S. JURISDICTION. It is difficult to reduce a jurisdiction so extensive and of such diverse component parts to a rigid and precise classi fication. But an approach to it may he made. The general nature of the jurisdiction has already been indicated. It exists • First, for the purpose of compelling a dis covery from the defendant, respecting the truth of the matters alleged against him, by an appeal to his conscience to speak the truth., The discovery is enforced by requiring an answer to the allegations in the complaint, in order that the plaintiff may use the matters disclosed in the answer, as admissions of the defendant, and, thus, evi dence for the plaintiff, either in connection with and in aid of other evidence offered by the plaintiff, or to supply the want of other evi dence on his part ; or it may be to avoid the expense to which the plaintiff must be put in procuring other evidence to sustain his case.
When the plaintiff's complaint, otherwise called a bill, prays for relief in the suit, the statements of the defendant in his. answer are considered by the court in form-, ing a judgment upon the whole case.
To a certain extent, the statements of the defendant in answer to the bill are evidence, for himself also.
The discovery which may be required is not only of facts within the knowledge of the defendant, but may, also, be of deeds and other writings in his possession.
The right to discovery is not, however, an unlimited one : as, for instance, the defendant is not bound to make a discovery which would subject him to punishment, nor, ordi narily, to discover the title upon which he relies in his defence ; nor is the plaintiff en titled to require the production of all papers which he may desire to look into. The limits of the right deserve careful consideration. The discovery, when had, may be the found ation of equitable relief in the same suit, in which case it may he connected with all the classes of cases in which relief is sought; or it may be for the purpose of being used in some other court, in which case the j diction is designated as an assistant uris diction.
• 9. Second, where the courts of law do not, or did not, recognize any right, and therefore could give no remedy, but where the courts of equity recognize equitable rights and, of course, give equitable relief. This has been denominated the exclusive jurisdiction. In this class are trusts, charities, forfeited and imperfect mortgages, penalties and fiiffeitures. imperfect consideration.
Uses and trusts have been supposed to have had their origin in the restrictions laid by parliament upon• conveyances in morcmain,— that is, to the church for charitable, or rather for ecclesiastical, purposes.
It may well be that the doctrine of equita ble titles and estates, unknown to the com' mon law but which could be enforced in chancery, had its origin in conveyances to individuals for the use of the church in order to avoid the operation of these restrietions,–= the conscience of the feoffee being bound to permit the church to have the use according to the design and intent of the feoffment.
But conveyances in trust for the use of the church were not by any means the only cases in which it was desirable to convey the legal title to one for the use of another. In many instances, such a conveyance offered a convenient mode of making provision for those who, from any circumstances, were unable to manage property advantageously for themselves, or to whom it was not desira ble to give the control of it; and the pro priety in all such cases of some protection to the beneficiary is quite apparent. The court of chancery, by recognizing that he had an interest of an equitable character which could be protected and enforced against the holder of the legal title, exercised a juris diction to give relief in cases which the courts of common law could not reach consistentlY with their principles and modes of procedure.