TROOP LEADING.
The principles of troop leading belong mainly in the domain of strategy; that of tactics is far more limited, because the subordinate commander usually receives the plan of operations from higher authority; nevertheless, he must often act independently. Every action of a commander should be based on a definite purpose, but often the original plan may have been based on false premises, because in war the circumstances are rarely clear. Even a division commander can rarely be fully informed of the condition of his entire division, much less an army corps com mander. Moreover, after making dispositions, the conditions may have entirely changed since the receipt of the reports on which they were based, and this is particularly true of cavalry forces, where events succeed one another 'so rapidly. These are some of the difficulties a commander hato contend with. The position taken by the commander in person is of great importance. Aside from the moral effect the commander must be influenced by the theatre of war and must have his hand on the pulse of his army; finally, in the critical moments his position is at the front where the decisive action must take place. The headquarters may remain in rear, but the leader himself must be at the front. In spite of all the modern aids to recon naissance and the transmission of reports, in spite of telegraph, railroad, bicycle, automobile, in spite of heliograph, balloon, and carrier pigeon, the veil covering the enemy has with time grown more and more impenetrable, due more particularly to the great masses involved in modern armies, the immense space covered, the greater rapidity of movement, and the increased effect of firearms. Still, the commander who decides to wait for definite information, espe cially as regards the strength of the enemy, will wait in vain. In this connection it must be remembered that the value of the initiative for the successful execution of an undertaking can not he overestimated; it often makes up for a poor plan.' The greater the sphere of action the more difficult it is to get a clear idea of the entire situation, for the commander must have in mind a definite conception of the state of affairs on the enemy's front, at the heads of his own columns, and of the entire field, and this must be derived from the innumerable messages and reports, regarding the enemy, his own troops, and the lines of communication, coining in from all directions. The picture is probably
never perfectly true, but on the whole it must sum up the situation correctly, for on it are based the orders issued to the troops, and the latter must always aim at a decisive action. Considering all the difficulties, it is evident that even the ablest leader cannot attend to all the duties of his position personally, and requires assistants; in other words, a staff. The leader must be fully responsible for all his decisions; the rest of the work his staff must relieve him of. Especially does he need an officer to look over and arrange the incoming reports of recon naissance, and in large commands this is placed under a separate bureau, where the dispatches are filed, and only the important ones, or a num ber of connected ones, placed before the com mander. See STAFF.
In carrying out the various operations and manoeuvres here described much depends upon the completeness and efficiency of the organiza tion of the army, consequently the subject of organization is closely associated with tactics. Therefore, in this connection the reader should consult the article ARMY ORGANIZATION and the articles ARMIES; ARTILLERY; CAVALRY; INFAN TRY; MOUNTED INFANTRY; STAFF; ADVANCE GUARD; OUTPOST; RECONNAISSANCE; and BAT TLE. The various arms and materials of war mentioned will be found treated either under such collective titles as ORDNANCE and SMALL Aims, or under their own heads.
BIBLIOGRAPHY. Shaw. The Elements of ModBibliography. Shaw. The Elements of Mod- ern Tactics (London, 1S94) ; Wagner. Organiza tion and Tactics (Kansas City, 1890) ; Dickhut, Ilandbech der Truppcnfiihrung in Kricgc (Ber lin, 1901) ; Hohenlohe, Letters on Infantry, Cav alry, and .4 rtillery (Eng. trans., London. 1890) ; Wisser, Practical Problems in ,strategy and Tac tics (New York, 1902) : Wagner, The gerviee of Security and Information (1898) ; De Gruyther, Tactics for Beginners (London, 1899) ; Guenther, 1 briss der Taktik (Zurich, 18951 : Von der Goltz, Kricgf rung (Berlin, 1895) ; Wisser, The Recond Boer War, a tactical study (Kan sas City, 1900) : Lihbreeht, A ttaque et des places (1888-95) Lauth. L'eta-t militaire des puissatttecs etrangere-s (Paris, 1894) ; Loehell, Jahresberichte (Berlin, annual).