The constitution of Australia is modeled obvi ously upon that of the United States, in that it is based upon the principle formally stated, that all powers not delegated to the Central Gov ernment were reserved to the States. During the process of constitution-making, this principle en countered great opposition from those who fa vored a strongly centralized State, modeled upon the constitution of Canada. The legislative power of the Commonwealth is vested in a Federal Parliament composed of the Sovereign of Great Britain or his representative, a Senate, and a House of Representatives. The Governor-Gen eral may summon, prorogue, and dissolve Parlia ment, which must meet, however, every year. The Senate is composed of six members from each of the States, elected at large for a term of six years. The members of the House of Representa tives are chosen for three years, and must com prise, as nearly as possible, twice the number of senators, but no State may have less than five members in the lower hon*.e. For the first Par liatnent, New South \Vales was apportioned 26 seats; Victoria, 23; Queensland, 9; South Aus tralia, 7; Western Australia, 5; and Tasmania, 5. Parliament has the power of increasing the membership of either house, hut no State may be deprived of its absolute or proportionate rep resentation without its consent. The qualifica tions for an elector to either house of Parlia ment are the same as those for an elector to the lower house in the different States. In defining the scope of the Federal Parliament the framers of the constitution did not show themselves so. ardently in favor of State rights as to grudge it the exercise of wide powers. Profiting, on the contrary, by the experience of the United States in the matter of the conflict of State laws, and influenced, too, by the opposition of those who advocated a strongly centralized government, they included within the jurisdiction of Parlia ment such subjects as divorce, bankruptcy, and corporations, and prepared the way for the ab sorption of the colonial railways by the Federal Government. Closely summarized, the exclusive powers of Parliament are as follows: (1) Taxa tion, both direct and indirect, borrowing money on the public credit, currency, coinage, and legal tender; (2) defense; (3) the regulation of for eign and interstate commerce, including naviga tion, shipping, and interstate railroads, and the granting of uniform bounties on the production and exportation of goods (but each State may grant bounties for the encouragement of tbe. mining industry) ; (4) banking and insurance carried on iu more than one State; (5) bank ruptcy, copyright, patents, trade-marks, and cor porations; (6) marriage, divorce, parental rights and guardianship; (7) census and statis tics, weights and measures; (8) external affairs, immigration and emigration, quarantine, the in flux of criminals, naturalization, and the control of any race, other than the aborigines, requiring special legislation (this referring to the im portant question of Chinese and Japanese coolie. labor) ; (9) posts, telegraphs, and telephones; (10) astronomical and meteorological observa tions, coast ser•ice, and fisheries; (11) indus trial arbitration in questions involving more than one State, invalid and old-age pensions; (12) the service of criminal and civil process, and the establishment of judicial comity among the States; (13) the control of the railways for the purposes of national defense, the permanent acquisition of the railways with the consent of the States involved, and the construction of new railways; (14) finally, all legislation incidental to the execution of powers specifically delegated. Any State law that is in conflict with a law passed by Parliament, acting within its jurisdic tion, is void.
Legislation may he initiated in either house, but money hills must originate in the Ilouse of Representatives. The Senate has no power to amend an appropriation bill, hut may reject such measure. In case of a deadlock between the two houses lasting more than three months, as when the Senate persists in rejecting a bill repeatedly passed in the lower house, or in adding amend ments which that house refuSes to accept, re course is had to a dissolution and to a general election, and if the deadlock continues in the new Parliament the two houses meet in joint session and decide the matter by a majority vote. The executive power is vested in a Governor-General, nominated by the Crown, and in a council of not more than seven salaried ministers, appointed by the Governor-General and responsible to Parlia ment, of which they must be members. The judi cial power is vested in a Federal Supreme Court known as the High Court of Australia, exercising original jurisdiction in cases involving treaties with other nations or the representatives of for eign nations, or cases to which the Common is a party, or a State, or the residents of different States. It hears appeals from the minor Federal courts and from the Supreme courts of the States. No appeal may be taken
from the decision of the High Court to the British Privy Council on questions involving the limits of the constitutional powers of the Com monwealth or of the different States, unless the High Court certifies that the question is one which ought to be determined by the Sovereign in Council. In all other cases, appeals lie to the Privy Council, subject to the rules of proced ure established by the Australian Parliament.
The rights of the States are affirmed in the clause reserving to them all powers not delegated to the Federal Government. Their present con stitutions continue in force, their laws are judi cially recognized, and their territorial integrity and political influence are guaranteed by the provision that no amendment altering the boundaries of a State or reducing its absolute or proportional representation in Parliament is valid without the consent of the State; whereas, an ordinary amendment to the constitution may be passed by a majority of both houses of Par liament, and ratified by the people of a majority of States, constituting at the same time a ma jority of the whole body of electors in the nation. New States may be carved out of one or more of the original States with their consent, and Par liament may prescribe conditions for the admis sion of new States into the union.
The Australian Constitution, like the Constitu tion of the United upon which it is mod eled, is the result of To mpro m ise between the principles of loose federalism and centralization. The former was undoubtedly favored by the great majority of people, but met with strong opposi tion from the powerful labor element, which was especially influential in New South Wales and Victoria, and succeeded in defeating the consti tution at the first referendum. This party, which may be considered the democratic or even the radical party in Australian politics, assailed those provisions especially which made the pass ing of a constitutional amendment for changing the boundaries of a State so difficult. They also pointed out the anomaly presented by a responsi ble ministry in a Federal Government where either house may claim an equal right to control the cabinet, and they insisted that in the course of time the ministers would be made answerable, not to the popular House, in spite of its control of the purse, but to the Senate, which is the stronghold of particularism, and which, by reason of its longer duration and the fact that it is renewed by rotation and not in mass, could pur sue a more consistent and more aggressive policy than the House of Representatives. The exam ple of the United States Senate was cited to prove that an upper house possessing no powers of originating bills of revenue may yet become the leading factor in shaping legislation. But perhaps the most disputed clauses of the consti tution were those providing that three-quarters of the national revenue should be redistributed among the States in proportion to their original contributions. The reason for this provision was the fact that the transfer to the Federal Govern ment of the custom and excise duties, which were the principal sources of revenue in all the colo nies except New South Wales, would have bank rupted some of the States and seriously crippled all. Moreover. the logical result of the provision would be the imposition of a high tariff on im ports, since the General Government was limited to the use of one-fourth only of the total income. To the people of New South Wales, which has consistently been a free-trading colony, the pros pect of a high protective system was disagreeable. The question lost nothing in importance after the inauguration of the new government; the elec tions for the first Parliament were fought out on the tariff issue, and the result of the elections showed an almost perfect balance between the advocates of low tariff and protection.
The Commonwealth has been regarded by many students of polities as a step toward complete Australian independence. The veto power lodged in the Crown and the right to appoint the Gov ernor-General of the Commonwealth are of only little importance as binding ties between the mother country and Australia, in view of the British theory of the relations of the executive toward the legislature. Practically the only bond between Australia and the Empire is the right of appeal from the courts of the Common wealth to the Sovereign Council. In the con stitutional draft submitted to the British colo nial Secretary, it was provided that no appeal should lie to the Privy Council except in cases in volving the interests of some other part of the Empire. The British Colonial Office insisted upon the modification of this clause, and in the final act it was given the form already described. It is generally conceded, however, that in practice the tendency would be to restrict the exercise of the right to appeal to the utmost.