JURISPRUDENCE (Lat. jurisprudent ia, prarlentia, knowledge of the law, from juris, gen. sg. of jus, law, and prudentia. knowledge, from proridcre, to foresee, from pun, before 4 to see). (1) In ancient Rome. the word jurisprudence was used in a sense very close its etymological meaning. Those men who were so skilled in the law (juris perili) that they could foresee its development, declaring what the rule would he in a novel or otherwise doubtful ease, were termed juris prude-n(Cs; and the body of law built up by their concurrent and constant interpretation was pradtsntia. In the Re publienn period these law-finders owed their au thority to the general recognition of their knowl edge and ability (hence furls consulti) and not to any official position. Front the time of Au gustus they were designated by the Emperor (by bestowal of the Pis respondendi); in the follow ing period they were drawn more and more into the direct administration of justice; and at the close of the second century nearly all the juris pratlentes were judges in the modern sense of the word. In the Republican and the imperial period alike, however, the juris developed the law by interpretation, and the juris pradentia was practically what English-speaking peoples call 'case law' (See Cm'. Both in France and in Spain the word jurisprudence ( jurisprathaler% jurisprudenria) is still commonly employee] in this sense. Abstractly, it means the judicial interpretation of the law: in the con crete it often designates a collection of decisions, or, as we say. 'reports.' In English. also, the word is sometimes used in this sense, as when we speak of 'equity jurisprudence.' (21 More commonly, however. especially in modern times, English-speaking peoples use the word jurisprudence to describe what was often called. at an earlier period. philosophy of law, and what Continental writers now call the 'theory' or the 'science' of the law. An English treatise cm inrisnrmlenec. rr on the 'science' or 'principles' of law. undertakes to determine what law is. i e. what are the essential elements in our
conception of law; what relation law hears to the cognate social sciences, polities, ethics, economies, etc.; how law originates (popular customs, judi cial usage, legislation), and how it ceases to exist (desuetude, change of usage, abrogation or re peal) ; how it is applied (with reference to per sons. time, and place). and how it is enforced (sanctions). Jurisprudence also analyzes and defines the principal conceptions with which law operates, e.g. legal relations, rights, and duties. It may undertake to classify law, and to construct a system or framework in which every rule of modern law (or perhaps of all law, past and present) shall find an appropriate place. It may —although it more rarely does—attempt to clas sify all the relations which the law recognixtes or creates and which it regulates or orders, e.g. the relations of State and government to other forms of association and to the individual. and the relations of private associations and of individu als to each other. It may—although it still more rarely does—analyze the fundamental conceptions. of the family, of property, and of succession. Such detailed investigations must ordinarily be sought in special treatises. English writers on juris prudence usually confine themselves to what the Germans call the genera] part' of legal theory.
Another limitation observable in works on jurisprudence is that they deal chiefly with pri vate law, i.e. with the law which the courts administer in civil proceedings. It is sometimes affirmed (as by Pollock) that public or political law lies outside of the proper field of jurispru dence and in the field of political science. When this is not affirmed, it is nevertheless noticeable that the attention of writers on jurisprudence is mainly directed toward private law; that their definitions frequently ignore the publie-law point cf view: and that their categories are private law categories. Thus Austin tries to force all public law into the law of fictitious and abnormal persons.