MIND (AS, ycmyad, Teel. minni, Cloth. gam ands, memory. from AS. munan, Icel. mum', (,oth. ya m Han, to remember; ultimately connect ed with Lat. mens, Gk. kayos, means, mind, Skt. to think). The collective term for the subject-matter of psychology (q.v.). The com mon-sense view of mind makes it a mind.sub stanee, a spiritual agent. a real• simple, and unitary being, sharply opposed to material sub stance as 'thought' is opposed to 'extension.' yet interacting with the physical universe under some form of the causal law. This conception of mind has its root in primitive refieetion upon the phenomena of sleep, dreams. trance, and death. It received philosophical treatment at the hands of the scholastic psychologists: and. in its current form, is practically a legacy from Descartes. It is doubtless kept alive by its emotional value; it. satisfies human aspirations. and accords well with the natural anthropocentric notion of the world at large. it is still held by some psychologists: Ladd openly accepts it, and James, while rejecting it for his psychology, yet admits that, for his personal thinking, it appears 'the line of least. logical Neverthe less, such a view• of mind is wholly foreign to the spirit and to the requirements of modern psychology. In the first place, it is unsupported by psychological evidence. Ilad there been the same emotional temptation to reject minds as there has been to posit them, we may be sure that the arguments ordinarily urged in their favor would have received but scant attention. Secondly, the assumption of a real mind is super fluous, "The substantialist view of the soul," says James, "is at all events needless for ex pressing the actual subjective phenomena of consciousness as they appear:" "the substantial sonl explains nothing and guarantees nothing."
In so far, then, as this theory of mind is con cerned, Modern psychology is what Lange. the historian of materialism, named it: a psychology without. a mind, a Psyehologic ohne Neck. Even the few writers who still cling to the substan tia list view make no use of the assumption in their actual presentation of psychological facts and laws: it. is only in their coneluding remarks. at the point of transition from psychology proper to metapin•sics. that mind. the being.' is introduced. At the same time, it would be en tirely erroneous to apply Lange's phrase. with out qualification, to mental science. A psyehol °ITT without some sort of mind would be impos sible. The new psychology keeps the term mind, hut defines it as the sum-total of an individual's mental experience. .1list as a `plant' is the organized whole of root, stein, leaves, and flowers, and not something above and behind these 'parts,' so is mind the organized whole of our mental processes (q.v.), the interwoven totality of thoughts, feelings, desires, volitions, etc., and not something above and behind these 'manifestations' of mentality.
BIBLIOGRAPHY. James, Principles of P.sycholBibliography. James, Principles of P.sychol- ogy, vol. i. (New York, 1890) Ebbinghaus, Orundz-iige der Psyehologic, vol. i. (Leipzig, 1897) ; 'mVundt, Outlines of Psychology (trans., ib.. 1898) : Titchener, Outline of Psychology(New York, Knelpe, Outlines of Psychology (trans., ib., 1895); id., Introduction to Philos• oplty (trans., ib., 1897) ; Ladd, Elements of Physiological Psychology ; losophy of Mind Oh, 18951. See BODY AND 511N0; CONSCIOUSNESS; ELEMENTS. CONSCIOUS.