LAW. A term of science and philosophy, there used in a metaphorical sense. The primary meaning of the word law' is written enactment or rule of action laid down by authority. Such law, when enforced by authority, secures a cer tain uniformity of action. The observed uni formity of action of physical objects thus pre sents a striking resemblance to the conduct of law-controlled human beings. This resemblance was without doubt the logical ground for the he lief. which appeared in the earliest known times. that the course of nature is prescribed by enact ment of a conscious being or of several such beings. Such a view comes to fullest expression in later Semitic literature. "He gave to the sea his decree, that the waters should not pass his commandment." "Hitherto shalt thou come, but no farther: and here -hall thy proud waves be stayed.'• Against this view protests have been raised for many centuries, but it is only within quite recent times that a less anthropomorphic and more scientific view of the uniformity of natural processes has gained wide currency. Ac cording to this view, the law of nature' is not an enactment expressing the will of some con scious being and obeyed by natural objects, but only the more fact that all events have causes (see CAUSALITY) ; and causes of events are not unaccountable entities in some way producing effects by some sort of creative magic, but noth ing more nor less than the invariably uniform antecedents of those events. Ever since Hume's trenchant criticism of such words as 'force' and `power.' it has come more and more to he seen that nothing is explained by referring effects to the power of causes to produce effects. To at tribute the order of nature to the power of sonic great being who can lay down the law to nature is to explain a fact by a mystery. Science gains nothing, therefore, by ascribing all the uniformi ties of nature to the determining decree of a supernatural being. The power of such a decree to produce an effect is no more self-explanatory than any causal efficiency of any physical object. Descartes and his school, and also modern paral lelists (see PARALLELISM), assert that while physical phenomena may cause other physical phenomena, and psychic phenomena may cause other psychic phenomena. there is no possible interaction between phenomena of the two dif ferent classes. See OCCASIONALISM.
Laws of nature, whether physical, psychical, or psycho-physical, are of different orders or grades. Sonic- observed uniformities are particu lar instances of more extensive uniformities ob taining in many ffinin facie diverse phenomena. For instance. the of the motions of the earth and of the moon from a straight line was successfully correlated by Sir Isaac Newton with the phenomena of falling bodies nearer the carth's surface. And inasmuch as not only the motions of the earth and of the moon accord with this law, but also the motions of all the planets and of such comets as have been care fully studied, all these uniformities are correlat ed in the so-called law of gravitation, which is by hypothesis conceived as obtaining among all physical objects within the universe. In this law of gravitation we have perhaps the best instance of what is called a scientific law i.c. a law which can be stated with accuracy. and to the universality and unconditionality of which all available evidence points with all the assurance of valid logical induction.
But not all discovered laws have this logical conclusiveness. INIany of them are merely rough generalizations. The exact condition, under which a phenomenon occurs may not yet have been aseertained, and still we may know that under certain general circumstances, not all of which are sufficiently defined, that phenomenon does actually and frequently occur. Take for instance the facts of heredity. We know that if there
have been in several successive c'enerations many in a certain line of descent, other criminals will probably appear when the present representatives of that line begin to reproduce. But we are not in a position to state the exact conditions under which this further criminality will be sure to appear. Some of the children may escape the taint altogether; some may have ten dencies toward criminality. but not too strong to be overcome by proper social influences; while still others are practically incorrigible. Here then we have an instance of a more general law of heredity. which may be stated in the proposi tion that psychical and physical characteristics of children are more or less conditioned by the psychical and physical characteristics of their parents and of more remote progenitors. Ob serve the more or less in the statement. There is no such qualification in the law of gravitation. Hence while the latter is a law in the strictest scientific sense of the term, the law of heredity is a law only in a very loose sense. Such laws are called empirical Experience suggests the existence of a causal connection. lint science has not yet succeeded in isolating and defining the relation. Empirical law- are the raw ma terial from which scientific laws are elaborated by exact observation. by experiment. and by more guarded generalizations. and especially by cor relation with other laws with which they may be related as particular to particular under a common universal. J. S. :Mill's account of em pirical laws differs somewhat from that just given, but it is really the starting-point of more recent investigations into the differences between scientific and empirical laws. On this account. it is worth while to quote it: "Scientific inquirers give the name of 'empirical laws' to those uni formities which observation or experiment has shown to exist, but on which they hesitate to rely in cases varying touch from those actually ob served, for want of seeing any reason why suet' a law should exist." Consult, especially, Logic, book iii.; but also the other works on inductive logic referred to under LOGIC, and Nnutvriox.
LAW. In social psychology (q.v.), law is closely related to custom. When it becomes necessary to enforce a custom, to make it com pulsory, to prescribe penalties for its infraction, the custom is transformed into a law. Thus the custom of dividing the spoils of battle mac be come subject to such serious lapses that the wel fare of the clan or tribe is imperiled. The gen eral welfare will then demand that an authorita tive rule be made and protected by sufficient penalties. Custom has its own sanctions, as well as law; but it lacks the authority and physical coercion that distinguish la Ny.
It is evident that custom, which is closely re lated to habit (q.v.). is older than law. In the simpler forms of civilization 'law and order' arc upheld solely by usage and custom. It is natural that law should first apply to those lines of con duct whose importance is too grave to allow them to be left to custom. The primitive law, or rule, with its external, physical compulsion, is of much earlier origin than written regulations, which demand not only a somewhat advanced stage of social development, but also a high de gree of stability in a society. Law appears only with sonic form of the State. So long as there is no general legislative and executive power that makes the State, it is obvious that law cannot be differentiated from custom. it is, then, a mis take to suppose that sonic kind of legal contract is prior to the State. The State arose from the tribal union as law arose from custom; both grew up gradually and side by side.
Consult: Wundt, Ethics, translation, vol. i. (New York. 1897) ; Lubbock, Origin of Ciriliza lion (New York, 1895).