The full significance of the Supreme Court as a factor in the new government was not at first appreciated by all; yet there were some who realized its great importance, like Washington, who, with prophetic visions of what the future was to disclose, wrote, in a letter inclosing the commission of James Wilson, one of the first associate justices: "Considering the judicial sys tem as the chief pillar upon which our national government must rest, I have thought it my duty to nominate for the high offices in that department. such men as I conceived would give dignity and lustre to our national character." Early there arose two parties in this country— one believing that the new government was but a continuance of the old confederacy, in effect a league of States, the States remaining the domi nant powers, and the national Government serving only as a limited agency for the transaction of a few matters of general importance; the other that a new nation was created, supreme in control, possessing all the power of a nation, the States being simply parts of the one new nation. By the one party, the provisions of the Consti tution were strictly construed; no power was vested in the national Government, except that which was expressly named. The other believed that the Constitution was to he so construed as to give vigor and efficiency to the new nation. Upon the solution of this question turned the future of the Piepublic. It was finally answered and settled by the Supreme Court, which has always spoken for the nationality of the United States. A brief reference to some of the leading eases may indicate its action, and the effect thereof on our history. In Chisholm, executor, r. Georgia. 2 Dall. 419, decided February 18, 1793. the court (considering those provisions of the Constitution which extend the judicial power of the United States to controversies "between a State and citizens of another State," and give to the Supreme Court original jurisdiction of con troversies to which a State is a party) held that an action might be maintained against a State by a citizen of another State. The national idea was nut yet strong, and the proposition that a sovereign State could at the instance of an indi vidual and without its consent be brought to the bar of a court and compelled to defend an action against it startled many. As a consequence the Eleventh Amendment was adopted, which in ef fect forbids an action in the Federal courts against a State by an individual.
John Marshall became Chief Justice in Janu ary, 1801, and remained in office for thirty four years. lle is often aptly called 'the great Chief .Justice.' During his long term many ques tions of vital interest were considered and de termined by the court. It was a great constructive period, and by those decisions which declared the relative powers of the nation and the State was disclosed the full significance of the Constitution as an instrument expressing the cre ating of a new nation and not a mere article of confederation between separate States. Not merely were these relative powers declared, but the peculiar work and value of the Supreme Court as the tribunal to determine the extent of such relative powers and to pass in judgment upon acts of State and nation were also made appa rent. In Narbury v. Madison, 1 Craneh, 137, decided February 24. 1803, it was held that an act of Congress repugnant to the Constitution was void. True, this was not the first case in which such a judicial opinion had been an nounced, but Chief Justice Marshall presented the argument so fully and forcibly that since then the question has been at rest, and it is now undoubted that a legislative act repugnant to the Constitution is a nullity. Again. in iNt'Cul loch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, the question was presented of the power of Congress to charter a national bank. The Constitution gives in terms no such power, or indeed any power to create corporations, and tho advocates of a strict con struction contended that in the absence of an express grant of such power Congress could not create a corporation for any purpose. The court, upon the authority of that clause which, follow ing the clauses making express grants to Con gress, empowers that body to "make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers," held that, as a bank was a proper and convenient agency for carrying on the fiscal affairs of a govern ment, there was power in Congress to create a banking corporation: that the word 'necessary' was not to be construed in a strict and narrow sense, but—viewing the Constitution as an organic instrument by which a government was estab lished and which from the very necessities of the case used general terms in giving to that government the power for its being—to be taken broadly and liberally, and said in a phrase which has become axiomatic in constitu tional law: "Let the end be legitimate, let it_ be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which arc appropriate, which arc plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional."
This decision laid the foundation of what is known as the doctrine of implied powers, the significance of which may be better appreciated when we recall the fact that under a grant of power stated in these few words "to establish post-offices and post roads" the great postal sys tem of the United States has been built up. At the same term was decided the case of the Trus tees of Dartmouth College a. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 51S, in which it was held that the charter of a pri vate corporation granted by a State created a con tract whose obligations the State could not impair, because of that provision of the Federal Consti tution which forbids a State to pass any law "impairing the obligation of contracts." (See DART4IOUTI1 COLLEGE CASE.) 1t is true the full effect of that decision has been avoided by con stitutional enactments in the several States, re serving the power of repeal, alteration, and amendment of all corporate grants. Yet, not withstanding these limitations, that decision stands as the great bulwark of the sanctity of contract rights created by the States.
Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304. and Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, the latter decided at the February term, 1821, settled the power of the Supreme Court to review, and if necessary set aside, the proceedings of a State court in a case in which a Federal right was asserted by the defeated party. Thus it is that all rights which are claimed under the Constitution of the United States may finally be adjudicated by the Su preme Court of the United States, and a unity is thereby established which pervades the nation in respect to such rights. Again, in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, decided in 1824, the supreme power of the Federal Government over the naviga ble waters of the United States was affirmed. In that case Robert Fulton, the inventor of the steamboat, and his associate, Robert R. Living ston, obtained from the State of New York the grant of an exclusive right to navigate with steamboats the waters within the jurisdiction of that State. Gibbons claimed a right under na tional authority to navigate with his steamboats the same waters. and hence the litigation. The Constitution having granted to Congress the power to "regulate commerce with foreign na tions and among the several States," it was held that that power could not be infringed upon by any action of a State and that a State could not interfere with such commerce even when carried upon waters wholly within its own territory. Upon that decision rests that freedom of com merce between the States which, perhaps more than any other thing, has wrought into the minds of the people the great thought of a single controlling nationality. In this connection the case of 'The Genesee Chief,' 12 How. 443, derided in 1351, may be noticed. In that case it was held that the English rule that the jurisdiction of admiralty ended with tide waters was in applicable, and that in this country such juris diction, which by the Constitution is vested in the United States courts, extends to all the navigable waters of the Republic. Thus the control of the Great Lakes and all the navi gable rivers of the United States, whether within or without the limits of a State, is vested in the national Government. In Osborn r. United States Bank, 9 Wheat. 73S, it was held that a State had no power to tax one of the branches of the United States Bank; that the bank was one of the agencies and instrumentalities of the national Government, and as such was removed from the sphere of State taxation. From that decision has sprung the settled rule exempting all the agencies and instrumentalities of the national Government from State taxation except so far as permitted by Congress. This is seen in respect to United States bonds, national banks, etc. Con versely, though at a later date, in The Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113, decided December, 1870, it was held that Congress could not impose an income tax on the salaries paid to State officials. By these two decisions neither State nor nation can impair the efficiency of the necessary gov ernmental action of the other.