INTENT (Lat. intent us, purpose, from in tendere, to stretch, intend, from in, in + tendere, to stretch; connected with Gk. teinein, Skt. tan, to stretch, and ultimately with Eng. thin). As employed in law, the purpose or de sign with which an act is done. Ordinarily the legal consequences which flow from acts are en tirely independent of the intent or motive with which the acts are performed. This is true of all violations of the general rights, known as rights in rem, more commonly described as prop erty and personal rights. Thus the right to be free from trespass and the right to be secure from violence or from arbitrary arrest do not depend in the least on the motive or intent of the person violating them. It is only in those eases in which the rights claimed flow from the engage ments of a party, or in which the law has. from motives of its own, attached consequences to the intent with which an act is performed, that in tent acquires any legal significance. Obviously any rights claimed under a will, a deed, or a contract flow from the intent of the person exe cuting it, and, in certain classes of torts, a malicious or fraudulent motive may constitute the gravamen of the offense complained of.
But, in all of these eases, it is not the actual and seerA motive. hut the expressed intent which determines the legal •haraeter of the act in ques tion. This is the real meaning of the rule which forbids the introduction of parol evidence to con tradict or vary the terms of a written instru ment. The grantor of land is not permitted to
show that he intended to convey another and different parcel of land. He must stand by the intent as expressed in his deed. So. in a will. a legacy to A cannot. by proof of a contrary intention on the testator's part. be converted into a gift to B, nor can one who has sold a horse for $100 show that lie intended to charge $150 for the animal. Analogous to this principle is the rule applied in those wrongs in which intent is an element, as in malicious mischief and cer tain cases of defamation and negligence. The person committing the injury is liehl to have in tended the reasonable and probable consequences of his acts, and cannot exonerate himself from liability by showing that his intention was really of an innocent or benevolent character.
There are other classes of cases. however, in which the actual intent with which an act was performed is a proper matter for judicial in quiry. This is especially so in eases where the wrongful intent is the gist of the wrong. as in actions for deceit, and. under certain circum stances, in proceedings to set aside fraudulent conveyances. See DECEIT: FRAUDULENT CONVEY ANCE; INTERPRETATION; SALES ; and the author ities there referred to.