BEN'EFIT OF CLERGY (ME. bic»f et, OF. bienfet, from Lat. brae, well + factin, something done, a deed, act), or PRI VILEGIUM CLERICALE. The privilege, claimed by the Me dieval Church for its clergy, of exemption from the process of the secular courts when charged with crime. The privilege was generally ac corded by the Christian nations of Europe, and it operated to render the clergy amenable, espe cially in eases involving barbarous punishments, only to the authority of the Church. The an cient usage was, says Blackstone, "for the bishop or ordinary, to demand his clerks to be tried in the bishop's instead of the King's court." This exemption, enjoyed by all persons in holy orders, from the lay courts, was a privilege highly valued and stoutly defended by the clergy. This sentiment was powerfully supported by the growing sense of the sanctity attaching to the priestly office, and the result was the crea tion of a priestly caste owing allegiance pri marily to the Church and subject only to her penalties.
In England the privilege was conceded in all cases of felony, except that of treason against the King; but not in eases of misdemeanor nor in civil litigations. Originally available only in the case of persons in holy orders, it was ex tended in 1330, by a statute of Edward III., to all clerks, whether religious or secular, the last class comprehending all persons who could read. The gradual amelioration of the penal laws and the spread of education rendered the benefit of clergy more and more of an anaehronism, and it was, by successive acts of Parliament, gradually shorn of its privileges, and finally, in 1827, abolished. It survives only in the statute for bidding the judicial impeachment of archbishops or bishops for crime without the consent of the King, and in the exemption of the clergy from arrest while in the performance of the services of the Church.
The process whereby the benefit was claimed varied with the growing power of the ordinary tribunals. Originally the bishop was entitled to demand the person of the clerk immediately upon his apprehension, whereupon the jurisdiction of the secular authority ceased. Later the courts asserted the right to compel the presence of the accused, in order to inquire into the question of his guilt or innocence, as well as his right to the privilege; and finally the courts took full jurisdiction and proceeded against him as in the case of an ordinary criminal, until a verdict was rendered, when he was allowed to plead his benefit in arrest of judgment. (See ARREST OF JUDGMENT.) The test of the prisoner's ability to read was thereupon made in open court, and if his claim wad sustained, he was turned over to the bishop, or ordinary, to make his purga tion. (See COMPURGATION. ) The punishment of branding on the thumb, which the secular court was authorized to inflict before discharg ing the convicted clerk from its custody, was mitigated and finally abolished by statute of 1'J Geo. III. (1779).
In the United States the right was recognized in a few early eases in the colonies of North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia. It was expressly forbidden by an act of Congress passed April 30, 1790, in all eases of conviction of capital crime. The early history of the practice in England is fully given in Pollock and Mait land. History of English Lan. (2d ed., Boston, 1809). For its later history, consult: Hale, His tory of the l'lcas of the Crown ; Blackstone, Com me»ta ries an the Law of England ; and Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of Eng land (London, 1883).