.AusTrio-PausstAix WAR ( IS66 ) During this war, nothing of importance. either in matiriel, or ganization or tactics, was developed by either the Austrians or Prussiaim The field-battery of the Prussians consisted of six guns. generally steel In eech-loading rifled guns, called 6- and 4-pound ers. the first class using a 15-pound oblong shell, and the latter a similar 9-pound shell. Shell-fire, using percussion fuse, was used almost exclusive ly. The Austrian artillery, on the other hand, was armed with muzzle-loading rifles (8- and 4 pounders), each battery containing eight pieces. The Austrians still retained the system of 'brig ade' artillery, and used rocket batteries. In this war 'brigade' artillery and rocket batteries ap peared for the last time, and breech-loading tilled field-guns for the first time. The Prussians handled their artillery ineffectively during the entire war, the _Austrians being far superior to them in initiative and dash.
FRANco-GERNIAN \VAR, The Prussians made great improvements in artillery after 1566. and their use of artillery in 1870 was One of the most important military lessons of that war. Reserve artillery disappeared, and divisional and corps artillery alone was employed. To each cavalry division two batteries of horse ar tillery were attached. The guns employed were steel breech-loading rifles, 6- and 4-pounders.
The proportion of artillery was 3.7 guns to a thousand men. The French used muzzle-loading rifles (8- and 4-pounders). A few 12-pounder Napoleon guns seem still to have been in service. The mitrailleuse used by them was a machine gun. Their proportion of artillery was three guns to 1000 men. "The characteristic features of the artillery tactics of the Franco-German War may be summed up as follows: On the march, the German artillery was no longer kept in rear of columns of infantry, but was pushed well to the front, being preceded only by enough infantry to protect it from surprise. It was brought into
action at the very first opportunity, and almost invariably in large masses, which concentrated their fire upon the objective of the infantry at tacks. Its fire, in almost every case, was delib erate and accurate, and was employed at ranges varying from 3300 to 650 yards; while the French wasted their ammunition in is rapid fire at ranges too long for the best effect. The French committed the further fault of retaining their batteries too long in reserve, and employ ing them too often singly instead of in masses. The mitrailleuse did not meet the high expecta tions that had been formed of it, though its effect was sufficient to foreshadow' the extensive use of machine guns in future wars. Borbstaedt ac knowledges that these guns did produce a eon sideralde effect, partly from the strange. rattling noise they made, partly from the rapidity with which an immense lumber of projectiles were fired; and he says: 'It cannot lie denied that the French mitrailleuses caused heavy losses to the attacking. German troops, especially in posi tions where it was possible to keep them con cealed till the decisive moment laid arrived.' The mistake of pitting these guns against the German field-artillery was frequently and dis astrously made by the French. They were good only in the defense of positions." (Wagner, Or ganir:ation aml Tactics, New York. 1895).
Russo-n:10:18n WAR. The guns used by the in this war were inferior to those used by Prussia seven years before. They were bronze breech-loading rifles, the heavy being 9-, and the light, 6-pounders. The niatriel of the Turkish artillery was superior to that of the Russians, being composed of Krupp's steel breech-loading rifle guns. 8 and 9 centimetres calibre (3.2 and :3.5. inelusive). The Russians had 3.9 guns to 1000 men, the Turks only 2.2. During this war nothing new was developed either in organiza tion. materiel, or tactical handling of field ar tillery.