5. Upon the principle of this presumption, a sudden and otherwise inexplicable tran sition from a state of indigence, aud a con sequent change of habits, is sometimes a cir cumstance extremely unfavorable to the sup position of innocence. 11 Mete. Mass. 534. See 1 Gray, Mass. 101, 102.
But this rule of presumption must be ap plied with caution and discrimination ; for the bare possession of stolen property, though recent, uncorroborated by other evidence, is sometimes fallacious and dangerous as a cri terion of guilt. Sir Matthew Hale lays it down that " if a horse be stolen frem A, and the same day B be found upon him, it is a strong presumption that B stole him : yet," adds that excellent lawyer, " I do re member before a learned and very wary judge, in such an instance, B was condemned and executed at Oxford assizes, and yet, within two assizes after, C, being apprehended for another robbery, and convicted, upon his judgment and execution confessed he was the man that stole the horse, and, being closely pursued, desired B, a stranger, to walk his horse for him while he turned aside upon a necessary occasion, and escaped ; and B was apprehended with the horse, and died in nocently." 2 Hale, Pl. Cr. 289.
6. The rule under discuezion is occasionally attended with uncertainty in its application, from the difficulty attendant upon the positive identification of articles of property alleged to have been stolen ; and it clearly ought never to be applied where there is reason- , able ground to conclude that the witnesses may be mistaken, or where, from any other cause, identity is not satisfactorily established. But the rule is nevertheless fairly and pro perly applied in peculiar circumstances, where, though positive identification is im. possible, the possession of the property can not without violence to every reasonable hy pothesis but be considered of a guilty cha racter: as in the case of persons employed in carrying sugar and other articles from ships and wharves. Cases have frequently oc curred of convictions of larceny, in such cir cumstances, upon evidence that the parties were detected with property of the same kind upon them recently after coming from such places, although the identity of the property as belonging to any particular person could not otherwise be proved.
7. It is seldom, however, that juries are required to determine upon the effect of evi dence of the mere recent possession of stolen property : from the very nature of the case, the fact is generally accompanied by other corroborative or explanatory circumstances of presumption. If the party have secreted the property ; if he deny it is in his posses sion, and such deniarl is discovered to be false ; if he cannot show how he became possessed of it ; if he give false, incredible, or inconsistent accounts of the manner in which he acquired it, as that he had found it, or that it had been given or sold to him by a stranger or left at Ibis house ; if he has disposed of or attempted to dispose of it at an unreasonably low price ; if he has absconded or endeavored to escape from justice ; if other stolen property, or picklock keys, or other instruments of crime, be fomid in his possession ; if he were seen near the spot at or about the time when the act was committed, or if any article be longing to him be found at the place or in the locality where the theft was committed, at or about the time of the commission of the offence ; if the impression of his shoes or other articles of apparel correspond with marks left by the thieves ; if he has attempt ed to obliterate from the articles in question marks of identity, or to tamper with the parties or the officers of justice; these and all like circumstances are justly considered as throwing light upon and explaining the fact of possession, and render it morally cer tain that such possession can be referrible only to a criminal origin, and cannot other wise be rationally accounted for. 1 Bennett & H. Lead. Crim. Cas. 371, 372, where thie subject is fully considered.