The power of appointment to the public ser vice, even when, as is usually the ease, un restricted in theory, may be practically limited by custom, by the despotism of political party control, or, as in the case of the President of the United States, by the operation of self-im posed rules. The British Parliament, and many of the United States, have enacted laws restrict ing the exercise of the power of appointments, and prescribing the qualifications for the civil service, and providing for an impartial method of selection aiming the candidates for office: and it. several States these provisions have been em bodied in the Constitution. The object of these laws being to raise the moral tone and improve the efficiency of the civil service by eliminating, so far as possible, political motives for appoint ments, and by securing to the incumbents of public office independence of external control, whether personal or political, some form of the so-called 'merit system' (q.v.) has generally been adopted. Similar boards exist in New York and in many other cities to govern appointments to municipal office. This system will be fully de scribed under that title; but it may be noticed, here. that it is based on the principle of com petitive examinations, conducted by a board of administrative officers known usnall• as 'Civil Service Commissioners.' The results of the ex aminations and the rating of the candidates are reported by the Civil-Servi•e Board to the ap pointing officer, who makes his selection from among the names so certified to him, as the law may direct.
The power of appointment being vested in the President of the l'nited States by the Federal Constitution, it is not within the power of Con gress to fetter his action by the enactment of similar laws. The merit system has, however. been extensively applied by the voluntary of the President, most of the great departments of the Government being now wholly or in large part under its operation—the most conspicuous exceptions being the post-offices, the consular service, and the Census Bureau.
In many of the States, by law, and in sonic de partments of the Federal Administration by executive order, the independence of civil ser vants has been further secured by provisions testri•ting the power of removal from office, in many cases by providing for a definite tenure, and in others by requiring the renn•itig officer to tile his reasons for making the proposed re mo•al, and to give the accused official an oppor tunity to be heard in his own defense. In still ether cases. where the tenure is for life, or 'during good behavior,' the action of the• remov ing officer may be reviewed by the courts, and the removed official reinstated if the grounds for the removal are deemed by the court to be insuffi cient. Cenerally, however, where the tenure is not permanent, the above described operate solely as a cheek on hasty and incon siderate action, and as securing to the civil ser vant reasonable notice and the consideration of bis claims upon the office, and vest no power of review in the courts. It has been judicially de termined that the civil-service rules promulgated by the President of the United States do not have the force of general law, and confer upon members of the service no right to invoke the aid of the courts to protect them against viola tion thereof. They are the President's law, and he alone can enforce them. The general effect of the adoption of the merit system alid of the legislation last referred to has been most salu tary. The evils at which these laws were aimed, and the history of the popular movement which resulted in their general adoption, will be found set forth in the article on CIVIL-SERVICE REFORM. See Ashley, The American Federal State (New . York, 1902) ; Anson, Law and Custom of the Constitution (Oxford, 1S92) : Eaton, Civil Ser •ice in Great Britain. (New York, ISSO) ; Good now, Comparative Administ mare Law (New York, IS93) ; and the authorities referred to under CIVIL-SERVICE REFORM,