PROOF ; ONUS PROBANDI.
This contrary proof may be a conflicting presumption ; and Mr. Best lays down the following rules for application in such cases: —.first, special presumptions take the place of general ones, see 8 Barnew. & C. 737 ; 9 id. 643; 5 Taunt. 326 ; 1 Marsh. 68 ; slcond, presumptions derived from the ordinary course of nature are stronger than casual presumptions, 1 Carr. & K. 134 ; 4 Barnew.
& C. 71 ; Coke, Litt. 373 a ; third, presump tions are favored which tend to give validity to acts, 1 Leach, Cr. Cas. 412 ; 5 Esp. 2$0 ; 1 Mann. & R. 668 ; 3 Campb. 432 ; 2 Barnew.
& C. 814 ; 7 id. 573 ; 2 Wleat. 70 ; 1 South.
•