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Skepticism

qv, knowledge, reality, skeptics, judgment, skepti, world and expression

SKEPTICISM (from skeptic. OF., Fr. seep ague, from Gk. (MEAT MSS, skeptikos, inquiring, from Gran-Teo-Ow, skeptcsthai. to consider; con nected with Lat. specere, to look, OHG. spehon, Ger. spahen, to spy, Skt. qtai, to look). A term applied in philosophy to any system which leaves in doubt either the existence of a world of reality transcending experience (metaphysical skepti cism) or the possibility of a valid knowledge (epistemological skepticism). As, however, doubt as to metaphysical reality in the last resort rests on suspicion of mates ability to know anything about such reality, all skepticism is ultimately epistemological; i.e. it rests upon views as to the scope and validity of knowledge. The Sophists (q.v.) of the fifth century 13.0. were many of them skeptics. Gorgias (q.v.) declared that all statements are false, and the reason he gave was that a true judgment is. an expression of abso lute identity; this contention may be illustrated by an insistence that no man is good. for the simple reason that every man is man, and only good is good. Such a doctrine involving the falsehood of all significant propositions is im plicitly at least a denial of the possibility of all real knowledge. Gorgias even went further and argued that there is nothing (nihilism) ; adding that if there were anything it could not be known (skepticism), and even it it could be known it could not be taught. Protago•as (q.v.) of Abdera taught that all we could know is our perception of things, but not things. Man is the measure of the Knowable Universe. After the constructive work of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, it was natural that skepticism should by reaction take a more definite stand, and this it did in Pyrrho and his school. Pyrrha's main thesis was that things are inaccessible to our knowledge, and hence it is becoming in us to suspend judgment. It seems that the school of Pyrrho was the first to win the appellation of `skeptics.' and so representative was its skepti cism that to this (lay the word Pyrrhonism, de rived from the name of the founder of the school, is used as synonymous with skepticism of a thorough-going kind. Tinton, Pyrrho's pupil, carried skepticism to its logical conclusion, which of course is contradictory with and yet necessitated by the premise from which it is drawn. This premise is that equally good rea sons can be given for any proposition and for its contradiction. This principle applied to the doc trines of skepticism themselves involves the re sult that as good reasons can be given for an anti-skeptical as for a skeptical view. This re

sult of course takes away all reasonable advan tage which the doubter may claim to have over his opponent, and the only course left for him is to give expression to his suspense of judgment by silence on the subject of skepticism. The Middle Academy, of whom Arcesilaus (q.v.) and Came ades (q.v.) were the most prominent leaders, were somewhat less radical in their skepticism; they had the logical grace to have some doubts as to the truth of a skepticism that doubted everything. -Enesidenrus (q.v.) elaborated ten reasons for skepticism. and called them tropes (Greek. tropoi, methods, i.e. of proving skepti cism). Agrippa and Sextus Empirieus (q.v.) were other noted skeptics of antiquity. In the Middle Ages Algazel (q.v.) in Arabia and Duns Scotus (q.v.) in Europe joined a philosophical skepticism with an unswerving religions faith. With the Refiaissance. the influence of ancient skepticism began to show itself in the writings of such men as 3lontaigne (q.v.), Sanchez, and (Jharron hut modern skepticism did not find its adequate expression till Hume (q.v.) wrote his celebrated Treatise of Human Nature (1739). In Book I. of this work is to be found the conclusion which Hume draws from his pre vious speculations, and not even those experi ences of life which have a practical import here escape the touch of doubt. "In all the incidents of life we ought still to preserve our skepticism. If we believe that lire warms. o• water refreshes, 'tis only because it costs us too much pains to think otherwise." "A true skeptic will be diffi dent of his philosophical doubts, as well as of his philosophical conviction; and will never refuse any innocent satisfaction, which offers itself, upon account of either of them." Kant (q.v.) and Spencer (q.v.) are dogmatic skeptics with regard to ultimate reality. We know the phe nomenal world, but the world of things-in-them sel•es (Kant) or the absolute (Spei'icer) is un knowable. This dogmatic skepticism is at the present day called agnosticism (q.v.). For a criticism of skepticism, see KNOWLEDGE, TIIEORY OF. See also Janet, "Le scepticisme moderne." in diaitres de la pens& moderne (Paris, 1383) : Owen, Evenings with the Sceptics (London, 1881) : Brochard. Les seeptiques grecs (Paris, 1887) ; Maccoll. The Greek Sceptics from Pyr rho to ,S'extus (London, 1869).