SIN (AS. synn, 011G. sun ten, swan, Ger. Sundt'; probably connected with Lat. golfs, guilty, Gk. drib ate, mischief, harm). Voluntary trans gression of a moral law believed to possess divine sanction. All theories assume a fact which they presuppose to be wet) understood from the experi ential point of view by all. The various mean ings attached to this fact reveal a gradual pro gression out of the crudest physical conceptions to the highly individualized views of modern ethics. Thus among savages we do not find any consistent perceptions of right and wrong, and it is doubtful if we have any ground for speaking of 'the sense of sin' in their ease. The only ele ment of our definition obvious here is the vague apprehension of a power, higher than the human, approving o• disapproving.whom it is possible to offend and therefore wise to conciliate. Clearer conceptions appear among the Oriental nations, whose elaborate ceremonial and mechanical piety are calculated to foster the sense of sin in the soul. The Hindus, moreover, extend this idea of evil to the cosmos, which is conceived of as sharing the common evil of all existence. The fatalistic pessimism of the Orient has made little attempt to trace sin to a common root in human nature.
Among the Greeks and Romans the idea of sin takes on the more positive character of their life and temperament. The essential excellence of human nature and the power of the human will, unaided. to attain to a high standard of virtue. was part of the genius of the Grfeeo-Boman civi lization. Yet the idea of moral evil is not lack ing, especially in the days of the decline of In the main, however, sin is conceived either as physical disease or as ignorance.
With Christianity there came a change, the ehief cause of which was the teaching of the doctrine of a future life. especially the doctrine of penalty for sin. This acted as a strong deterring influ ence. which showed itself still further in the practice of self-accusation and in the habit of affixing personal responsibility for the smallest departures from the divine law. In their con flict with paganism and Greek philosophy the early fathers were led to define the nature of sin more fully and precisely. We find two broadly divided schools. One regarded sin as an individual affair, as a voluntary act, as an actual reality. The other regarded it as a mat ter of the race, as a matter of hereditary de pravity and corruption. The former school held that moral responsibility was confined to the in dividual's own acts; the latter, that this respon sibility is shared and conditioned by the race as such. Out of these opposing views arose the dis
tinction between actual and original (q.v.) sin.
Later speculation made nraeh of the classification into mortal (q.v.) and venial (q.v.) sins.
In modern thought sin is studied for the most part in connection with thendiey, psychological ethics. and sociology. It assumes three forms: (1) the inquiry into the origin of evil: (2) the ques tion of freedom and necessity: and (3) the rela tion of sin to final causes. As regards the first, we find Descartes and Spinoza practically denying the positive character of sin, being followed in this view by Alalebranehe. who, however, perceiving the dilemma of absolute determinism, maintained that sin is a phenomenon, throng]) which God occasionally ac•ts, as Ile might through any other act of a human being. For Leibnitz, the author of the most original system of theodicy, evil is the contrast to the good. The origin of evil, therefore, is not to be found in the divine will, nor entirely in the action of man, but rather in the essential limitations of matter, which is the condition of realizing the good. Thus evil is merely privation and has no true cause. In re gard to the second question Spinoza's theory of universal determinism led him to attribute free dom to God alone, and, of course. this caused him to deny the reality of free agency. cartes's view that God creates the distinction be tween truth and falsehood, right and wrong, tended in the same direction. Leibnitz, on the other hand, while admitting that God is the only complete and perfect cause, nevertheless con tended that the has, in creating man, conferred upon him the prerogative of freedom. Now the possession of freedom by man is not a limitation of God's absoluteness. For, first, freedom in a finite agent involves the liability to error and sin: and, second, the sin of man is not predes tined or ordained by God, but only permitted. so that the good may be more completely mani fested. Sin, therefore. cannot defeat the final purpose of God, which is the completion of the system. the establishment of good in the heart of every man: for God has determined or chosen that, on the whole, the system shall promote the happiness of Ifis creatures, which is the only principle that has positive character.