BELIEF' ( the verb belic re, AS. gc/ljfan, Goth. yalaubjan, Ger. glauben. literally means to esteem dear, to value; cf. E. lief, Cloth. hubs, dear, Lat. Tibet, lubct, it pleases, Ger. Liebe, love). In discussing the subject of Belief, the psychologist has to distinguish sharply between two related questions: that of the composition of the believ ing or assenting consciousness, and that of the na ture of belief as an attitude or function of mind at large. Under the former head (I) we find the most diverse views prevailing in the different psychological systems.. Locke ( 1632-1704 ), James Mill (1773-1836), end Herbert Spencer otter a purely intelleetnalistie analysis. For Locke, belief is an association of ideas on the ground of probability. If the association corresponds to a natural connection among the objects of idea, the belief is right; otherwise, it is wrong. The reasons for erroneous assent are to be found in want of proofs; want of ability or will to use them; and wrong measures of probability (reli ance on authority, yielding to passion). Mill declares, in similar vein, that in every instance of belief there is an indissoluble association of ideas. "I never have a sensation, nor the idea of that sensation, without associating with it the idea of myself. . . . In the ease of a pres ent sensation• end that of a present idea, the sensation and the belief in the sensation, the idea and the belief in the idea, are not two things; they are, in each case, one and the same thing." Those psychologists who deem these analyses defective have pointed out that while belief always implies the presence in con sciousness of ideational material, the object of belief, it is rather a feature of the emotional and volitional than of the purely intellectual life. This fact is recognized by Bagebot, when he speaks of the "emotion of conviction"; by James, when he defines belief as "a sort of feeling more allied to the emotions than to anything else"; and by Bain, who, postulating a primitive tendency to credulity as lie postulates a primitive tendency to spontaneous movement, describes be lief as "in its essential character a phase of our active nature, otherwise called the will." When
we remember how close is the connection be tween emotion and volition ("the emotion itself, together with its result, is a. volitional process": Windt). we see that it is a matter of comparative indifference whether the affective or the voluntary aspect of belief receives em phasis in the definition; the important thing is to avoid the intellectualistic fallacy of the associationist school.
(2) The nature of belief as an uttitudr or func tion of the mind at larg•.—That belief can be envisaged, not as a eomplex of conscious process es, but as a state of consciousness (see ATTEN TION), appears in II ume's (1711-76) account of it. "Belief is nothing but a more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady conception of an object than the imagination alone is ever able to attain. It consists . . in the manner of the conception [of the ideas] and in their feeling to the mind. . . . It gives them more weight and influence; makes them appear of greater importance; enforces them in the mind." Hume does not profess "per fectly to explain" this mode of conception. Ile is followed by J. S. Mill, who asserts that the difference between "thinking of a reality and representing to ourselves an imaginary picture" is "ultimate and primordial"; and by Brentano, who makes 'judgment' one of the elementary conscious functions. Without questioning the uniqueness of the state of assent, we may say, in general, that belief is a state of attention, with extreme liability of suggestion in a given direction.
BIBLIOGRAPHY. James, Psychology (NewBibliography. James, Psychology (New York, 1890) ; Mill, Analysis of the Phenomena of the human Mind (London, 1869) ; Bain, The Emotions and the Mill (London, 1880) ; Spen cer, Psychology (New York, ISSI) ; Locke, Es says (London. 1894) ; Hume, Inquiry (Oxford, 1894) ; Brentano, Psyehologie (Leipzig, 1874).