BOMBARDMENT (Fr. hombarde, a cannon, a musical instrument; It. homborde, a musical instrument, a cannon; from Lat. hoinbus, boom ing noise; cf. bomb). An attack upon the forti fications of an opponent by artillery, cannon, and other heavy ordnance. All modern battles begin, when possible, by a heavy bombardment of the enemy's position. (See ATTACK.) The bombardment of a fortified town is a much more difficult undertaking, owing to the practical im possibility of knowing what results are being accomplished. or with what degree of accuracy the aim is taken. With reasonably strong de fenses and time for preparation, together with weans speedily available for the suppression of conflagration. the modern bombardment is more formidable for its moral effect and usefulness in blockading than for the actual damage it does the enemy, great as that might possibly be. It is an established fact that few modern bombardments have been particularly destruc tive. At the siege of Paris by the Germans, in the War of 1870-71, an average of 500 shells daily actually fell within the city, but accom plished comparatively little damage. In the British-Boer War of 1899-1902 the bombardment of Ladysmith and Kimberley was of daily occur rence, the deadliest of modern ordnance ex plosives being brought into use; hut there also little damage was inflicted. Buildings under the flag of the Red Cross are required to be some distance away from the combatants. and are supposed to be exempt from bombardment.
According to international agreement, 24 hours' or more notice of bombardment is given for the protection of non-combatants and their property.
The attack of defensive positions by naval Vessels is not generally regarded as likely to result in serious injury, but much depends on the character of attack. Moreover, permanent in jury may not be sought. In many instances it has been found possible to smother the fire of a fort by rapid fire front the small and medium calibre guns of ships. Where the guns are mounted behind low parapets or breastworks, and the embrasures are large. this may easily be done, if the preponderance of tire of the ships is considerable. At the attack on the de fenses of San Juan, Porto Rico, in May, 18N, by the fleet under Admiral Sampson, the Morro batteries, armed with very recently constructed six-inch guns. were silenced, though not much injured. Protected in this way by the fire of the fleet, the torpedo-boat Porter was able to go close under the guns of the fort and examine the harbor, in order to ascertain what Spanish ships were in the port. In the various bom bardments of the batteries at Santiago, the men were driven from the works, but the damage done was of little account. The bombardment of the town by the vessels of the fleet was very successful, and was the leading immediate cause of the surrender. The guns used were of eight inch calibre, the shells weighing 250 pounds. The naval vessels fired over an intervening rise of ground with a range of 4 miles, the fall of the projectiles being reported by the Army Signal Corps. For fear of striking in the Ameri can lines, the first shells were directed too far to the left, and fell into the water. The next lot —about 25 of them—all fell on the water-front street, in a space about 200 yards long and 30 yards wide. The third lot fell in a space of
about the same area, about half way from the water-front to the palace, wrecking the interior of every- house they struck, and in some cases destroying the exterior walls. The direction of the firing was again changed, and three shells fell just beyond the palace, passing close to its roof, when the signal to cease firing was seen. The Spaniards realized that the Americans were slowly feeling their way to the intrenchments, and that it was only a question of a very short time when they would be reached and made un tenable. As the majority of the inhabitants had left Santiago at this time, no one was hurt by the bombardment. At the same time that the ships were bontharding, the artny field-artillery was also throwing shells into the city; hut they were 2' too small ( weighing less than 0 pounds) to in jure buildings or to have much moral effect on the enemy. All other recent bombardments have taught the same lessons as may be learned front these; which are, that the damage done to forti fications is trilling compared to the expenditure of ammunition, but that. when the bombardment is directed against trenches or troops in the open, the actual and moral effects are consider able. It must not be assumed that because ships cannot successfully attack forts the latter can stop a fleet of modern armored ships front running by them. Of course some of the ships may he badly damaged, hut if the channel is clear and not too close to the enemy's gluts, the greater part of the vessels will probably get by without serious injury. In the Report of the British Naval and Military Operations in Egypt in MS.?, by Lieutenant- CollI111:111dPr Casper F. Goodrich, U.S.X. (published by the Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington. 1885). will be found a detailed account of the bombardment of the fortifications of Alexandria. The results conelusions derived from them are similar to those hereinbefore mentioned. Compare, also, the attacks on Charleston by the Federal fleet during the Civil War, and the bombardment of Forts Jackson and Saint Philip, below New Or leans, and of Fort Fisher, near Wihnington.
During the Spanish War much fear was ex pressed that the Spanish squadron would bom bard summer resorts and defenseless places on the Atlantic coast of the United States. Apart from other considerations, such a proceeding would have been a foolish waste of ammunition. It is possible that seaport cities may he forced to pay money to secure exemption from bom bardment, but wanton destruction is unlikely to be attempted. Its cost is generally out of pro portion to the damage inflicted, unless the con ditions are very favorable to the attack. An inferior fleet, at a long distance from its base of supplies, cannot afford to use up its ammuni tion. in operations which have no bearing upon the general course of the war, or which would not decrease the power of the enemy's fleet. See COAST DEFENSE, SIEGE AND SIEGE WORKS, and FonmicAnox, under which titles are de scribed the military tactics to be followed and means employed for defense against bombard ment.