FREDERICK THE GREAT. It is remarkable that Frederick the Great should have neglected his artillery as he (lid in the early battles of his career. It was not until later that its true value as a weapon was learned by him; and, like most military lessons, it was learned by costly experi ence. The defect of Frederick's artillery was its immobility. The following from Decker will illustrate its inferiority and Frederick's methods of handling it on the field of battle: "The di rection of two pieces was intrusted to a corporal, to whom all initiative was forbidden. The com mander of the battalion alone had the right to control the guns; hut he was too much occupied with his men to think of the cannon. The conse quence was that the two pieces marched quietly behind the battalion; but upon arriving within 500 paces of the enemy they unlimbered and continued to advance, dragged by the men. It is very doubtful whether the corporal had any par ticular instructions for the fight. We only know that he had orders not to fire grape until within 350 paces, and always to keep himself 50 paces in front of the battalion; a very convenient measure. doubtless, but one which did not take into consideration that artillery is effective only in position, and not while marching. Worst of
all, when the battalion was beaten, the loss of the pieces was almost inevitable, for want of time to limber up." After the battles of Rossbach, Leutben. and Hochkirch, Frederick, appreciat ing at last the valuable service rendered by his artillery during these three important bat tles, improved and increased the number of guns to five for every 1000 men of other arms. He also created a horse-artille•y system of ten light 6-pounde•s, which wwns able to accompany his cavalry. Ills field-artillery was also improved as his infantry decreased in number, and consisted of 3-, 6-, and 12-pounder guns and 7-, 10-, and 25 pounder howitzers. The Austrian artillery op posed to Frederick's was much superior. The tactics of this period consisted in massing the guns, but the tire itself was not concentrated, the range of the guns being so inferior that it was impossible to concentrate the lire of sepa rated batteries on the same distant object. The general result of these wars, so far as artillery is concerned, was the formation and organization of position :Din batteries, which were assigned to brigades of infantry, the formation of howitzer batteries, and the creation of horse artillery.